Public Opinion and Military Intervention in Iraq:
The Impact of Race, Gender, and Political Alienation

Eugene Walton Jr.
Mentor: Dr. Marijke Breuning
Truman State University

Abstract

This study explores how race, gender and alienation affect public opinion on military deployments abroad. This study extends the literature concerning these three variables. Specifically, the theories and predominant patterns of past studies have been applied to the newest case (the U.S./Iraq war). The subjects came from the 2002 National Election Survey. The model enjoyed a respectable sample size of 673 respondents. Confirming prior studies, it was found that being female and having a lower economic status, continues to correlate highly with diminished support for military deployments abroad. Conversely, political affiliation with the President's party and approval of the President's job performance leads individuals to support military interventions abroad at higher rates. Surprisingly, Blacks were not found to significantly disfavor war in comparison with non-blacks, and alienation was found to be completely insignificant in determining support for the U.S. deployment to Iraq. This finding is theory infirming, as both of these variables demonstrate a break with previous research.

Introduction

Many have argued that the infamous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on targets both in Washington, DC, and New York, resulted in a paradigmatic shift in public perceptions of international threats to the United States. In the aftermath, patriotism as well as xenophobia were purported to have been at all-time highs (Isaac, 2003). Hence, these events constitute an important reason to revisit the literature concerning public perceptions of military deployments abroad. Did public opinion regarding foreign policy – and specifically regarding military deployments overseas – change after 9/11?

The literature has consistently suggested that race, gender and alienation affect public opinion about politics in general, and foreign policy and military deployments overseas in particular. African-Americans consistently differ in their opinions and voting behavior from whites in America – a chasm that can be found along a wide range of national policy issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001). This racial divide remains intact across studies that have investigated trends in race differences regarding foreign policy opinions over the last fifty years (Nincic & Nincic, 2002). In addition, women's opinions parallel those of Black Americans closely in this regard (Erikson, Luttbeg & Tedin, 1991). Lastly, political alienation has also been found to have an effect on public opinion about military deployments abroad (Kowalski, 1991). Is this still true in the post-9/11 era? This study seeks to extend earlier work on the relevance of race, gender, and alienation in public opinion regarding foreign policy. Did public opinion regarding the impending military intervention in Iraq follow similar patterns as public opinion on earlier interventions, such as those on the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf?

If there has indeed been a paradigmatic shift, the impact of race, gender, and political alienation on public opinion regarding military deployments overseas should be significantly

different from the patterns observed prior to 9/11. If, however, the claims of a paradigmatic change have been overstated and, rather than a paradigmatic shift, public opinion has remained steady, the patterns observed in earlier studies should remain visible in post-9/11 surveys. To investigate persistence and change in the relevance of race, gender, and alienation, I will employ data from the 2002 National Election Study (NES) and compare the patterns found in this recent study to those found in the literature. The 2002 NES was completed very shortly after the events of 9/11 and shortly before the troop deployment to and war in Iraq. Hence, this survey was well-timed for the questions central to this investigation.

Review of Literature

In order to judge whether a paradigmatic shift in public opinion regarding military intervention has occurred, it is important to first sketch the patterns of previous findings on the impact of race, gender, and political alienation. After outlining the general trends within the literature on public opinion and foreign policy, this section will discuss previous findings regarding the impact of race, gender, and political alienation.

The literature concerning public opinion began with the premise that there are societal foundations to the development of U.S. foreign policy opinions. Traditionally, however, the literature has approached this premise from what is a *vertical* rather than a *horizontal* perspective (Nincic & Nincic, 2002). Vertically thinking scholars emphasize the elite/mass interaction. That is to say that they believe understanding opinions on foreign policy is a product of how elites and masses coalesce (Almond, 1950; Galtung, 1964; Holsti & Rosenau 1984). Much of this literature (Hinckley, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Russett, 1990; Wittkopf, 1990) emphasizes a

'realpolitik' conceptualization in which elites often attempt to manipulate the content and sources of information to affect domestic opinion on foreign policy (Nincic, 1992). The horizontal perspective, by contrast, presumes that one's opinion is primarily a function of where one finds oneself relative to one's society (Nincic & Nincic, 2002). Within the work of those who have taken a horizontal approach, many scholars have concluded that race, gender and oft times perceived alienation have been strong and significant factors in predicting public opinion (Erickson, Luttbeg & Tedin, 1991). This study follows the horizontal approach and seeks to identify how: natural, societal, and self-inflicted designations affect opinions concerning foreign policy.

