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An Examination of Institutional Constraint:
Comparing of the Coalition of the Willing and the
Coalition of the Non-Willing

Abstract

The democratic peace theory proposes that democracies do not go to war with one another. One of the key components of this theory is the institutional constraint mechanism, which suggests that democracies are constrained by their domestic public opinion from engaging in unpopular wars. This paper applies the institutional constraint mechanism to the 2003 war in Iraq and examines nine nation's decision to join the "coalition of the willing" to use military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Public opinion polls reveal that many of the nations that participated in the war in Iraq did so in opposition to the preferences of their citizens. An analysis is conducted of each of the nine nations to attempt to explain their decision to join or not join the "coalition of the willing". The institutional constraint mechanism is found to be inadequate in explaining why a nation decided to participate in the 2003 war in Iraq. Realist principles tend to have more relevance in accounting for leaders decisions to join or not join the "coalition of the willing".

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Abstract

The democratic peace theory proposes that democracies do not go to war with one another. One of the key components of this theory is the institutional constraint mechanism, which suggests that democracies are constrained by their domestic public opinion from engaging in unpopular wars. This paper applies the institutional constraint mechanism to the 2003 war in Iraq and examines nine nation's decision to join the "coalition of the willing" to use military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Public opinion polls reveal that many of the nations that participated in the war in Iraq did so in opposition to the preferences of their citizens. An analysis is conducted of each of the nine nations to attempt to explain their decision to join or not join the "coalition of the willing". The institutional constraint mechanism is found to be inadequate in explaining why a nation decided to participate in the 2003 war in Iraq. Realist principles tend to have more relevance in accounting for leaders decisions to join or not join the "coalition of the willing".

Introduction

The democratic peace theory, which states that democracies do not go to war with each other due to shared norms and domestic institutional constraints, is becoming one of the most accepted theories in international relations (Oneal & Russett 1996; 1997; 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; Ray 1998, Weart 1998). One of the critical tenants of this theory is that the public can act as a constraint upon a democracy's ability to wage war. Citizens of democratic governments are argued to be pacifistic in nature and this constrains their respective governments from engaging in war without their consent. Nations that are considered democratic in nature have governments that derive their power from the

consent of the governed. The delegate model of representation states that officials presiding in democracies should follow the will of the people. However, often times this is not the case, especially in matters concerning foreign policy. U.S. government support for the Contras in Nicaragua and the 1994 Haiti intervention are just a few examples of U.S. foreign policy not matching public preferences. This paper seeks to examine whether the public, as measured by public opinion, acted as a constraint upon leaders in their decision to become part of the “coalition of the willing” or “non-willing” in the use of force against Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In order to measure this, public opinion polls asking citizens from five “coalition of the willing” nations whether they supported joining the war to remove Saddam Hussein from power will be compared with public opinion polls asking citizens from four “coalition of the non-willing” nations whether they supported the war to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

Literature Review

James Fearon’s (1994) notion of audience costs is an important starting point, in understanding institutional logic contained in democratic peace theory. His research suggests that elected leaders are constrained by their domestic populations, since they can be removed from office if they pursue unpopular policies. The work of Eyerman and Hart (1996) offers support to Fearon’s audience costs findings. They state that their research findings “Support the notion that domestic structures are important in that they provide the constraint, presumably through the electoral mechanism.”¹ Sebastian Rosato corroborates the institutional logic of democratic peace theory, which posits that elected officials within democracies are accountable to the citizenry. Rosato states, “Accountability derives from

¹ Eyerman, J. & Hart, R.A. Jr. (1996). An Empirical Test of the Audience Cost Proposition: Democracy Speaks Louder Than Words. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40:597-616.

the fact that political elites want to remain in office, that there are opposition parties ready to capitalize on unpopular policies, and that there are regular opportunities for democratic publics to remove elites who have not acted in their best interests. Moreover, several features of democracies, such as freedom of speech and open political processes, make it fairly easy for voters to rate a government's performance."² This suggests that democracies have institutional constraints built into their political system, which regulate democratic leader's ability to engage in use of military force. Democratic leaders are aware of this fact, and only engage in use of force that is supported by their respective public. This is necessary for them to remain in office and keep the public they are beholden to content.

