PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE: ECONOMICS, CULTURE, OR EXPOSURE?

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Abstract

This study examines several common arguments that attempt to explain public opinion on immigration in Western Europe. These explanations are individual economic, collective economic, culture, and exposure to immigrants. The goal of this research is to test which of these arguments is able to predict public attitude. The analysis uses OLS regression, which allows for control of each argument and comparison across models. The data used is from the Eurobarometer survey data from 1997. The results show that national economics and culture are able to predict public opinion on immigration, while individual economics and exposure to immigrants are unable to predict public attitudes. Attitudes are therefore shaped by both short-term influences (national economy) and long-term influences (culture).

PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE

One of the major changes in European society since World War II has been the increase in immigration, bringing new peoples, languages, religions, and cultural practices to the continent. Immigration can influence every sector of a country, including politics, culture, and the economy. In response to this, scholars have been studying the effects of immigration on national and local economies, extreme right political parties (Mayer 2002; Marchart 2002; Betz 2001), group preferences (Haus 1995[1]), government policies concerning multiculturalism (Barry 2001), access to the welfare system, and citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998). Oddly, only a few studies have examined public opinion on immigration. In two of the most relevant studies, Hernes and Knudsen (1992) looked at Norwegians' opinion of immigration, while Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior conducted a study of immigration opinion in The Netherlands (2004).

Public attitudes on immigration can influence the position of political parties, that in turn shape public policy on immigration. Currently, we do not yet understand what shapes individual attitudes on this subject. We do know that public opinion varies over time and several theories have been presented to explain these changes.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive examination of the factors that influence public opinion on immigration. Previous work suggests that the factors can be divided into three categories: economic, cultural, and exposure to immigrants. Sniderman et al. found that in The Netherlands public attitudes on immigration are better explained by culture than economics (2004). Their study was conducted in only a single country, thus lacking variance in the national economy that exists when comparing one country to the other.

There is disagreement among scholars as to which set of factors is most important in explaining public opinion. The first section of this study examines the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of each set of explanations. Next, empirical tests are conducted to examine the relationship between public opinion on immigration and variables measuring each set of explanations across twelve European countries. Finally, a combined model is run with all of the variables; this model proves to be the most accurate in explaining public opinion towards immigration.

CATEGORIES OF PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION

Each of the three sets of explanations: economic, cultural, and exposure to immigrants purport to explain public opinion on immigration, and each does so by specifying the existence of conflict between the native population and immigrants over resources. The nature of the conflict, however, is different for each of the explanations.

Economic Theories of Public Opinion

Theories concerning the effects of economic factors on electoral preferences are commonplace in political studies (Lewis-Beck 1986, 1988; Feldman 1984; Kiewiet 1983) and

[1] Leah Haus focuses upon immigration policy preferences of labor unions in the United States and France.

can be divided into two general types. The first is commonly referred to as the individual theory and the second is the collective theory.[2] Both hold that during bad economic times voters are less likely to support the incumbent government and that during good economic times voters will support the incumbent government. The difference between the two theories is the level of measurement for the economy. The individual theory uses individual-level measures, such as individual income and employment status. It argues that people are concerned with their personal economic situation. Meanwhile, the collective theory focuses on national economic variables, such as the unemployment and the economic growth rates. This theory argues that voters use the national economic situation to determine their opinion on the economy, and ultimately their vote choice.

Economic performance can also explain public opinion concerning immigration (Sniderman et al. 2004). Specifically, bad economic times should be associated with negative opinions of immigrants. In stagnating economies, job competition can create a conflict between the native and immigrant populations, which according to both economic theories, should result in a negative backlash against immigrants (Zolberg 1991). In periods of economic growth, as the number of jobs increases and job competition is less affected by the arrival of immigrants, public opinion on immigrates should moderate. Theoretically, native individuals who are in direct competition with immigrants for jobs should have the most negative attitudes about immigrants and immigration (Runchiman 1966 and Brox 1972). But, do individuals base their opinion on immigration on individual economic conditions or collective (national) economic performance? The literature on immigration is relatively silent on this point.

Cultural Theory of Public Opinion

A challenge to the economic explanation is the possibility that long-term cultural predispositions have a larger impact on public opinion on immigration than either individual or national economic conditions. Even during periods of economic growth, public opinion may be anti-immigration, and this may be due to cultural influences. Eytan Meyers wrote, "…the unique history of each country, its conceptions of citizenship and nationality, as well as debates over national identity and social conflicts within it, shape its immigration policies" (Meyers 2000, 1251), and presumably also influence public opinion on immigration. The basic assumption of cultural theory is that every culture has an identity that is shaped by its unique history and this identity influences public opinion including, presumably, opinion toward immigrants.

