The Inhumane Response

Europe’s Failure of the Syrian Refugees

Steven Oaks

Monmouth College

Academic Advisor: Ira Smolensky, Ph.D.

Project Advisor: Nathan Kalmoe, Ph.D.

**Abstract**

Since 2010, the Syrian Refugee Crisis has threatened to sink the region further into turmoil that could drag down neighboring regions. In an effort to alleviate the strain, the European Union needs to partner with the regional countries around Syria and open their doors to the incoming refugees. This report takes a time sensitive approach to analyze the history of the conflict, looks at the critical needs of the neighboring states bearing the largest burden, and assess the policies that bigger states in the EU can enact to relieve the burden. In this process I consider economic factors, security factors, popular and political opinions in host countries, foreign policy implications, and external strains. I also analyze varying methods states employ when handling the refugees entering their borders, policies that impact the ability of refugees to move to other host nations.

**Keywords**

Syrian crisis; Syrian migrants; migration policy; integration; Resettlement; Migration management; Mass influx; Schengen Agreement; European Union;

**Intro**

With the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, a major policy crisis began to form in foreign policy circles worldwide. The forced migration of 4.8 million Syrians into surrounding countries has led to criticism for the way many countries handled the immigration and refoulement process, as well as visas. These developments have shaken the Schengen Agreement of free movement in the European Union (EU) and its policy of open borders to the core. With many countries closing off their borders, the strain is being felt by Syria’s neighboring countries, especially Turkey (2.5 million), Jordan (635,000) and Lebanon (1.1 million). The EU should open its doors and begin to relieve this burden by accepting a share of these displaced people. By doing so, it will begin to help stabilize both the security and economic welfare of the countries taking on the most stress of this disaster. While the EU is concerned for the welfare of their own country and citizens, they will gain more overall by helping to ease the strain.

Terminology

A major issue across all areas is the terminology. While “migrant” is used as an umbrella term, many other labels have been placed on the displaced victims of the crisis. A few terms listed by the Council on Foreign Relations are:

* **Asylum seeker**- person fleeing persecution or conflict seeking international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention on the Status of Refugees;
* **Refugee** - asylum seeker whose claim has been approved.
* **Economic migrant**- person whose primary motivation for leaving his or her home country is economic gain. (Park, 2015)

These words have a certain symbolism based on how they are used. According to Seth Holmes and Heide Castaneda, framing the causes of displacement (particularly those involving the overlapping dichotomies of “voluntary”/“forced,” “(im)migrant”/“refugee,” and “economic”/“political”) shape how states and other actors respond to displaced people (Holmes & Castaneda). They argue that the use of “migrant crisis” can delegitimize efforts for protection, while “refugee crisis” can reinforce them. The term “refugee” brings to mind the image of displaced citizens who are involuntarily moved; thus needing help, while the term “migrant” makes these same citizens seem like they are voluntarily leaving their country in an effort to make economic gains and are often seen as opportunists. The term “illegal migrant” has also began to be used in the media as a way to discern asylum seekers who arrive without documentation and normally by being smuggled or trafficked into the country.

Legal Status

Syrian migrants enjoy a special consideration of *prima facie* refugee status with the UN during the application process, but that does not extend to the states housing them (Park, 2015). This confusion in terminology has caused problems in Turkey. According to separate studies by Senay Ozden, Ahmet Icduygu, and Yusuf Akgunduz, the Turkish government did not originally recognize the displaced Syrians as asylum seekers, instead labeling them as guests (Akgunduz, van den Berg, & Hassink, 2015) (Ozden, 2013) (Icduygu, 2015). According to the Akgunduz study, two specific implications came from this decision:

* Syrians cannot apply for asylum in a third country, limiting the opportunities of migrating to other countries.
* Second, unlike the refugee status, the guest status implies that refugees can be relocated by the Turkish government without any legal process. (Akgunduz, van den Berg, & Hassink, 2015)

This distinction was changed with the passing of the Regulation on Temporary Protection in 2014, which was based off the EU Council Directive on “Temporary Protection” of 2001 (Aras & Menkutek, 2015). The regulation provided Syrians with temporary asylum, for a time period decided by Turkey’s Council of Ministers, until they could be resettled into a third safe country. Aras and Menutek state the most important clarification was the clear definition of their legal status that is also shown with the identity cards, their rights and the acquired social support (Aras & Menkutek, 2015).