Rosato also details several other constraints that are apart of the democratic peace theory's institutional logic. These include the group constraint mechanism, which posits elected officials will carry out the wishes of antiwar groups. In large societies there will be numerous groups possessing different demands that officials are responsible to. If many of these groups were to oppose the use of force, the democratic leader would have to obey these demands from the groups. A second mechanism that constrains democracies is slow mobilization. This suggests that democracies must engage in a long process of informing and persuading the public of the necessity to engage in use of force. This keeps the democracies from mobilizing for war quickly. The third mechanism that constrains democracies from using military force is the information mechanism. This mechanism suggests that democracies foster information that can prevent wars. Democratic leaders will be hesitant to engage their nations in military endeavors that the public does not support. If the military endeavor goes badly they will be responsible to their constituents

² Rosato, Sebastian. (2003). The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory. *American Political Science Review*. 97, 585-602.

and may not get reelected in their next election. . Rummel (1997) also provides support that democracy is a pacifying force and argues that public opinion is a critical component in why democracies are peaceful.

Public Opinion as a Constraining Force on Foreign Policy

In examining the literature concerning the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, there are complex findings. In short, the foreign policy enacted tends to reflect the preferences of the citizens as indicated by surveys. However, there are several caveats to this overly simplistic finding. As will be detailed later, leaders attempt to educate or manipulate public opinion to get the public to support their policy goals. These efforts indicate leaders attempt to lead rather than follow opinion; however they also provide evidence that they are sensitive to the preferences of the electorate.³ There is a plethora of research indicating that the White House has an eye towards public opinion when it is shaping foreign policy, however research is lacking in comparing democratic government's responses to public opinion in foreign policymaking.

Many scholars have indicated that foreign policy tends to reflect the preferences of the public. For example Shapiro and Jacobs stated, "We find a great deal of evidence that government policies in the United States often and substantially reflect what the public wants."⁴ Shapiro and Jacobs also cite studies indicating examples where the preferences of the public played a major role in foreign policymaking. Some of the examples are in U.S.-Chinese relations (Kusnitz 1984), in U.S. policymaking toward the Contras (Katz 1998)

³ Powlick, P.J., & Katz, A.Z. (1998). Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus. *Mershon International Studies Review*. 42, 29-61.

⁴ Shapiro, R.Y. & L.R. Jacobs. (2000). Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

and Reagan-Bush years (Hinckley 1992).⁵ Although public opinion has been a major factor in foreign policy deliberations of U.S. officials, the scholars warn that the relationship between public opinion and foreign policymaking is not a causal one.

Other research such as Powlick 1990 & 1991 suggests that officials have given a more prominent role to public opinion since the Vietnam War. In the past the public was assumed to be ignorant of many foreign policy issues. Public opinion does not play as large a role in foreign policymaking as it does in domestic policymaking; however foreign policy leaders have become more cognizant of public opinion. For example, Jacobs and Shapiro find evidence that presidents have paid increasing attention to public opinion with the institutionalization of polling and public opinion analysis in the White House.⁶ Leaders do not want their policies to stray far from the preferences of their electorate, especially in matters concerning the use of military force.

Comparative Evidence of the Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Nexus

Most of the research into the connection between public opinion and foreign policy has been focused in the American foreign policymaking arena. These findings offer insight into how similar democracies might treat public opinion in foreign policymaking. However, since this paper seeks to compare the role of public opinion on foreign policymakers in several nations it is important to include research regarding the public opinion and foreign policy nexus in those nations as well. Natalie La Balme found evidence that French government officials gave public opinion an important role during the

⁵ Shapiro, R.Y. & L.R. Jacobs. (2000). Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

⁶ Shapiro, R.Y. & L.R. Jacobs. (2000). Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

deliberations over whether to use force in the Kosovo crisis. In conducting interviews with French elected officials, she found that they were, “aware that such military interventions cannot be conducted against the will of the population, or at least without its implicit support.”⁷ She also found strong evidence that French President Francois Mitterrand was much attuned to French public opinion on whether to join the global coalition to use military force in the 1991 Gulf War. La Balme’s research concluded that public opinion is not the sole factor that leaders base their foreign policy decisions off of, however, “decisionmakers can nevertheless be either constrained or motivated by public opinion, and they can also come to use it as a political tool.”⁸ This suggests that public opinion is important, but its exact role depends on the circumstance. The use of public opinion as a political tool will be revisited shortly.