It seems plausible, for example, that cultures have at their core a basic level of tolerance for outsiders – immigrants in this case. The level of tolerance results in differences in policies concerning social rights, a multicultural society, and whether national identity is civically or ethnically based. If the national identity transcends ethnic differences, then immigrants are more likely to be accepted, but if national identity is based on ethnicity, then immigrants may be shunned.

National identity based on ethnicity is consistent with social identity theory. The theory argues that group identity, which can be culturally based, is a component of individual identity (Brown 1995). Brewer (2001) found that some individuals view out-groups negatively in order

[2] For a review of personal and collective categories, see Lewis-Beck, 1986.

to maintain a positive view of their in-group identity, which helps in maintaining a positive individual identity. The presence of immigrants creates an out-group for the native population and helps to determine membership of in-groups (Barth 1981). Out-groups pose a threat to the in-group identity, which means a threat to individual identity according to the social identity theory.

The strength of the cultural theory is its ability to explain differences in attitudes toward immigration that are not captured by short-term economics. The downside of the theory is that culture changes slowly while public opinion on immigration can change quickly. An example of a dramatic change concerning immigration entry policy occurred in the United Kingdom from 1958 to 1968. In 1958, 37% of those surveyed supported free entry, but by 1968 only 1% supported it (Alibhai-Brown 1999). The British culture certainly did not change so dramatically in a single decade, so cultural theory falls short of fully explaining public attitudes on immigration.

Exposure to Immigrants and Size of Immigrant Population

The recent immigrants to Western Europe come from various countries, but the majority are from the developing world. For example, Germany receives Turkish immigrants, while most immigrants into Great Britain and France come from their former colonies, in South Asia and Northern Africa. These immigrants bring with them non-European cultures, languages, and religions. As the number of immigrants in a country increases, so does exposure of the native population to the immigrants and to their different identities. The native population can perceive this as a threat, which is sometimes called collective threat theory (Quillion 1995). This theory contains two parts. The first is economic, which includes the individual and collective economic theories mentioned previously, while the second part is the relative size of the immigrant groups. Quillian (1995; 589) argued that as the relative size of the immigrant population increases, there is a corresponding increase in prejudice and discrimination by the native population. This seems logical because as the number of immigrants increases so does the amount of contact between them and the native population.

Besides relative size, it is important to include the degree of segregation and the location of the immigrating population. Segregation allows for cultural reproduction of immigrant identities while also making the immigrants more visible to the native majority by concentrating the population into specific neighborhoods. Location also affects where ethnic conflict occurs. Immigration patterns in France, Great Britain, and Germany are similar in that the immigrants tend to congregate together in urban centers. The result is that ethnic enclaves have been created in major cities throughout Western Europe. The immigrants are able to reproduce their culture and withstand assimilation, while competing against the members of the native population that also live in these cities. So, when immigrant groups can resist assimilation through segregation and location, native public opinion of them may become more unfavorable.

DATA, HYPOTHESES, AND ANALYTICAL METHODS

The main data source for this study is the Eurobarometer Survey 47.1, conducted in 1997.[3] The survey sampled the opinions of the general population in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Additional national level data comes from the 2002 *Eurostat Yearbook* and the 1997 *CIA World Factbook*.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this study is an additive index of public opinion on immigration made by combining two Eurobarometer survey questions. The first question, number 54, asks if the individual agrees or disagrees with the statement: "legal immigrants should have the same rights as citizens of the host country." The data were coded as 1 for agree and 0 for disagree. The second question, number 55, concerned people's opinion on the presence of immigrants in the host country. It was originally coded as a 1 for "benefits a great deal", as a 2 for "benefits a little", as a 3 for a "little better off", as a 4 for a "great deal better off", and as a 5 for neutral, but I recoded it to a scale of zero (great deal better off), .25 (little better off), .5 (neutral), .75 (benefits a little), and zero (benefits a great deal) so that the scale for this question spans the same 0 to 1 range as the first question.[4] These changes allow the questions to be combined to create a variable that ranges from zero to two with a correlation between the questions of 0.346 (significant at .01). This correlation indicates that both questions capture a similar sentiment about immigration. Table 1 provides the mean and standard deviation for the dependent variable for each country in the study.