When one shifts the dependent variable from domestic and social issues, to those of foreign policy, the quantity of scholarly research on the subject diminishes substantially. The existing literature indicates that race, gender, and political alienation are important to understanding public opinion, but it is not always clear whether this is also true of public opinion on foreign policy. I will discuss the findings regarding the impact of race, gender, and political alienation. Where possible, I will draw on literature that addresses foreign policy directly, but I must also employ work conducted on domestic and social issues to extrapolate plausible hypotheses regarding the impact of these variables on public opinion and foreign policy.

Race. The issue of how race affects public opinions on foreign policy has largely been neglected in the literature. However, in the few studies on the matter, the results were found to be significant (e.g., Tuck & Sigelman, 1997). When considering explanations for possible differences in the way whites and Blacks perceive policy, domestic issues have enjoyed considerably more attention. Through such research, explanations for minority behavior (specifically African-Americans) have identified multiple issues of policy upon which Black and

white opinions differ. For instance, some scholars have found that blacks tend to support social welfare policies considerably more than whites (Erickson, Luttbeg &Tedin, 1991; Kinder & Sanders, 1996). In another example, research has demonstrated that Blacks tend to exhibit more opposition to abortion and more support for school prayer than whites (Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1992). It is not always easy to identify where interest and policy preferences coalesce in these individual matters. Generally research on foreign policy finds similar differences in Black opinion, as research focusing on domestic policy. From these works it is clear that these cleavages are strongest between the Black and white American communities, as opposed to other minorities.

When looking at Black support for military deployments, it was found that Blacks are less likely to support the deployment of military forces abroad than are non-Blacks (Mueller, 1973 & 1994; Nincic & Nincic, 2002). The exception to this rule *may* occur when the military deployment is to a country that has a majority black population (Holsti, 1996; Yankelovich Partners 1994; & Gallup, 1993). This lack of enthusiasm for American foreign policy was found to be significant during the Cold War as well, as Blacks were found to be less anti-communist than whites (Smith & Seltzer, 1992: 79-80). These studies and assertions, have been few in number, and have not been conducted since the end of the Gulf War.

Gender. The role of gender in public opinion is well established. The vast majority of scholars have found that the divide between women and men is more substantial than that between Blacks and non-Blacks (Genest & Wilcox, 1990; Shapiro & Mahajan 1986; Caprioli, 2000; Mueller 1973 & 1994; Page Shapiro, 1992; Nincic & Nincic, 2002). Numerous theories have been offered in support of these findings.

The schools of thought as to why gender matters fall into three broad categories. The first, *social-constructionist* theory proposes that women are socially and culturally engineered as more passive than men (Eisenstein, 1983; Goldstein, 2001, Peterson, 1994). The second school of thought (*essentialist theory)* holds that men tend to be more aggressive than women. This difference in aggression is then attributed to various physio- and psychological reasons (Fukuyama, 1998; Goldstein 2001, Ruddick 1989). Together they seem to be a tilt on nature/nurture arguments. The third viewpoint is that of *consequentialist theory* (Berkman, 1990). This innovative explanation focuses on the fact that women are increasingly becoming the victims of war. That is to say those women suffer numerous hardships that range from issues of dignity and social survival to the very practical issues of personal safety and providing for families. The recent events in the Sudan demonstrate this argument succinctly. Of the women who have become victims of this conflict, thousands have been tortured, systematically raped, and/or otherwise abused. For these reasons, women are believed to consciously oppose aggressiveness and military deployments.

These theories have not yet been applied to major conflicts beyond the Gulf War. However, collectively they illustrate the need for continued application of the concept of a gender gap in opinions of militarized deployment abroad, as the role of women in this matter is both substantial and unique (Lindsey, 2000). Nonetheless, some scholars feel that either the gender gap does not exist or they proffer arguments that diminish its strength substantially (Berkman, 1990; Cook & Wilcox, 1991; Tessler & Warriner, 1997).