Research has also indicated that public opinion has a prominent role in Italian foreign policymaking. La Balme indicated that the Kosovo conflict demonstrated that the Italian public is gaining influence in the foreign policy realm. Most research regarding the link between public opinion and foreign policy in liberal democracies suggests that all leaders are attuned to public opinion, but not to the same extent. For example Eric Shiraev, states that democratic leaders, “tend not to undertake actions at odds with an overwhelming public consensus, so that overall there is frequent and substantial correspondence between policy and public opinion.”⁹ This research paper will examine if Shiraev’s findings are

⁷ La Balme, Natalie (2000). Constraint, Catalyst, or Political Tool? The French Public and Foreign Policy. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

⁸ La Balme, Natalie (2000). Constraint, Catalyst, or Political Tool? The French Public and Foreign Policy. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

⁹ Shiraev, Eric. (2000). Toward a Comparative Analysis of the Public Opinion-Foreign Policy Connection. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

applicable in comparing numerous democratic government's foreign policy linkage to public opinion regarding the use of military force in removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.

Elite Perception of Public Opinion and its Impact on Foreign Policy

Before one can speak about the role public opinion plays in foreign policy, it is important to delve into how leaders perceive public opinion. For example, James Stimson notes, "public opinion exists largely in a latent form and becomes activated only when policies stray outside a range of public acceptability. Thus, policymakers are constrained by what they perceive as the parameters of public acceptability."¹⁰ This suggests that public opinion is typically latent in the minds of leaders and it is the perception of public opinion that matters most to them. Powlick and Katz cite numerous research indicating that foreign policy officials are concerned with latent public opinion or opinion that could later become activated. As such leaders are concerned with "anticipating the future impact of current policies."¹¹ This still suggests that the views of the public are important, however it suggests that leaders have flexibility in educating or manipulating latent opinions.

Problems Associated With Linking Public Opinion to Foreign Policy

Before one is convinced that liberal democracies always follow the will of the public in foreign policymaking, it is important to point out the flaws with connecting public opinion to policymaking. First, there is a plethora of research that indicates the bi-directionality of public opinion and policymaking. As Jacobs and Shapiro state, "There is a

¹⁰ Kull, Steven & Ramsey, Clay. (2000). Elite Misconceptions of the U.S. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

¹¹ Powlick, P.J., & Katz, A.Z. (1998). Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus. *Mershon International Studies Review*. 42, 29-61.

reciprocal relationship between public opinion and policymaking: government responds to, as well as leads public opinion.”¹² This occurs due to leaders attempting to influence public opinion towards their own preferred policy options, which was mentioned earlier.

In reading the vast research into the public opinion and foreign policy nexus it is apparent that leaders do not treat public opinion as a fixed or given phenomenon. Rather, they treat it as a moldable object that can be shaped. One can argue that every leader goes to some effort to mold public opinion towards the policy preferences they hold. This leads to much difficulty in empirically investigating the causal relationship between public opinion and foreign policy.

Many researchers have detailed the growth and institutionalization of public-relations activities within the White House. Jacobs and Shapiro argue that although the White House engages in activities (such as extensive public opinion polling) that could provide them the ability to respond to public opinion, they tend to use these activities to lead, rather than follow public opinion. One such example of this that the authors cite was the Reagan administration’s National Security Directive (NSDD-77), which established an office in the State Department specifically to build public support for the president’s Central American policy (Parry and Kornbluh 1988; Powlick 1995a).¹³ Powlick and Katz offer evidence that the White House can use the institutionalized public-relations apparatus to “create the illusion of policy support” (Mondak 1993:206).¹⁴ This is achieved by

¹² Shapiro, R.Y. & L.R. Jacobs. (2000). Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

¹³ Shapiro, R.Y. & L.R. Jacobs. (2000). Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc

¹⁴ Powlick, P.J., & Katz, A.Z. (1998). Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus. *Mershon International Studies Review*. 42, 29-61.

pursuing new foreign policies when the presidents' public approval ratings are high. This parlayes the president's public approval ratings into higher ratings for the foreign policy pursued. The Rational Public cites numerous research indicating the effects of presidents attempting to mold public opinion to their preferred policy preferences. For example, presidents with approval ratings higher than 50%, who speak out strongly in favor of a specific policy can increase opinion in favor of this policy by as much as five or ten percentage points-within a few months.¹⁵ This phenomenon may be evident here, as President Bush and other leaders of the "coalition of the willing" have spent much political capital in pursuing the policy of regime change and disarmament in Iraq. Jacobs and Shapiro also cite Douglas Foyle (1999) who argues that presidents dating back to Harry Truman have acted in foreign policy areas in a realist manner by shaping and leading public opinion rather than responding to public opinion.¹⁶