Control Variables

Four control or background variables were included in every model. These are age, gender, education, and population. Age is measured in years. Gender is coded as 0 for male and 1 for female. Education is the age of the respondents when they completed their last full year of education. I removed all respondents currently continuing their education since they were coded as 99. Finally, population is the 1997 CIA estimate of the total population for each country, reported in thousands.

Economic Variables

The economic variables are divided into collective economic indictors and individual economic indictors. The collective variables are the unemployment rate in 1996, the change in unemployment from 1995 to 1996, GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita, and GNP (Gross National Product) change from 1995 to 1996. Most of the variables came from the *Eurostat Yearbook* and each country's values were attached to the respondent from that country. The unemployment variables used data from two sources. The *Eurostat Yearbook* provided the number of unemployed individuals in each country and the *CIA World Factbook* provided the population of each. I divided the number of unemployed individuals by the total population to

[3] Random samples of individuals are taken from each member of the EU. The questions are the same and the sample size is usually 1,000 individuals except for the United Kingdom and Germany. Note that Luxembourg is not included in this study but was included in the survey and Northern Ireland is combined with the United Kingdom.
[4] The appendix provides further details on this change.

find the percentage of each country that is unemployed. The unemployed change variable was simply the difference between the percentage of 1995 and 1996.

As the unemployment rate increases, public opinion on immigration should become more negative, because the number of individuals in direct competition with immigrants increases as economic conditions worsen. High levels of unemployment should also result in negative attitudes towards immigrants. Higher per capita GNP should be positively correlated with public opinion of immigration should be. Countries with higher GNP per capita have an economic need for immigrants to fill lower wage and labor-intensive sectors of the economy. Meanwhile, immigrants see these countries as desirable places, due to the economic wealth. So, these countries probably receive more immigrants than less economically developed countries. As measured by the changes in GNP from 1996 to 1997, it is expected that as the economy grows, public opinion on immigration will improve because the number of jobs is also growing, decreasing job competition.

Three Eurobarometer questions were used to measure respondents' individual economic situation. The respondents' personal economic situation is measured with a question that asks if the individual's present situation has improved, stayed the same, or worsens in the past five years. I coded the question as 1 for worse, as a 2 for same, and as a 3 for better. Thus, personal economic situations should be positively correlated with opinions of immigration, because good economic standing should lessen the perceived threat of immigrants in the job market. The second individual variable is whether the respondent has been unemployed in the last five years, and it is coded as a 1 for yes and a 0 for no. Individuals who have been unemployed in the last five years are likely to view immigrants as a direct threat to their jobs, resulting in negative opinions of immigrants. The final individual variable is income, and is measured using a four-point scale that divides respondents into quartiles allowing for a cross-national comparison of economic status. The bottom 25% of the respondents in each country are coded as a 1, the second quartile is coded as a 2, the third as a 3, and the highest as a 4. While this variable is not ideal, it does take into account differences in the value of each country's currency. It is expected that as income increases, public opinion on immigration will become positively correlated. High income implies economic security and a decreased economic threat from immigrants.

Cultural Variables

The cultural model uses three variables: a tolerance index, trust, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Tolerance is an additive index using four questions from the Eurobarometer survey, which focus on social rights and lacks any mention of immigration. The questions asked about freedom of speech, the right to one's own language and culture, religious freedom, and freedom of association[5]. It is expected that countries that have a strong ethnic identity and those that support assimilation of minorities will score lower on the tolerance variable than countries that have a more multi-cultural outlook. So, as tolerance increases, public opinion on immigration should become more positive.

Inglehart's (1997) interpersonal trust data are used as another cultural variable. The variable is the percentage of respondents from each country who said that people could be

[5] See appendix for exact questions and coding changes for the tolerance index.

trusted in the 1990-91 World Values Survey. Each country's percentages were attached to the respondents from that country in my dataset. As the level of trust increases, public opinion on immigration should become more positive. A society with a high level of trust should be more accepting of immigrants and consider them to be less of a threat.

The *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* provides the data for the ethnolinguistic fractionalization variable (Taylor and Jodice, 1983). This variable is the probability of two randomly selected individuals in a country speaking different languages. If language is considered an important distinction between cultures that can create in- and out-groups, then this variable captures the level of division in a society. So, as the level of ethnolanguistic fractionalization increases, public opinion on immigration should become positive.