Political Alienation.   A growing number of scholars are applying what has been and is in some respects an ambiguous term to the realm of opinion and foreign policy. These scholars believe that how much an individual or group of individuals identifies with the larger polity

(*alienation)* affects that individual or group's attitudes and perceptions of foreign policy. Incidentally, Blacks and women experience levels of alienation that are systematically higher than that of whites (Nincic & Nincic, 2002). We know that Blacks and women support military deployments less than whites, and so it is possible that alienation is an intervening variable in this case. Thus alienation may be a large part of the cause for supporting or failing to support military deployments abroad. This argument derives form the work of earlier scholars who have concluded that greater identity with the group leads to greater identity with the group's successes and failures (Kowalski & Wolfe, 1994; Sidanius et al, 1997). This conceptualizing of the nature of how political alienation affects individuals and their role in society is largely unchallenged in the literature.

There has long been a realization that the crisis of war can enhance civic democracy and participation (Brown, 1974). By extrapolation it can be concluded that such an enhancement may constitute a decline in feelings of political alienation. However, as of now, any new literature concerning the combination of terrorism with political alienation is understandably puerile. One scholar argues from an inverse perspective and concludes that these traditional patterns (of increased civic participation) have largely not materialized when looking at the new case of terrorism (Skocpol, 2002). Specifically, she argues that past traumatic events (e.g. World War II) have coincided with massive government efforts to "mobilize the citizenry," but that the current case has not occurred in the same way. Skocpol has concluded that September 11 resulted in no change in participation, with the exception of church attendance. As evidence of this she points to a decline in the indicators of civic participation. Once again, it can be inferred that if this is true, than feelings of alienation experienced by specific communities must have at

least remained constant, despite the *unifying* attacks of 9/11. This idea qualifies civic

participation, in much the same way other prominent scholars have done (e.g. Putnam, 1995).

The concept of alienation is one that is not well understood. Why might individuals

increase or decrease personal perceptions of alienation, and how does that affect their opinions

about foreign policy? I propose that alienation as it is measured on the 2002 National Election

Study will provide a good approximation of levels of political alienation after the terrorist attacks

of September 11, 2001. This data will help identify how; 9/11 may or may not have resulted in a

change in feelings of political alienation. This measure of alienation will be aimed at providing

some description of the state of the polity after these attacks. In so doing, this study will address

the applicability of the theoretical paradigm on a public exposed to volatile terrorist activity.

Specifically, the question at issue is whether or not alienation remains to be important in

determining support for military deployments abroad.

Additional Independent Variables. Although race, gender, and political alienation are

the variables of interest in this study, several other variables are added to rule out alternative

explanations. The literature has taken into account the *political affiliation* of respondents. The

basic premise is that if military action is being undertaken by a President of the same political

association (Republican or Democrat), then the respondent's support for said action will increase

(Mueller, 1973). This finding was extended to the more recent case of the Gulf War, and found

to be consistent (Holsti, 1996). Yet the larger literature examining cases in the past fifty years is

inconclusive. Whether this finding is supported or not as these models are extended to more

recent cases remains to be seen, yet they are necessarily included to avoid attributing to much of

the cause for opinions about military deployments to race and gender (Nincic & Nincic, 2002).

In addition to party affiliation, the respondent's judgment of the President's job performance may affect foreign policy opinions. I argue that how the public views the competency of its leadership will share some systematic relationship with who supports decisions (by that leadership) to go to war. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that one's resistance to militarism may be appeased if that individual has a certain degree of confidence in the competency of the leadership. By logical extension, it is possible that this relationship might work in reverse as well. This being the case, *Public Perceptions of Leadership* (PPL) may mitigate any lack of variance experienced in the model, when looking at political alienation and other independent variables. That is to say that PPL may give a more accurate depiction of the causes of support for war.