Turkey

Since the beginning of the crisis in 2011, Turkey has been as a leader in this crisis. Initially welcoming and refusing foreign aid to help with the displaced Syrians, Turkey has begun to buckle underneath the pressure of incoming swells of displaced Syrians. Souad Ahmadoun’s report to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs shows that since its initial request for international aid in mid-2012 to October 2014, Turkey received only $250 million in aid to support the $4 billion in costs incurred by the estimated 1.35 million Syrians at that time (Ahmadoun, 2014). These numbers rose with a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) donation of $100 million to support the 1.718 million Syrians from January to April 2015 (Bahcekapili & Cetin, 2015).

Although studies by the Akgunduz group show no major effects economically from the influx (slight rise in food and housing prices, no effect to jobs market), Buket Cetin and Cengiz Bahcekapili show that impacts differ across regions (Akgunduz, van den Berg, & Hassink, 2015). Looking at the seven major influx areas of GAK (Gaziantep, Adiyaman, Kilis), HKO (Hatay, Kahramanmaras, Osmaniye), SD (Sanliurfa, Diyarbakir), MBSS (Mardin, Batman, Sirnak, Siirt), AM (Adana, Mersin), KK (Konya, Karaman), and MEBT (Malatya, Elazig, Bingol, Tunceli), Cetin and Bahcekapili found prominent changes in internal migration and foreign trade (Bahcekapili & Cetin, 2015). In all seven regions, foreign trade balances evened out and internal migration from the area increased. While unemployment and inflation varied across all seven regions, the GAK region showed the strongest correlation with the Mundell theory of free foreign trade. With the densest Syrian population at 15%, GAK showed the highest inflation rates while showing improvement in unemployment and foreign trade, which are strong indicators of economic recovery (Bahcekapili & Cetin, 2015).

Many studies have shown major security risks directed at or caused by the refugee population. According to Ahmadoun’s report, early sectarian rifts have caused tensions to rise in many southern Turkish border towns (Ahmadoun, 2014). The largely Sunni refugees have encountered prejudice from the mostly Alawi members of the border towns, especially in the disputed city of Hatay (Ahmadoun) (Ozden, 2013) (Icduygu, 2015). Hatay has seen the largest number of incidents reported including refusal of medical treatment by Alawite doctors, illegal exploitation of Syrian workers, illegal marriage of Syrian women as second or third wives to Turkish men, and numerous complaints of rising crime and prostitution committed by Syrian refugees (Ahmadoun, 2014) (Ozden, 2013) (Icduygu, 2015).

The current perception in Turkey is that Syrians are overstaying their welcome. After a warm welcome and the initial feeling this would be a short-lived crisis, public perception has cooled immensely. Waves of exploitation and xenophobia are starting to creep into public life, and Syrians have become targets. The Migration Policy Institute reports 70% of Turkish respondents in a recent survey think refugees are damaging the Turkish economy, and more than 60 percent oppose aiding Syrians when there are Turkish citizens living in poverty (Icduygu, 2015). This is similar to the wave of xenophobia currently enveloping the United States and some countries in the EU.

Jordan

The Kingdom of Jordan has followed Turkey’s lead in how they have welcomed Syrian refugees, but with a few key distinctions. The first is the encampments. While the Jordanians have been hospitable, they have been far stricter about keeping refugees in encampments and not allowing them to work. Ahmet Icduygu reports 4 out of 5 Syrians live in urban housing instead of encampments in Turkey; this cannot be said in Jordan or Lebanon (Icduygu, 2015). Jordan has taken steps to keep Syrians in the encampments by:

* Cutting food assistance to urban refugees
* Restricting movement in urban centers
* Discontinuing Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASC) to refugees who have left encampments
* Cutting all health care access to any refugee without an ASC
* Starting a verification campaign used to administer deportations and refoulements (Achilli, 2015)

Another major risk is water usage. As the second most water poor nation in the world, Jordan has seen a severe decrease in available water with the near 10% population increase caused by refugees (Szparaga, 2014). And while Andrew Szparaga describes a situation similar to Turkey regarding local feelings toward refugees, he also details how close the Kingdom is to spiraling out of control.