Other research indicates that public opinion plays a rather minimal role in affecting leaders' foreign policy actions and that realist traits of foreign policy dominate. For example, Powlick and Katz provide evidence that U.S. president sometimes shape their foreign policies based upon national security. They cite evidence that President Nixon made clear that his approach to foreign policy would be based on the realpolitik calculations of national interest.¹⁷ This supports a realist perspective rather than a democratic responsiveness model. This would also conflict with institutional constraint mechanism that is a part of the democratic peace theory. If presidents make their decisions

¹⁵ Page, B.I., & Shapiro, R.Y. (1992). *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press

¹⁶ Shapiro, R.Y. & L.R. Jacobs. (2000). Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc

¹⁷ Powlick, P.J., & Katz, A.Z. (1998). Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus. *Mershon International Studies Review*. 42, 29-61.

based upon realist considerations, instead of the public's preferences, than the institutional constraint mechanism is not supported.

It is worth noting that some have argued that it is not always prudent for leaders to heed public opinion. Eric Shiraev and Vlad Zubok argue that there are circumstances that warrant leaders deciding foreign policy that may conflict with public opinion. They state that public opinion, "Can develop and express some contentious, belligerent, even hostile attitudes about a foreign nation state or alliance...It seems that the job of any responsible government in this situation is to do what is right for the world's peace and freedom and not only what is useful for victory in forthcoming elections."¹⁸ This argument has some merit, but it could also be used by governments to justify taking foreign policy actions that are not congruent with their domestic populations' preferences. This would also be in contradiction to the institutional constraint mechanism.

Governmental Structures of the "Coalition of the Willing" & "Non-Willing Nations"

This research paper seeks to examine the domestic foreign policy preferences of several nation states compared to their respective government's policy pursued. The nine nations examined are generally referred to as democratic nations. However, the nine nations have different domestic governmental structure and institutional constraints. It would be a fallacy to categorize these nine nations as possessing identical democratic structures. For example Powlick and Katz cite Risse-Kappan (1991, 1994) to illustrate that different domestic structures and coalition-building processes in the United States, France, West Germany, and Japan resulted in different impacts of public opinion regarding Soviet

¹⁸ Shirev, Eric & Zubok, Vlad. (2000). Public Opinion and Decisionmaking in Russia: The impact of NATO Expansion and Air Strikes on Serbia. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

policy during the 1980's.¹⁹ Risse-Kappen found that the United States public had the most influence and the French public had the least influence amongst these nations, due to varying degrees of centralization of their national institutions.

Eric Shiraev suggests that one needs to account for the differences between the American presidential system and the European parliamentary systems prior to comparing the role of public opinion between the U.S. and European nations on foreign policy. He argues that the U.S. system possesses weak parties and party factions within Congress, whereas the role of parties in the European context is much greater. European leaders have internal political considerations, such as assuring that their party remains as the majority party in parliament. Ensuring party control over parliament typically takes precedence over the preferences of the public. The difference between parliamentary and presidential systems was acknowledged by U.S. leaders. Vice President Dick Cheney stated, "Blair's got to deal with his own parliament, his own people, but he has to deal with the French-British relationship as well, and its context within Europe," similarly President Bush stated "And so he's (Tony Blair) got a very difficult assignment. Much more difficult, by the way than the American president in some ways" (Bush at War 297). Shiraev also states that in the Italian political system, political parties and the mass media have the largest influence on foreign policy matters.²⁰ These are important considerations to account for, prior to making a comparison between presidential and parliamentary systems.

¹⁹ Powlick, P.J., & Katz, A.Z. (1998). Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus. *Mershon International Studies Review*. 42, 29-61.

²⁰ Shiraev, Eric. (2000). *Toward a Comparative Analysis of the Public Opinion-Foreign Policy Connection*. In *Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

The design portion of this paper will also talk about domestic structure differences, specifically opposition parties within each nation. A more detailed analysis of the national government structures that make up the “coalition of the willing” and “non-willing” is available in appendix A. Table I below offers a comparison of the government types of the various nations and whether they have a parliamentary or presidential system.