Researchers of this topic area are also careful to point a suspicious finger at the usual suspects (*socio-economic* variables). Researchers have been careful to add these age and status variables to their study, as their training demands, yet their significance has been marginal or non-existent. The principal variables of this sort included in the literature are *age, education,* and *income*. The research on socio-economic patterns and foreign policy opinions is contradictory. As such, the impact of age, education, and income is unclear. Some scholars (Mueller 1973; Russet & Nincic, 1976; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Holsti, 1996) have conducted studies from which they base assertions about the nature of these relationships.

Various case studies and empirical studies have found largely divergent significances. These being the case, scholars largely refrain from speculation as to the direction and strength of such relationships. The research on age and propensity to support military deployments abroad is largely inconclusive. However, some scholars suggest that older individuals will support war less than younger individuals (Page & Shapiro, 1992). These generational differences are in line

with domestic public opinion findings. Mueller (1973) concluded that those of a higher socio-economic status will support military deployments more readily than those of lower status. So as an extension of that theory, those with a higher income are expected to support war more readily than those with lower incomes. Other than this finding the jury is effectively out, on how income shapes opinion on foreign policy. In some cases (i.e. Korean War & Desert Storm) it has been found to be significant, in others (Vietnam & Desert Shield) it was found very insignificant. Finally, education research is inconclusive as well. Some researchers maintain that support for military intervention increases with increased education (Russett & Nincic, 1976). Other scholars who study public opinion are more speculative of such a finding (Holsti, 1996). This project will include these variables.

It has been proposed that both *military assertiveness* and *isolationism* are consistent measures of policy preference (Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser, 1999). This study has shown that whether one is militarily assertive or not, and/or has a propensity towards isolationism or internationalism, significantly affects how that person views the decision to go to war. No qualms are made about the validity of these findings. However, this measure seems to work better in time-series studies. Applied to a specific case, such as this one, the relationship will likely contribute little to the understanding of how the public viewed going to war, and thus these variables are not appropriate for this study.

Hypotheses. In sum, the literature has provided contrasting findings on at least several of these variables, although it appears that race, gender, and political alienation have been consistently found to influence attitudes on foreign policy. If there has been a significant paradigmatic shift, than one would expect:

> H_o1: *Black respondents will not display significantly less support for war, than non-Blacks.*

H_o2: Female respondents will not display significantly less support for war than males.
H_o3: Feelings of alienation will not increase significantly, as support for war decreases.

If there has been no significant paradigmatic shift one would expect that:

H_a1: Black respondents will display significantly less support for war, than non-blacks.
H_a2: Female respondents will display significantly less support for war than males.
H_a3: Feelings of alienation will increase significantly, as support for war decreases.

The fourth hypothesis, concerning Public Perceptions of Leadership, cannot be grouped in the same manner, as there is no precedent in the literature for the impact of such a variable. Instead it will be assessed on its face for applicability and usefulness as an explanatory variable. This being the case, hypothesis four reads:

H_o4: Respondents, who approve of the President's job performance, will display higher support for war than those that disapprove of the President's job performance..

Data & Methodology

The 2002 National Election Study is used to test the above hypotheses. The information extracted from the database, are questions which help get at topics of interest to this study. For example, one question asks for the respondent's opinion on a possible military deployment to Iraq. Other questions ask for opinions on the performance of the President, political affiliation, and, of course, there are a number of demographic and socio-economic questions that have been extracted as well. Due to the nature of the dependent variable (support for war), ordinary least squares regression (OLS) was used to test the effect of a number of independent variables on a continuous dependent variable.

Support for War. This measure ranged from (1) approves strongly to (2) disapprove strongly. The measure was recoded to run continuously from (1) disapprove strongly to (4) approve strongly. Support for war appears in the result section as *supforwar.*

Race. This dummy variable is coded as non-Black=0, and Blacks=1. The literature

focuses heavily on the Black/white distinction. The database being (National Election Study,

2002) used is has a sample of Blacks that is rather small, yet is the only and most recent survey

dealing with this issue area. The literature, which realizes this weakness, has compensated by

using a time-series technique, which substantially increases their black sample. It also suggests

that more extensive racial categorizations be used. However, the current limitations of the data

will not allow for valid application to broader racial categories. Thus the Black/non-Black

distinction will be used as the primary racial measure. The race variable appears in the result

section as *black.*

Gender. Dummy variable coded as male=0, and female=1. The Gender variable appears

in the result section as *female.*

Alienation. Prior studies involving alienation have utilized two questions from the

National Election Studies. Fortunately these questions are also included on the 2002 National

Election Study and are designed to identify how estranged from government the respondent feels.