Exposure Variable

The sole variable in the exposure model is the percentage of non-European Union foreign citizens in each country and the data came from the *Eurostat Yearbook*. This serves as an estimate of the number of immigrants in each country. It does not include those immigrants who had become naturalized citizens before 1996 and it only includes immigrants from non-EU countries. These are the individuals who are often targeted by the extreme-right parties and anti-immigration movements, who are less likely to assimilate, and who simply stand out more to the native population due to cultural and ethnic differences. As the number of these foreign citizens increases, public opinion on immigration should become more negative due to the increased amount of conflict between groups.

ANALYTICAL RESULTS

The results were generated using OLS, and are presented in Table 2.[6] The dependent variable is the same in each model, facilitating a comparison of models. The findings are very consistent across each of the six models and provide evidence supporting several of the different hypotheses.

Economic Models

The first three models of Table 2 use the economic variables. Model 1 employs the collective economic variables, model 2 the individual economic variables, and model 3 includes both the collective and individual variables. The results of the economic models are similar; the coefficients remain positive or negative across the models and they show the expected coefficient sign, except for the GDP per capita which is negative when hypothesized to be positive. The majority of the economic variables are significant in each of the models, except for individual unemployment, which is never significant. Also, income is not significant in the combined economic model, but is in the individual economic model.

[6] Luxembourg is excluded from all models. Greece is not included in the cultural and final models due to lack of data for the ethnolinguastic variable.

The first model tests the influence of the collective economy on public attitudes on immigration. The results as a whole conform to many of my hypotheses. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, the coefficient for GDP per capita has a negative correlation with public attitudes. This result is difficult to explain, but it is possible that countries with a high GDP per capita perceive immigrants as a greater threat to both their high level of economic development and the welfare system that states such as Sweden have developed for their population. Future research is required to determine the cause of this unpredicted result.

GNP change is positively correlated, supporting the hypothesis that if the economy is growing then attitudes on immigration are more likely to be positive. Immigrants are less of a national economic threat to the in-group with a growing economy.

The coefficient for unemployment is unexpectedly positive and it provides no support for my hypothesis. Theoretically, I expected high levels of unemployment to result in negative public opinion, since immigrants would be viewed as competition. It could be that the actual trend in change of unemployment may be more important than the actual unemployment rate. Adding an unemployment change variable tested this idea. The coefficient for the unemployment change is correlated and negative. Combine this result with the fact that if unemployment decreased, the value for this variable is negative, then a decrease in unemployment from 1995 to 1996 results in positive public opinion on immigration. This conclusion is confirmed by the regression results with a significant coefficient for this variable.

Studying the standardized coefficients and the R-square allows for further understanding of the results of this model. The standardized coefficients provide evidence that the two most important variables are GDP per capita and GNP change. The collective economic model explains .063 percent of the variance. This result is comparable to that explained by the cultural and exposure models.

The second model uses the individual economic variables. The income and personal situation variables are significant in this model, providing support for the individual hypotheses, and individual unemployment is not significant. As individuals view their personal situation as improving, their attitude about immigration also improves, since immigrants are not negatively affecting these individuals. Income is positively correlated with public attitudes on immigration. Income is measured in quartiles, so the higher the quartile the more likely the individual will have positive attitudes. Both of these correlated results are as expected and provide evidence for the individual economic theory. Comparing the standardized coefficients between personal situation and income results in personal situation being the stronger of the two variables. Based upon this comparison I can conclude that the psychological belief of economically doing better over the last five years is more important than the individual's actual income. However, the individual model does not explain a lot of the variance in public attitudes on immigration. The R-square is only .049, the lowest of any of the models.

The first two models explored two aspects of economics, but the third model combines the economic variables used in the collective and individual models, allowing for a comparison of the two economic theories. The combined economic model provides evidence that collective economics influences individual opinion on immigration more than individual economics. Three

of the four collective variables are significant and once we controlled for these variables only one individual economic variable, personal situation, is important. The standardized coefficients determine that GNP change and personal situation are the two most important of the economic variables. The combined economic model explains .073 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. This is the second highest, only the final model is higher.

Cultural Model

The fourth model on Table 2 uses the three cultural variables. Only the tolerance index is significant at .001. The coefficient for tolerance is positive as expected. As the tolerance index increases, attitudes about immigration become more positive, on average. The standardized coefficient provides evidence that the tolerance index has a strong influence upon public attitudes on immigration. This result makes theoretical sense and provides support for this individual hypothesis. A country with a higher level of tolerance will be more accepting of immigrants and the differences between the native and immigrant cultures. Also, a high level of tolerance can provide a sense of cultural security making immigrants less of a social threat to the in-group. The model explains .066 of the variance in public opinion on immigration. This is the third highest model, behind the final model and the combined economic model. This provides evidence of the importance of the cultural influence upon individual attitudes.