Table I: Coalition of the Willing Government Structure

Nation	Government type	Parliamentary	Political system
U.S.A.	Constitution-based federal republic; strong democratic tradition	Presidential	Constitution-based federal republic
U.K.	Constitutional monarchy	Yes	Constitutional monarchy
Poland	Republic	Yes	Republic
Spain	Parliamentary monarchy	Yes	Parliamentary monarchy
Italy	Republic	Yes	Republic

Table II: Coalition of the Non-Willing Government Structure

Nation	Government type	Parliamentary	Political system
France	Republic	Yes	Republic
Germany	Federal Republic	Yes	Federal Republic
Russia	Federation	Yes	Federation
Turkey	Republican parliamentary democracy	Yes	Republican parliamentary democracy

*-Information derived from the CIA-World Fact Book

Design

The empirical questions this paper seeks to examine are: 1) whether there is an institutional constraint provided by the individual publics towards their respective governments regarding whether to support or join the war against Iraq and 2) whether there

is more congruence between public opinion and support for joining the war against Iraq within the “coalition of the willing” nations compared to the “coalition of the non-willing” nations. In order to answer the first question I will examine a March 2003 Pew Global Attitudes Project Poll, which asked “coalition of the willing nations” the following question: “Thinking about possible war with Iraq, would you favor or oppose (Survey Country) joining the U.S. and other allies in military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein’s rule?” I will simply use the percentage of responses in favor or opposed to determine whether the citizens of the individual nations favored or opposed joining the war. For “coalition of the non-willing” nations I will use the slightly different Pew Poll question of: “Thinking about possible war with Iraq, would you favor or oppose the U.S. and other allies taking military action in Iraq to end Saddam Hussein’s rule?” I will again use the percentage of responses in favor or opposed in order to determine whether the citizens of the individual nations favored or opposed joining the war. The poll questions are slightly different due to different circumstances in the two sets of nations. It was only prudent for the Pew survey to ask respondents their thoughts about joining the coalition if their respective government had proposed to do so. This method will allow for detecting the amount of congruence between public opinion in favor of joining or supporting the war against Iraq to the individual policy pursued by the respective nations. In order to answer the second question, I will compare the results from the polls question between the “coalition of the willing” and the “coalition of the non-willing” nations.

I will also use the POLITY IV data set to account for the level of democracy and autocracy present in each of the examined nations. I will specifically use the polity variable which is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score of each

nation. The unified scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

It is also necessary to account for whether the government's decision on the Iraq war issue was opposed or supported by the major opposition parties within their government. Kenneth Schultz (1998) points out the importance of opposition party's stance on international crises. His research suggests that if the government is facing opposition from rival parties it could alter their ability to pursue war. This is due to accountability and competition that opposition party's can provide if they have an alternative stance to the party in power. To account for the role of opposition party, Table III has a column categorizing the stance of each nation's opposition party towards Iraq. The simplistic categorization of opposed or support war, describes the major parties that contested the presiding leadership in the respective nations. Most of the nations have several parties, some of which opposed and some of which supported the war. In deciding how to categorize the opposition party's stance towards Iraq, I examined several newspapers of the individual nations. Most of the party's in each nation went on record of supporting or opposing war with Iraq. An opposition party was listed as supportive of war if more party's supported the war and/or if the major opposition party supported the war. For example, in Poland there were four major parties that supported the war and two minor parties that opposed the war. As such, the opposition party's stance is listed as supportive of war. The same process was used for categorizing opposition parties as opposed to the war in Iraq.

In the United States the only opposition party were the Democrats. The Democratic Party can be described as supportive of the war to remove Saddam Hussein. This is

exemplified by the Congressional vote to authorize the use of United States armed forces against Iraq, in which 70% of the House members and 77% of the Senators supported the resolution. The situation in the United Kingdom was similar to the United States. The parliamentary vote endorsing military action was passed by 412 to 149. Although Tony Blair had a record number of members rebel from his own party (139) he did not face major opposition from the Tories. In Poland the Democratic Left Alliance, Labour Union, Civic Platform, and the Law and Justice Party all supported Polish participation in the Iraq war. There was more vocal opposition within the Polish parliamentary debate than in the U.S. and British legislative bodies, however the parliament did not vote on participation in the Iraq war. Political party's expressing discontent with joining the "coalition of the willing" were the Polish Peasant Party and the Self-Defence Farmers' Party. While the American, British, and Polish leaders lacked strong opposition parties that were against the war in Iraq, the Spanish and Italian leaders faced opposition by domestic political parties. In Spain Prime Minister Jose Marie Aznar faced strong opposition by the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party would go on to win the March 14th 2004 elections in large part due to their opposition to the Iraq war. In Italy political parties stance on Iraq was more complex. In general it can be said that Silvio Berlusconi faced weak opposition by political parties. Italian political parties also hold less influence than many of their "coalition of the willing" counterparts.