These questions are direct and allow the respondent to judge how whether or not they agree with

the following statements:

- Public officials don't care what people like me think.
- People like me have no say about government.

The two questions offered finite responses; 1) agree, 2) neither agree nor disagree, and 3)

disagree. The two measures were indexed into a new variable, and recoded so that a continuous

measure from 2…10 in even intervals, was created (from disagree, to agree). This combined

measure appears in the result section as *alienation.*

Age. The age variable, as derived from the National Election Study 2002, ranges from 18-79 years. The ages are coded in intervals from 1…8 in ascending order. The variable appears in the result section as *age.*

Income. Income of the household is measured in thousands of dollars per year on a continuum from $0…to more than $84,999. The income measure appears in the result section as *income*.

Education. Education is measured by degree completed, from high school diploma to PhD. This measure is coded from 3…7. The education variable appears in the result section as *education*.

Political Party Affiliation. The original variable ran on a scale from 1…6, meaning strong Democrat to strong Republican. For the purposes of this study the three categories of support for each party were collapsed into one dichotomous dummy variable of either Democrat or Republican. This measure is coded as Democrat=0, and Republican=1. The affiliation measure appears in the result section as *republican.*

Public Perceptions of Leadership. This variable is measured as disapprove=0, approve=1. The approval dichotomous variable appears in the results section as *bushjob.*

Model. The literature proposes that race, gender, alienation, and political affiliation will systematically affect support for war. The relationships have been found to be strongest with regards to race, gender, and alienation. Thus, these have become the principal variables for this study. Being Black, female and/or exhibiting strong feelings of alienation will likely continue to indicate less support for war. In addition to these factors the literature suggests that four other variables be taken into account as well. Because the significance of these factors has been inconsistent, these variables (age, income, education, and political affiliation) are not expected to

have much effect on support for war. However, if these factors are found to be significant, younger respondents will support war more, while lower income respondents will support war less. Furthermore, those with higher levels of education will support war less, than those with lower levels. Although the literature does not address public perceptions of the President, this model will include a Bush job approval thermometer. The hope is that the approval rating will act with party affiliation and absorb some excess variance that might be attributed to race or gender. Support for war will most likely share a positive correlation with Bush's job approval measure. A full set of co-linearity diagnostics has not yet been conducted, but a simple correlation matrix shows that co-linearity is unlikely to be a problem (see Appendix A). Accounting for these factors, the equation for the theoretical model can be stated as follows:

$$\rightarrow supforwar = a + b_1\,(black) + b_2\,(female) + b_2\,(alienation) + b_4(age) + b_5(income) \quad + b_6(education) + b_7(republican) + b_8(bushjob)$$

Results

Patterns evident in the literature would suggest that the paradigm is that both Blacks and women will exhibit less enthusiasm for military deployments abroad than that of both whites and men respectively. Furthermore the literature has supported notion that both alienation and support for war will share an inverse relationship. If these patterns continue to be true than one would expect the results to show that; Blacks, women, and individuals who feel alienated will demonstrate less support for war than their respective counterparts.

Furthermore, most scholars concede (although they don't agree as to the nature of this shift) that the events of 9/11 have represented a major paradigmatic shift in the history of America. This being the case, it is possible that such a shift has implications for public opinion on foreign policy. One such implication is that feelings of alienation might have experienced a

decline, due to the trauma experienced on 9/11. These events may have acted in much the same way as previous attacks (e.g. Pearl Harbor), and triggered a greater sense of identity between the polity and the government. It is entirely possible that people feel that their fate is tied with that of the government and the larger society, and that by its very definition is a lack of alienation. If this is the case than it is also possible that both Blacks and women may be more inclined then they previously were to support military deployments abroad Thus the central question of this study remains, are the aggregate patterns concerning race, gender, and alienation changed or unchanged after the events of 9/11.