Economically, Jordan was not ready for this crisis. Already housing Palestinian refugees, the Jordanian economy was left reeling from the dual shocks of the global financial crisis of 2008-09 and the Arab Spring of 2011. They have lost access to cheap gas reserves from the Egyptian junta of 2013 (Fakih and Ibrahim).The fragile Jordanian economy was stretched bare even before the Syrian Civil War. With one of the smallest economies in the region, the addition of Syrian refugees has caused havoc in Jordan. Andrew Szparaga noted the sharp decline in affordable housing and the steep rise in prices for everyday items as a result of the influx (Szparaga, 2014). He attributed the increased prices to Jordan’s normal reliance on cheaper Syrian goods that are no longer in production as a result of the current conflict. The continuing shocks to the Jordanian economy have begun to limit the resources for the economy to heal itself.

With worker protests over low pay and the low quality jobs available, the employment situation was dire prior to the refugee arrival according to the International Labour Organization (Ajluni & Kawar, 2014). There are fears in multiple reports that Syrians will begin to undercut the Jordanian workforce through the informal economy and the fact that the minimum wage only applies to Jordanian citizens (Ajluni & Kawar, 2014) (Fakih & Ibrahim, 2015). The most straining and important factor of the refugees’ impact is on the performance of public services. Both the Jordanian government and United Nations Development Programme believe that overstretched public service is ‘undeniably the main current threat to social cohesion’. Social tensions are currently being fueled by this lack of cohesion, rising unemployment levels, and the negative portrayal of Syrians in Jordanian media. However, several authors agree that the crisis only exacerbated previous structural issues that existed pre-Syrian migration. Another major factor that proves these views to be short sighted is GDP growth. According to Trading Economics and the World Bank, Jordan has seen a boom period of growth since the Syrians arrived in 2011. It’s reported GDP of 35.83 billion USD in 2014 is an all-time high for Jordan (The World Bank, 2016).

Brief History of EU Asylum Policy

In 1985, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg worked on measures to abolish the internal borders among them in order to facilitate the completion of the single market. This facilitated the signing of the Schengen Agreement, which established common rules regarding visas, the right to asylum and checks at external borders. This was implemented outside the then European Economic Community and took effect in 1995. It was incorporated into overall EU framework following the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. The Dublin Convention of 1990 was a second system negotiated outside the EU framework aimed at designating a single country as responsible for handling of asylum applications. The goal of this convention was to prevent ‘asylum shopping’. This is the phenomenon that allows asylum seekers to make multiple claims in different EU member states. This established the practice of the asylum claim being assessed by the country of first origin and only once. With a refinement convention in 2003(Dublin Regulation II), this is the system most of the EU has been employing during the crisis. These systems were largely negotiated and put in place due to the turmoil in the Balkan Peninsula, however the policies were often uneven in practice and created a few burden sharing issues.

The process of harmonization began with the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The negotiation of the Common European Asylum System began with the Tampere Program. As the first stage of the process, this program introduced common standards for access to employment, welfare, housing, healthcare, and education for asylum seekers. It also set up the European Refugee Fund. This common fund was meant to be used for emergency temporary protection measures for a mass influx event. The second measure formed is the Temporary Protection Directive. The aim for this directive is to relocate refugees from countries under the event of a mass influx. This directive has never been triggered due to an explicit formula being instituted. The second stage (Hague Program) deepened the commitment and harmonization. It was finalized with the Stockholm Program, which aimed at completing the CEAS. The biggest development was the creation of European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in Malta. The EASO is tasked with establishing an early warning system to support states that are under pressure, but has not been given control over the asylum policy.

The CEAS is relatively new to the EU. It remains ineffective in developing burden sharing policies and the majority of the implementation remains with the individual states. While EU directives are placed over national laws, they still are in need of refinement in relieving the burden seen by member states.