Within the "coalition of the non-willing" nations most of the leaders did not face opposition from rival parties. The only exception to this was Germany, in which there was only moderate opposition from rival parties. The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens were both against Germany joining the "coalition of the willing". However,

there were individuals within these parties that did speak out against Gerhard Schroeder's handling of Iraq. Members of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social (CDU) were Schroeder's primary opposition. Members of the CDU claimed that Schroeder made war more likely, by publicly announcing he would veto any UN resolution that would use force against Iraq. Alternatively, French President Jacques Chirac faced much less domestic opposition from political parties. The French legislative assembly was dominated by members of Chirac's Union Party and rival parties seemed hesitant to oppose Chirac, due to strong public support for his handling of the Iraq situation. The situation in Turkey was much more complex. The parliamentary vote to let U.S. troops invade Iraq from Turkish soil was passed by a parliament vote of 264-250. However, the vote fell four short of the absolute majority required by the Constitution, thus failing to pass the proposal.²¹ Opposition political parties tended to reflect the views of 90% of Turkish citizens and voted not join the "coalition of the willing". Russian political parties also generally supported President Vladimir Putin's decision to not join the "coalition of the willing". The Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party were the most vocal parties and they were strongly against the war in Iraq. In short, opposition political parties did not prevent their leaders from either joining or not joining the "coalition of the willing". In Spain and Italy opposition political parties were unable to keep their respective governments from joining the "coalition of the willing" and in Germany opposition political parties were unable to influence their government to join the coalition. In the other six cases the major opposition parties and the government had similar stances on Iraq

²¹ Turkish Daily News (Ankara, Turkey) March 4, 2003. Turkish Political Circles and NGO's Hail Parliamentary Vote.

policy. It is apparent that one needs to look beyond the major opposition parties in figuring out why governments either joined or did not join the “coalition of the willing”.

Explaining the Cases: Why These 9 Nations Were Chosen

In selecting a sample to investigate the institutional constraint mechanism of the democratic peace theory, I have chosen an equal number of nations for the “coalition of the willing” and coalition of “the non-willing.” The United States will also be included in the “coalition of the willing” group, however it can be considered separately as it was primarily the United States that advocated using military force to remove Saddam Hussein and disarm Iraq. Moreover, the institutional constraint mechanism is not relevant since United States citizens favored the policy of their government using force to remove Saddam Hussein from power. I have selected a total of four other nations for the “coalition of the willing” sample and the “coalition of the non-willing” sample. Thus, the total sample is nine including the United States. The sample was constrained to nine to foster a deeper investigation into a few nations, instead of a more limited investigation of several nations. The sample was not chosen randomly and is a small sample, which will prohibit generalizing the results of this research project. However, it was determined that deliberately selecting a few key nations would produce more fruitful results than achieving a random sample that possessed nations less prominent on the world stage. The nations for this sample were selected based upon at least one of the following criteria: 1) one of the 15 voting nations in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (which threatened Iraq with “serious consequences” if they did not fully comply with disarmament obligations), 2) one of the nations that contributed to the war efforts to remove Saddam Hussein (either militarily or economically), 3) one of the most vocal opponents of the war

against Iraq, 4) one of World's top military spenders, 5) one of the World's highest GDP's, 6) or one of the United States key Allies. Of the nine nations chosen are all within the top 30 nations of world military spending and GDP and many are in the top ten. In short, the sample chosen possesses arguably the key members of the "coalition of the willing and non-willing."

Findings

Table III listed below, illustrates that in four out of the nine democratic nations investigated, the public did not act as a constraint against their respective governments ability to join a war. The United States was the only nation within the "coalition of the willing" that followed the foreign policy preferences of its citizens. The other four nations that made up the "coalition of the willing" had leaders that were apparently not constrained by their domestic citizens' policy preferences. They engaged their nation in a war that their citizens did not support. In the case of Spain and Italy, less than 20% of the population supported the policy their government ended up pursuing. This suggests that institutional constraint mechanism was not strong enough for four "coalition of the willing" leaders to recognize it as a constraint. In the four nations that were a part of the "coalition of the non-willing" the institutional constraint mechanism was present. Table III below could be classified as parsimonious, as it does not explain everything. One could argue that there are many other variables that could contribute to whether a nation decided to join the coalition of the willing. However, the primary goal of this project is to explain as much as possible with as little as possible.