*** Table 1, about here***

Table 1 reports the result of the principal variables. Of these, only female was significant. Female had a coefficient of -.141 and was significant at the .10 level. Thus, female respondents were shown to be less supportive of war than male respondents. This finding is consistent with that of earlier studies. Perhaps the most surprising finding was that Blacks were not found to significantly disfavor war, when compared to non-Blacks, and that feelings of alienation showed no significance at all with regards to support for the Iraq war. Both of these findings constitute a substantial break with the patterns demonstrated in the literature, and thus the pre- 9/11 era.

Additional significant findings included *republicans, income* and *bushjob.* Republican respondents had a coefficient of .179 and that finding was significant at the .10 level, so respondents that identified as Republican favored war more than those that identified as Democrats. Income was significant at the .10 level and had a coefficient of -.033, thus respondents with higher incomes supported the war less than respondents with lower incomes.

By far the most significant finding in the model was the Bush approval thermometer. Those respondents who approved of the President's job performance favored the war more than those that didn't, as hypothesized. This finding was significant at the .001 level and carried a coefficient value of 1.46. In addition to these insignificant findings, age was found to be insignificant as well. The model had a sample size of 673 respondents and an r-squared value of .351.

The results from the model clearly supported hypothesis; H_{o1} -- *Black respondents will not display significantly less support for war than non-Blacks,* and alternate hypothesis H_{a2} -- *Female respondents will display significantly less support for war than males.* Also supported was hypothesis H_{o4} -- *Respondents, who approve of the President's job performance, will display higher support for war than those that disapprove of the President's job performance..*

Discussion

Invariably, this research has produced results that may suggest differing courses of direction. The results both confirm previous research and disconfirm it as well. Some of the variables (gender and political affiliation) demonstrate a remarkable degree of continuity with those of earlier studies. On others (race and political alienation) the represent a break with past studies

Perhaps most surprisingly, Blacks did not significantly disfavor war less than non-Blacks. This finding is a break with the previous literature. Studies conducted in the past are scarce, but those that have been done have found that Blacks disfavored the wars in Korea, Vietnam as well as the Gulf War, more than white Americans (Mueller, 1973 & 1994). Other scholars conducting empirical studies have found similar results, including that Black Americans are

more likely to favor a military withdrawal than white Americans (Nincic & Nincic, 2002).

Interpreting these results might lead one to conclude that the events of 9/11 have acted to change

this paradigm in some way. For instance, it is possible to conclude that 9/11 either permanently

or temporarily mitigated some of the resistance to military deployments existent in the Black

communities. If this is the case, one would expect to see a reduced resistance to the newest

military deployment, which was at issue in the model. Certainly, there are other possible

explanations for this apparent shift. For instance, Blacks continue to comprise a substantial

portion of the military and thus may have developed substantial ties to its values and the

organization itself. At the very least, there are likely to be many Blacks who view this support

and patriotism as support for their friends and relatives.

Of course there are limitations as to what conclusions can be drawn from a lack of

significance, and thus future projects need to explore larger samples with more extensive

demographic categorizations. In addition it would be helpful to conduct a poll that would help

track Black opinions on the Iraq war as it develops, so that we might determine if this break with

prior research constitutes a legitimate shift or simply one of many shifts in public opinion. Will

this new development continue and represent a new pattern in Black opinions on foreign policy,

or is this lack of significant difference only a temporary phenomenon? It is important to note

that although there was a lack of significance found, the coefficient was negative. That being the

case it is possible that a future study that utilizes a larger Black sample will find a significant

difference. Essentially, it is simply too early to conclude that Black opinions are substantially

different than they have been in the past.

Although limits of data and social-designations have constrained the parameters of this

project, I do not assume that the universe of public opinion can be stratified completely into a

Black and non-Black structure. Furthermore, I suspect that the racial divide with respect to Black American groups is much more complex than the literature suggest. Specifically, I propose that if it is true that issues of foreign policy are largely based on ideology because they hold little substantive benefit (Abrams & Hogg, 1990), than all the complexities and inconsistencies that accompany the ideologies of Black Americans would be visited on opinions of military deployment. In short, the issue is more complex than my results would lead one to believe. However, the fact that these results break with previous findings is intriguing and cause for further study.