**Analysis**

With Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq taking 95% of the fleeing refugees, the European Union has the opportunity to ease the global conflict by relieving the strain seen throughout the Middle East (Achilli, 2015). The EU can no longer afford to contain the situation and provide little in way of physical or financial aid. The EU policy of containment needs to end before it further destabilizes the region; however, the EU shows no effort in rectifying these stances.

The March 2016 EU-Turkey deal has been met with waves of criticism regarding the EU’s desperation as well as its use of Turkey as a way of removing the problem from EU territory. Many human rights groups are already calling this deal a bluff and a sham because of Turkey’s unwillingness to follow Geneva Human Rights Convention. Under the guise of regaining control of the situation, the main objectives of the deal are:

* **Returns**: All "irregular migrants" crossing from Turkey into Greece beginning on March 20, 2016 will be sent back. Each arrival will be individually assessed by the Greek authorities.
* **One-for-one**: For each Syrian returned to Turkey, a Syrian migrant will be resettled in the EU. Priority will be given to those who have not tried to illegally enter the EU and the number is capped at 72,000.
* **Visa restrictions**: Turkish nationals should have access to the Schengen passport-free zone by June 2016. This will not apply to non-Schengen countries like Britain.
* **Financial aid**: The EU is to speed up the allocation of €3bn ($3.3 bn; £2.3 bn) in aid to Turkey to help migrants.
* **Turkey EU membership**: Both sides agreed to "re-energise" Turkey's bid to join the European bloc, with talks due by July (BBC News, 2016).

Amnesty International has called the deal “horse trading” between nations and questioned the legality of the deal while accusing the EU of turning its back to these people (Amnesty International, 2016). Iverna McGowan, Head of Amnesty International’s European Institutions Office, has gone on record, saying:

“EU and Turkish leaders have today sunk to a new low, effectively horse trading away the rights and dignity of some of the world’s most vulnerable people. The idea of bartering refugees for refugees is not only dangerously dehumanizing, but also offers no sustainable long term solution to the ongoing humanitarian crisis,” (Amnesty International, 2016)


Human Rights Watch (HRW) has also spoken out against the EU for its institution of border checks throughout the Balkan region. Spokespeople for the organization have called the trapping of refugees in Greece “unconscionable and short-sighted non-solution that is causing suffering and violence” and that it demonstrates “the European Union’s utter failure to respond collectively and compassionately to refugee flows” (Human Rights Watch, 2016). They have also spoken out regarding multiple instances of Macedonian border control officers’ excessive and wanton use of teargas and stun grenades. Other issues brought into controversy are the turning away of refugees by capping applications on a per day basis. Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia currently have a limit of 500 per day, while Austria is even slimmer at a meager 80 per day. The HRW has called these policies “plainly incompatible” with EU and international law and called for a swift end to these policies (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The UNHCR has been just as critical of the EU effort, calling for the EU “to wake up”. UNHCR spokesperson Adrian Edwards told reporters on March 1st:

“With governments not working together despite having already reached agreements in a number of areas, and country after country imposing new border restrictions, inconsistent practices are causing unnecessary suffering and risk being at variance with EU and international law standards. At least 1,500 [refugees] had spent the previous night in the open. The crowded conditions are leading to shortages of food, shelter, water and sanitation. Tensions have been building, fueling violence and playing into the hands of people smugglers" (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016)

How can the European Union, the winner of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize for spreading democracy and furthering human rights, allow such a crisis to evolve on its doorstep and find a solution in the furthering of these violations? How has it allowed the Schengen Agreement, the Common European Asylum System, and the Dublin System to become so archaic and overburdened? The EU has a chance to turn this situation into an opportunity to rebuild and reinforce a major institution.

**Policy Prescriptions**

The refugee crisis has been the worst humanitarian disaster since World War II and the biggest problem faced in the new millennium. Since 2015, over a million asylum seekers arrived on the Greek islands to escape the refugee camps and war they had left behind. More asylum seekers arrived in Europe in 2015 than previous all-time highs after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of Yugoslavia (Aiyar, et al., 2016). They have been met on those shores with a wave of xenophobia and construction of walls along borders (*Figure1*) that implicitly go against the Schengen Agreement of free borders in the EU. Why has the EU turned its back to these displaced people and transitioned them to Russia or back to Turkey? With the failing economies of Spain, Italy, and the entire Balkan region, does Europe really believe it is in a position to refuse these workers?