Exposure Model

The exposure model adds a single variable, the percentage of non-EU foreign citizens in each country. The variable is negatively correlated with public attitudes on immigration, which is an interesting result. The negative coefficient indicates that as the number of immigrants increases, then the attitudes on immigration decline. As the number of immigrants increases, the perceived threat of them also increases; whether this threat is believed to be economic or cultural needs to be determined. The R-square for the exposure model is the second worst, only larger then the individual economic model. The model explains .06 of the variance in the dependent variable. Public opinion seems to be explained by more than just contact with immigrants. There needs to be either a situational trigger such as economics, or a predisposition toward negative opinions about immigration.

Final Model

The final model combines all the variables from the previous five models. The pattern established in each of the economic models continues in the final model for the majority of the variables. Even while controlling for culture and exposure, GDP per capita and GNP change continue to be correlated with public opinion. Unemployment is still correlated but is now negative instead of positive. This change from positive to negative finally provides support for the unemployment hypothesis, which stated that as unemployment raises, public opinion on immigration becomes more negative. From the individual economic variables, only personal situation is correlated and it remains positive.

Several changes occur from the cultural model to the final model. Personal situation continues to be positively correlated while trust and ethnolinguastic fractionalization become

correlated. Both variables are positive, providing evidence that as they both increase so do positive attitudes on immigration. Trusting in other individuals decreases the strength of the in and out-group boundaries, the us-versus-them mentality. A country with higher levels of ethnolinguastic fractionalization in 1982 (the year of this measure) would already contain several different cultures before the arrival of the current immigrants. These societies have already created crosscutting cultural institutions to limit the amount of cultural conflict. An example would be Switzerland, a population composed of four European cultures and which implemented more than one official language.

The exposure variable continues to be negative and correlated. This is evidence that as the number of immigrants in a country increases, opinion declines towards them. Theoretically, as the number of immigrants increases in a country, the political, economic, and cultural competition increases on the national level. On the individual level, the amount of contact between the majority and these immigrants increases, which can also cause negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Examining the standardized coefficients for all of the variables allows us to compare them to each other. Individually, the four most powerful variables are GDP per capita, personal situation, tolerance index, and trust. The collective economic variables have a combined standard coefficient value of .255[7]. The cultural variables have a higher value of .319, providing stronger support for the cultural theory of public opinion on immigration. I can also conclude from this finding that high levels of tolerance, trust, and ethnolinguastic fractionalization can keep a positive public opinion of immigration, even with a declining economy. Public attitudes will still decline but may not become problematic.

The final model explains 11% of the variance in the dependent variable. This amount is greater than any of the previous models. The higher R-square is not surprising considering the model contains all the variables from the previous models.

CONCLUSIONS

The final model provides evidence that public opinion on immigration is explained by numerous factors: the collective economy, culture, exposure, and how the individual views their personal situation. These results provide further support for the findings of Sniderman et al. (2004) who found that public opinion in The Netherlands is based upon a cultural conflict rather than an economic conflict. This conclusion is true when comparing individual economics to culture, but the study lacked the variance in collective economics since it focused upon only one country. Adding collective economic variables shows that the national economy is also an important factor in explaining public attitudes on immigration.

Second, the results show that both short and long-term influences are important determents upon individual attitudes. The long-term influences (culture) are difficult to change and take a long period of time to change. A country that is able to increase both their tolerance and trust of outsiders will more likely have a positive attitude of immigrants, but changes in

[7] Added only the significant standardized coefficients together.

these categories are the results of slow change. The second part of this story is the short-term economic influence upon public opinion on immigration. Economies cycle through periods of good and bad times, and these cycles tend to be mostly uncontrollable by governments. Based upon the regression results we can expect attitudes on immigration to also cycle with the national economy.

Finally, as the number of immigrants in each country increases, we can expect that attitudes on immigration will become negative. The combination of a possible declining economy and the increasing number of immigrants to these West European countries can predict a sharp decline in public attitudes and may predict an increase in social problems between the majority and the immigrants.

Future research can expand our understanding of the relationship between economic factors, cultural factors, and exposure to immigrations in three different ways. First, this study focuses upon a single survey conducted in 1997; the results may be a product of that individual year. Research using a longer period of time but the same variables would provide better evidence of the relationship between these variables and public opinion. Second, future research should also expand the number of countries included in the study. Expanding the number of countries allows for greater generalization of the results. Finally, studies focusing upon the individual categories of variables can further explain the relationship between public opinion and how these variables shape opinion.