Females were less supportive of war than were males. This finding is consistent with the literature that has looked at major American conflicts over the last fifty years. Thus, the gender divide was found to continue to hold merit with regards to foreign policy opinions. These findings are not at all surprising and help give credence to the model. In light of the finding that gender continues to be a salient basis for division in opinion, the research must now seek to answer why this is the case. For instance, this divide might be a product of nature/nurture concerns (i.e. essentialist or consequentialist theory). On the other hand, what is being read as an output of gender might actually be reflection of an overall sense of alienation from both politics and government or the greater polity it self. What is interesting is that despite the monumental effects of 9/11, women continued to exhibit similar behavior in that they remain more reluctant to engage in war than males. This might suggest that the roots of disparity between male and female opinions are deeper than many might have previously believed. If this is the case, one could certainly think of a number of bases upon which such strong cleavages may be derived.

Republicans and those who approve of George Bush's job performance favored and strongly favored war, respectively. This is a very intuitive finding, as one would expect those

who like Bush to be Republicans. When correlated these two variables indeed shared a

correlation of .53, so there is a degree of overlap inherent in the two variables. Yet, this output

leaves room for personal judgment, and I propose that job approval may be a measure capable of

displacing political *affiliation* in the literature. This is especially true if the measure is intended

as a control rather than one of principal interest, as job approval is a much stronger indication of

support for war than was party affiliation. This measure also leaves room for non-partisanship,

as respondents who indicate a Democratic affiliation may still approve of the performance of a

President from the Republican Party. At the very least, future research should take such

considerations into account with multiple measures, especially when measuring the affects of

highly unifying events (such as 9/11).

Income did not move in the expected direction. I suspect that the myriad of controversies

surrounding the Bush administration's decision to proceed with war in Iraq led to a more

complex polarization of opinions than would have otherwise existed. Indeed many low income

Americans are among its most patriotic citizens who may exhibit more trust in the President's

decisions than I initially anticipated. This is likely very true of rural Americans. A more

conservative opinion might conclude that the income inconsistencies are a product of sampling

problems. Particularly, there is the problem that there are many more non-black respondents

than black respondents. These non-black respondents (comprised of mostly whites) will

inevitably have a higher average income. The results must be reconciled with the fact that, there

might be a skew in the results because of this bias, and that this will have its biggest affect on

marginal measures, such as this one.

Given the findings of previous studies, it is interesting that alienation was not found to be

a significant factor in determining support for the Iraq war. This result suggests that alienation

did not influence the degree to which Americans supported the decision to go to war. If this is the case, than what is suggested by Skocpol (alienation is not necessarily on the decline) may not be true. Although she has found that Americans are not becoming more involved in civic organizations, I must caution scholars against concluding too much from this finding. Americans did not find that feeling alienated was significant in determining their support for war. Although the nature of this study precludes me from claiming that feelings of alienation are on the decline, it is possible that Skocpol's findings have limitations. Maybe, the growing isolation of the average American from his/her community does not extend to how they feel about going to war or possibly other areas of foreign policy. It is also possible that the alienation measure which is in use by this project and numerous other studies in the literature, are poor. Clearly, if more understanding is to be gained, there must be more research conducted.

When viewing the totality of the evidence, one cannot come to the conclusion that a complete paradigmatic shift has occurred after 9/11. The gender variable returned a significant result that moved in the predicted direction. This was a confirmation of the literature and support for the concept that some of these differences in opinion still exist. Yet to assert that there has been no change since 9/11 or at least since the Persian Gulf War would also be false. When viewing the results of the race variable, it is clear that something led to a change in the behavior of Black Americans. If Blacks disfavored every other conflict more than non-Blacks, and did not disfavor the Iraq war significantly, then that is cause for further exploration. In total the results here are cause for continued interest in the matter and exploration into what the effect of 9/11 has been on public opinion. Furthermore, future research must explore whether these effects represent permanent paradigmatic shifts or simply an exceptional and temporary shift in

public opinion. It is also possible that researchers could make up for shortcomings in the data by

taking a more detailed look at respondents and their opinions.