*Figure 1: Travel Routes of Refugees and the Areas Where Border Fences Have Been Placed*

The first priority will be to address the humanitarian emergency along the refugee routes in the EU. Policies aimed at strengthening the receiving capacity and processing abilities of the Common European Asylum System. By reforming the system and allowing a quicker more streamlined approach to help relieve current strains and form a workable refugee system. A multilateral approach will also need to be developed. The unilateral views taken by EU countries (such as Sweden, Austria, and Hungary) have been short sighted and often xenophobic. The closing of borders, railways and highway systems through these countries in an effort to stop migration has been harmful to its neighbors and to tourism. These efforts may be stymied by individual governments. Sovereignty issues have often caused issues in terms of transnational cooperation. Oftentimes state governments are unclear on what their goals are with their personal refugee and immigration policies, and governments can experience turnover based on their stances on these issues. German chancellor Angela Merkel has been experiencing wavering favorability ratings due to her pro-refugee stance. Establishing the CEAS as a more distinct and powerful agency with the credibility to solve the overburdening is the first step to healing the crisis.

The second priority would be the integration and movement of migrants throughout the EU. Alexander Betts, Director of Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, underlines these benefits with his research. In his TED talk in February 2016, he asks how Europe has developed such an inhumane response to a humanitarian crisis (Betts, 2016). He goes over the inconsistencies in the European response regarding things such as the deaths of many child refugees, human smugglers, and leaving refugees in limbo instead of safe shelter. He describes three measures to effectively introduce refugees into society while helping refugees empower themselves and benefit their host nation. Two of these measures, special economic zones (SEZ) and Nansen passports, are key to Europe shouldering their load and as a way to improve their economic and security futures[[1]](#footnote-1).

Nansen passports began during the refugee crisis that followed World War I. The League of Nations began issuing passports to Russian refugees fleeing the Russian Civil War and later expanded them to cover Turkish, Armenian, and Assyrian refugees. The passport was named after Fridtjof Nansen, the High Commissioner for Refugees for the League of Nations. He convened and negotiated the Intergovernmental Conference on Identity Certificates for Russian Refugees, in Geneva in 1922. These passports provided free travel and settlement for stateless refugees like Syrians today. As a forebearer of today’s UN High Commission for Refugees and a Nobel Prize winning idea, it is time to bring these passports back.

The passports would alleviate the asylum issue currently causing the blockages at major checkpoint and border areas. The free passage could allow the displaced Syrians the ability to find work and resettle into countries, all while evening out the burden and alleviating major tension areas. This also would have the added benefit of undercutting the illegal underground markets that have sprung up on the path from Turkey to Greece. With Nansen passports, a displaced person can apply for asylum in Turkey and take a normal bus or plane ride to the EU, instead of taking the treacherous path through the choppy Mediterranean Sea. This path claimed the lives of over 3,700 refugees in 2015 alone (BBC News).

The most beneficial option I came across was Betts’ recommendation for special economic zones. Refugee resettlement is the most important aspect in relieving tensions among the refugee population and potential host nations. The argument that refugees have to be a financial burden to a host nation is a myth. The zero-sum public opinion has been false in many instances. The major political concern of displacement effects on native workers is marginal. While concerns of lower wages and higher unemployment are understandable, they have been temporary and limited in the past. This may be due to a low rate of substitution between native workers and immigrants, or due to the increase in investment that accompanies an increase in a nation’s workforce.

By creating special economic zones, the EU could offer protection to especially vulnerable Syrians. In multiple countries, such as Uganda, China, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and even in EU association state Moldova, open markets have flourished in allowing various refugee groups to have the freedom of movement and trade in these areas. SEZ can perform four functions, all of which can be beneficial to host countries, refugees, and native workers. These are:

* Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI)
* Serving as “pressure valves” to alleviate large-scale unemployment
* Supporting a wider economic reform strategy
* Acting as experimental laboratories for the application of new policies and approaches (Zeng, 2015)

These functions not only allow for the implementation of refugees, but allow for the recovery of some of the failed economic states in the EU.