Table III: Public Opinion and Policy Congruence

Nation	Opposition Party's Stance	Polity Score	% of Public Opinion that favors supporting/joining war against Iraq	% of Public Opinion opposed to supporting/joining war against Iraq	Policy Congruence
United States	Support War	10	59	30	Yes
United Kingdom	Support War	10	39	51	No
Poland	Support War	9	21	73	No
Spain	Against War	10	13	81	No
Italy	Against War	10	17	81	No
<i>France</i>	<i>Against War</i>	9	20	75	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Germany</i>	<i>Support War</i>	10	27	69	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Russia</i>	<i>Against War</i>	7	10	87	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Turkey</i>	<i>Against War</i>	7	12	86	<i>Yes</i>

*Nations in *Italics* are members of the “coalition of the non-willing”

Explaining the Cases: Institutional Constraint Present

France

In explaining Jacques Chirac decision to keep the French out of the “coalition of the willing”, it is necessary to consider French public opinion. The public constraint mechanism in the democratic peace theory is evident in the French decision to not join the “coalition of the willing.” Chirac was able to boost his public standing by taking the anti-

war stance the vast majority of French citizens advocated. It is unclear if Chirac was personally a staunch advocate against going to war with Iraq or whether it was a political calculation intended to capitalize on an issue the public clearly supported (not using military force against Iraq and standing up against the United States). The San Francisco Chronicle believes Chirac's stance was due to, "A mix of motives -- from boosting France's stature in the European Union and overseas to fear of a potential backlash by some 5 million Muslims living in France."²² Some have suggested that the French decision is based upon economic concerns, specifically the potential loss of Iraqi oil contracts. Others believe that oil contracts did not play a major factor in the French decision. "If the French were really interested in oil, they would go along with the Americans," said Guillaume Parmentier, director of the French Center on the United States, in Paris. "We know where this war is going to go. The Americans are going to win."²³ One must also consider that the French Senate and National Assembly are dominated by members of Chirac's party. Chirac did not face major debates from either the leftist or far right political coalitions. In short, it is apparent that Chirac capitalized on a political issue that the French public strongly supported and one which the opposition parties were too weak to contest.

Germany

An investigation of several German newspapers leading up to the March 2003 war in Iraq, suggests Gerhard Schroeder's anti-war stance was political capital and he used it effectively to win his own election. The German Newspaper Deutsche Press-Agentur asserted that Schroeder used the Iraq war issue to win his re-election.²⁴ The Frankfurter

²² San Francisco Chronicle. Elizabeth Bryant, Chronicle Foreign Service. France Says "oui" to Chirac's 'non' on Iraq War Opposition to U.S. Makes Him Popular. February 22, 2003.

²³ San Francisco Chronicle. Elizabeth Bryant, Chronicle Foreign Service. France Says "oui" to Chirac's 'non' on Iraq War Opposition to U.S. Makes Him Popular. February 22, 2003

²⁴ Deutsche Press-Agentur February 24, 2004

Rundschau claimed that Schroeder's Social Democratic Party and the Green political party won the 2002 Bundestag election due to their uncompromising no to the war in Iraq.²⁵ The Die Welt Newspaper suggested that the Iraq war gave Schroeder's party an advantage over their political competitors. The Iraq war gave the SDP Social Democratic Party a new domestic political impetus after a series of unusually severe election defeats.²⁶ Other political parties tried to use the Iraq war issue to weaken Schroeder's standing. Christian Democrat Party leader Angela Merkel accused the German Chancellor Schroeder of pursuing a "go it alone" policy for Germany, and went on: "Anyone who rejects military action as a last resort weakens the pressure that needs to be maintained on dictators like that of Iraq and consequently makes a war not less but more likely."²⁷

It seems possible that the German chancellor's anti-war position on Iraq was motivated by electoral strategies. He viewed his domestic public opinion as strongly against German participation in the "coalition of the willing" and took this position as his own. However, it should be noted that Schroeder claimed his stance on Iraq was not due to electoral strategies. He believes their firm stance after state parliamentary elections in early February 2003 is a testament to this. The DDP news agency wrote, "Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (SPD) said that the coalition's position on the Iraq conflict is 'unchanged' after the state parliament elections in Lower-Saxony and Hesse and will remain unchanged. This illustrates that the Federal Government's position was not adopted "with a view to certain elections and expected results, but is of a fundamental nature", Schroeder stated.²⁸

²⁵ Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt/Main, Germany) January 16, 2004

²⁶ Die Welt Newspaper: Berlin, Germany February 22nd 2003.