Conclusion

This study extends the literature on the race/gender divide and alienation and its effect on

foreign policy beyond the Gulf War. The results show that; being female and having a lower

economic status implies a lower propensity to support military interventions abroad. These

findings are in line with previous research and suggest that these differences in opinion have

deep roots that remain consistent over time. Conversely, political affiliation with the President

and approval of the President's job performance leads individuals to support military

interventions abroad at a higher rate, as could be expected. These variables must be taken into

account when studying this topic area, and would probably be best used together as an aggregate

measure of the elite/mass interaction. That is to say that taken together these variables allow one

to measure how the respondent feels about their leadership.

Surprisingly, Blacks were not found to significantly disfavor war in comparison with

non-blacks, and alienation was found to be completely irrelevant in determining support for war

(in the case of the U.S. deployment to Iraq). These findings constitute a break with prior studies.

At issue in this study is why Black respondents were no longer showing themselves to be as war

inhibitive as they once were. Further study should seek to conduct more thorough examination

of Black respondents and increase their Black Sample. Without such studies it is impossible to

determine whether Blacks are displaying this new behavior because of: fears over personal safety,

heightened feelings of patriotism, or a new feeling of genuine closeness and identity with the

greater American polity. When considering what has changed and, and what has not changed for

Black Americans in the course of the 50 years prior to this study, one can be certain that the possible explanations are daunting. Social mobility is a new reality for many Black Americans, yet many barriers still exist. Various policies aimed at mitigating the injustices of the past have been developed and are currently in place, yet the affects of the disenfranchisement of slavery and beyond are still apparent, especially when considering the lack of true wealth in the Black community. Actually, it is not at all surprising that this group and its particular combination of characteristics coupled with a changing and dynamic world might lead to tremendous shifts in the collective opinion.

Although this study cannot make direct claims regarding the change or continuity in public opinion of Blacks, women, and alienated citizens, the findings certainly suggest that there is quite a bit of continuity and the intriguing finding that even though Blacks still support war less (as evidenced by the negative coefficient), they are no longer significantly (statistically) different from others in American society. Despite the considerable work of prior researchers and indeed the work of this project, the study of popular opinions on foreign policy issues (with regard to race, gender and alienation) is still in its early stages, and needs to be expanded. This expansion must include more cases, larger samples, as well as greater and more nuanced measures.

Yet the results found in this study suggest that the opinion's of our nations female and minority groups is not well understood. This study demonstrates that Black opinions are not simply always the opposite of white opinions. In fact, Blacks and whites have much in common and share many of the same values. Despite the long and troubling history Black Americans have endured, they are still fiercely patriotic, religious and behave politically within the scope of these two values. It must be understood that their opinions on a number of policy issues (foreign

and domestic) have been mitigated by the reality of their citizenship. They proceed with caution on matters of economics, war, and civil liberties because they have often been the designated losers in these areas of policy.

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Table 1: OLS Regression: Support for War

Independent Variable	Support for War
black	-.189575
	(0.226)
female	-.1408955*
	(0.076)
alienation	.0087691
	(0.517)
republican	.1788185*
	(0.064)
age	.027763
	(0.334)
education	-.061402
	(0.260)
income	-.03259113*
	(0.091)
Bushjob	1.457145***
	(0.000)
Constant	2.205447
N	673
R-Squared	.3512

Note. ***Indicates significance at the .01 level. **at the .05 level and *at the .10 level. p-value is in parentheses.

Correlations among Independent Variables

	black	female	alien	repub	age	educ	income	bushjob
black	---	.01	.07	-.25	.04	-.02	-.17	-.22
female		---	-.03	-.03	-.04	.03	-.13	-.01
alien			---	-.13	-.07	.04	-.2	-.10
repub				---	.03	-.01	.19	.54
age					---	-.19	-.04	.02
educ						---	.01	-.03
income							---	.12
bushjob								---

Note. alien = alienation; repub = republican; educ = education.