APPENDIX

Dependent Variable Question Wording and Code Changes

Eurobarometer Question 55:

> "Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY) benefits from the presence of immigrants from non European Union countries, or do you think that (OUR COUNTRY) would be better off without them?"

The following changes were made to this variable:

Table 2. Changes to Question 55, Immigrants Presence- Benefit

Original Code	Answer	Code Change
1	Benefits a great deal	1
2	Benefits a little	.75
3	A little better off	.25
4	Great deal better off	0
5	No Difference	.50

Eurobarometer Question 54:

"Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should have the same social rights as the (NATIONALITY) citizens."

Originally coded as 1 "tend to agree" and 2 as "tend to disagree." The only changed made was "tend to disagree" was changed from 2 to 0.

Independent Economic Variables Question Wording

Eurobarometer Question 37, Personal Situation:

"If you compare your present situation with five years ago, would you say it has improved, stayed about the same or got worse?"

Eurobarometer Question 39, Unemployed in Last 5 Years:

"During the last five years I have been unemployed once or more"

Tolerance Index Question Wording and Code Changes

Each individual was asked "for each of the following rights and freedoms, could you please tell me whether you think they should be respected under all circumstances, or whether this depends on the circumstances." The individual was then asked about certain rights and freedoms.

Eurobarometer Question 46_1, Freedom of Speech
Eurobarometer Question 46_2, Freedom of Association
Eurobarometer Question 46_3, Own Culture and Language
Eurobarometer Question 46_4, Religious Freedom

Each question was coded 1 for all circumstances and 2 for it depends. I changed the 2 for it depends to a 0 then added all four questions together.

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Table 1. Mean and Standard Deviation of the Dependent Variable by Country

Country	Mean of Dependent Variable	Standard Deviation
Austria	1.00	.70
Belgium	0.79	.69
Denmark	1.18	.64
Finland	1.12	.64
France	1.16	.70
Germany	0.95	.69
Greece	1.16	.58
Ireland	1.42	.51
Italy	1.20	.59
Netherlands	1.23	.59
Portugal	1.34	.60
Spain	1.44	.49
Sweden	1.23	.64
UK	1.24	.66

TABLE 2. Regression of Economic, Cultural, Exposure, and Combined Models

	1. Collective Economic	2. Individual Economic	3. Combined Economic	4. Cultural	5. Exposure	6. Final Model
Constant	1.477***	.840***	1.106***	.871***	1.289***	1.223***
Collective Economic						
Unemployment 1996	1.064*		1.22*			-2.638***
	(.025)		(.028)			(-.063)
GDP per Capita 1996	-2.98E-05***		-2.71E-05***			-4.14E-05***
	(-.138)		(-.12)			(-.153)
GNP % Change 95-96	.041***		.037***			.017*
	(.092)		(.082)			(.039)
Unemployment Change 95-96	-3.584*		-2.297			1.608
	(-.031)		(-.02)			(.014)
Individual Economic						
Personal Situation		.103***	.097***			.088***
		(.117)	(.111)			(.099)
Unemployed Last 5 years		.033	.019			.03
		(.024)	(.014)			(.021)
Income		.016*	.009			.008
		(.026)	(.015)			(.014)
Culture						
Tolerance				.102***		.092***
				(.183)		(.166)
Trust				.001		.004***
				(.012)		(.092)
Ethnolinguastic				.082		.277***
fractionalization				(.019)		(.061)
Exposure						
% of Foreign Citizens					-.04***	-.012**
					(-.178)	(-.054)
Control						
Education	.039***	.029***	.037***	.029***	.034***	.036***
	(.173)	(.126)	(.163)	(.127)	(.149)	(.158)
Gender	.004	.002	.007	.01	.006	.016
	(.003)	(.001)	(.006)	(.007)	(.005	(.012)
Age	-.003***	-.002**	-.001	-.004***	-.003***	-.002**
	(-.062)	(-.042)	(-.024)	(-.095)	(-.074)	(-.037)
Population	1.266E-06***	-8.91E-07***	1.178E-06**	-1.05E-06***	3.566E-07	1.793E-06***
	(.057)	(-.041)	(.054)	(-.048)	(.016)	(.083)
R^2	.063	.049	.073	.066	.06	.108
N	8463	7451	7451	7339	8463	6557

Note: OLS coefficients, with standardized coefficients in parentheses. ***p<.001, **p<.01; *p<.05.