The zone program will need to be tailored to the host country’s needs. The implementation will need to be rapid, and made into an integral part of the long term development plan (Zeng, 2015). Zeng also states that policymakers need to make efforts to:

* Make economic zones effective in attracting quality investments
* Ensure zones are economically viable and deliver positive externalities, including catalyzing economic reforms, facilitating learning, innovation, upgrading, and structural transformation
* Ensure the sustainability of economic zones from an institutional, social, and environmental perspective (Zeng, 2015)

Instead of using Uganda as proof to the success of SEZ as Betts did, I would prefer to look at nearby Moldova. The World Bank released a case study looking at the evolution of Moldova’s seven zones that developed from 1995 to 2010 after the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. All seven showed robust employment growth up until the 2008 financial crisis, while increasing both domestic and foreign investment by fivefold (The World Bank, 2015). This investment led to the goals of diversifying exports, increasing exports, and the entrance into global value chains. While the zones growth slowed after the 2008 financial crisis, they were beginning to show signs of recovery when the study ended in 2010.

Diversification can herald a healthier economy. The Moldovian government has seen a change in their export structure due to these zones, largely due to the automotive and textile sectors. The investment from these companies has significantly transformed the structure of production, from beverages to electrical machinery and equipment and textiles (The World Bank, 2015). The share of industrial goods produced in the economic zones increased from 4.2 percent in 2006 to almost 10 percent in 2014. A key part to the economic zone is the need for open markets. Flexibility in product markets can also help integrate refugees. Entrepreneurship is encouraged with easier access to finance start-up options, simpler regulatory and administrative processes, and ensured equal access to markets. Betts encouraged this entrepreneurship, citing the Uganda SEZ that had 21% of refugee owned businesses employing Ugandan nationals to work alongside them (Betts, 2016). The removal of obstacles in the process

The integration of refugees into the workforce of these SEZ areas allow for a number of benefits. The influx of refugees can prompt native workers to increase their skills in the workforce. The upgraded training, specialization of more complex tasks, and a more upward career trajectory allow for higher skills and better pay for native workers. The increase in training will produce a spillover effect as more workers circulate through the labor market. The training they receive in these zones can be translated to a skill they may be able to use with another firm. Most industries will have on-the-job training that help to build a more specialized vocational skill. Douglas Zeng also states a lesson learned from the Chinese SEZ is the culture breeds innovation. He writes that a workforce made of a strongly motivated migrant community tends to generate an innovative and entrepreneurial culture (Zeng, 2015).

To ensure proper implementation of SEZ, a few key steps need to be implemented. Rapid integration is essential to unlocking the full economic, fiscal, and social benefits. The rapid integration minimizes the risk of social exclusion and maximizes net contributions of the integrated refugees (Aiyar, et al., 2016). Specific policies will need to be directed to asylum regulation, labor and product markets, and education. Examples of specialized policies are eased access into the labor market, and a guarding against excessive employment protections and higher statutory minimum wages. Germany has already started these specialized policies by exempting accepted refugees from the minimum wage for the initial six months. Education is extremely important in the integration process. School systems with well-developed preschools, less school segregation, and limited early tracking of students have been found to be more suitable to the educational success of immigrants’ children (Aiyar, et al., 2016). The sooner the refugees gain employment, the more they will help the public finances by paying income tax and social security contributions. Successful integration of the refugees also helps cover the upcoming costs of the aging, native workforce.

Several decades of low birth rates has led to an increased dependence on older workers. Migration and the acceptance of refugees into the work area will infuse the workforce with a generation of younger workers and counteract the economic impact of an aging workforce. The future of economic growth in EU will thus depend on young migrants possessing the skills required to contribute efficiently and their integration into European labor markets.

**Conclusion**

The EU can no longer afford to try and contain the Syrian Refugee Crisis into the region around Syria. With 4.8 million displaced Syrians in the surrounding region, the EU has a responsibility to help the regional governments in the Middle East, as well as the refugees. By failing to provide help, it has helped cause a humanitarian crisis that has built up upon their shores. By taking action and deepening reforms to the CEAS, the EU can begin to ease the burden on their member states, the refugees and the host countries surrounding Syria. These reforms can allow migrants to find a new life, while helping the EU with the economic problems currently plaguing the continent. Implementing a humanitarian approach, allowing migrants to be workers, and unburdening host border states can begin to heal this situation before it creates anymore failed states. Unilateral policies, such as each state deciding how many refugees it will take, will doom both the EU and the Syrian migrants.

**Study Limitations**

The research for this paper found a significant lack of information available for Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt. These three states round out the top five countries of asylum seeking Syrian refugees. Another issue is the lack of research or response from other major states in the geographical area, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran. While Saudi Arabia and Iran have been having hostile aggression against each other, those aggressions have been by proxy in Yemen, leaving land space and resources available in each country. Why have they not helped relieve this situation?

# References

Achilli, L. (2015). *Syrian Refugees in Jordan: a Reality Check.* European University Institute. Florence: Migration Policy Centre.

Ahmadoun, S. (2014). *Turkey's policy toward Syrian refugees: domestic reprecussions and the need for international support.* Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

Aiyar, S., Barkbu, B., Batini, N., Berger, H., Detragiache, E., Dizioli, A., . . . Topalova, P. (2016). *The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economis Challenges.* Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

Ajluni, S., & Kawar, M. (2014). *Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on the Labour Market in Jordan.* Beiruit: International Labour Organization.

Akgunduz, Y. E., van den Berg, M., & Hassink, W. (2015). *Impact of Refugee Crises on Host Labor Markets: The Case of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Turkey.* Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.

Amnesty International. (2016, March 8). *EU Turkey Summit: EU and Turkish leaders deal death blow to the right to seek asylum.* Retrieved March 21, 2016, from Amnesty International: http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/eu-turkey-summit-eu-and-turkish-leaders-deal-death-blow-to-the-right-to-seek-asylum

Aras, N. E., & Menkutek, Z. S. (2015, September). The international migration and foreign policy nexus: the case of Syrian refugee crisis and Turkey. *Migration Letters, 12*(3), pp. 193-208.

Bahcekapili, C., & Cetin, B. (2015, August 25). Impacts of Forced Migration on Regional Economies: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Turkey. *Internation Business Research, 8*(9).

BBC News. (2016, March 20). *Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect.* Retrieved March 22, 2016, from BBC World News.

BBC News. (2016, March 4). *Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts.* Retrieved March 21, 2016, from BBC World News.

Betts, A. (2016, February). Our Refugee System is Failing. Vancouver.

Fakih, A., & Ibrahim, M. (2015). Impact of Syrian Refugees on the labor market in neighboring countries: Empyrical evidence from Jordan. *Defense and Peace Economics*.

Holmes, S. M., & Castaneda, H. (2016, February). Representing the "European Refugee Crisis" in Germany and Beyond. *American Ethnologist, 43*(1), 12-24.

Human Rights Watch. (2016, March 1). *EU/Balkans/Greece: Border Curbs Threaten Rights.* Retrieved March 20, 2016, from Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/01/eu/balkans/greece-border-curbs-threaten-rights

Icduygu, A. (2015). *Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead.* Washington D.C.: TransAtlantic Council on Migration.

Ozden, S. (2013). *Syrian Refugees in Turkey.* European University Institute. Florence: Migration Policy Centre.

Park, J. (2015). *Europe's Migration Crisis.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Szparaga, A. E. (2014). *Effect of the Syrian Crisis on Jordanian Internal Security.* Independent Study Project.

The World Bank. (2015). *The Performance of Free Economic Zones in Moldova.* Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

The World Bank. (2016, March 23). *Jordan GDP 1965-2016*. Retrieved March 23, 2016, from Trading Economics: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/jordan/gdp

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2016, March 1). *UNHCR warns of imminent humanitarian crisis in Greece.* Retrieved March 18, 2016, from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: http://www.unhcr.org/56d58c146.html

Zeng, D. Z. (2015). *Global Experiences with Special Economic Zones.* Washington D.C.: World Bank Group.

1. The third measure is a way of matching preferences between host nations and refugees, this is obsolete with the implementation of the Nansen passports; therefore I will not be addressing it in this paper. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)