²⁷ Die Welt Newspaper: Berlin, Germany February 22nd 2003.

²⁸ DDP news agency (Berlin, Germany) February 3, 2003

Opponents of Schroeder suggested that he was using the Iraq war issue as an electioneering tactic. The Die Welt paper stated, "There are arguments, including good ones, against that war. But who wants to buy them from a politician who does not declare his commitments in parliament or at international bodies but when attempting to mobilize all remaining resources for his party? Who subordinates security and alliance policies to election campaign objectives?"²⁹ Opponents of Schroeder questioned the decision to risk US-German relations over electioneering strategies. Even President Bush believed that Schroeder used an anti-war stance to enhance his chances of getting re-elected as evidenced by Bush's statement, "You read about Germany and this guy winning an election by making me look like a piñata," referring to chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's anti-war rhetoric during his reelection campaign. (Woodward 2004)

Russia

In explaining why Vladimir Putin and the Russian government decided not join the "coalition of the willing" the institutional constraint mechanism should be considered. Strong public opposition in which nearly 9 out of 10 Russian citizens were against their government using military force against Iraq may account for the government's stance. Others suggest the Russian people are concerned with the direction of United States foreign policy. Communist Deputy Sergei Reshulsky said, "The Russian people are afraid of military encroachments by the United States." Interestingly, a leading pollster VTsIOM found 71 percent of the Russian population views the United States as a threat to peace, while 45 percent see Iraq as the threat.³⁰ However, it is quite possible that the public's views on Iraq and the United States are due to Russian leaders speaking out against the war

²⁹ Die Welt: Berlin, Germany. January 24, 2003

³⁰ Moscow Times (Russia) March 20, 2003

in Iraq. That is to say, Russian public opinion may have influenced leader's opinions and leader's opinions may have influenced Russian public opinion. Moreover, within the Russian legislative body (the Duma) there was strong opposition to the Iraq war led by the Communist and Liberal Democratic parties. In January 2003, 80 Russian members of Parliament signed a petition against a war with Iraq and against U.S. hegemony.³¹ Additionally, the Eurasian Party of Russia, the Russian Peace Party and the Labour Party of Russia were also influential by organizing anti-war rallies.³² In short, the Russian decision not to join the coalition of the willing can be attributed to strong public and parliamentary opposition.

Turkey

Turkey's decision not to join the "coalition of the willing" may be the most complicated. This is due in part to their geographic location as Iraq's northern neighbor. Their proximity to Iraq would undoubtedly result in many potential positive and negative effects that members of government would need to consider. The Turkish Parliament voted 264-250 in favor of allowing U.S. troops to enter Turkey; however the vote fell four short of the absolute majority required by the Constitution, thus failing to pass the proposal. Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and AK Party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan endorsed the plan (to allow 62,000 U.S troops to invade Iraq from Turkey), and they urged their party members to support it. But in a crucial decision, they decided not to enforce what is known as "group decision," in which every legislator is required to vote in lock step with the

³¹ ITAR-TASS News Agency (Moscow, Russia) January 20, 2003: Eighty Russian MPs sign petition against war in Iraq

³² Interfax News Agency (Moscow Russia) March 15th 2003: Antiwar Rallies in Moscow Pass Off Without Serious Incident.

leadership.³³ This decision was the main reason the proposal failed. Moreover, Turkey did not join the “coalition of the willing”. The institutional constraint mechanism can partially explain this, as roughly 90% of the Turkish citizens were against the Iraq war. However, this explanation is not sufficient in accounting for the final outcome. The institutional constraint mechanism would not suggest that so many parliament members would vote for a resolution that 90% of Turkish citizens were against.

One of the factors that contributed to the vote being so close was realist considerations of the Turkish government. Turkey was offered 5 billion dollars in grants and then an additional 10 billion in loans if they complied with the U.S. offer.³⁴ Others claimed that Turkey’s national interests trumped considerations of following public opinion. For example, the Turkish Daily News proclaimed that by Turkey siding with the United States they could: 1) block an establishment of an independent Kurdish state, 2) maintain close ties with the world’s lone superpower, especially after not being able to join the European Union, 3) ensure Turkey has good relations with the post Saddam Iraqi regime, and 4) ensure Turkey has a role in assisting the U.S. plans to reshape the Middle East.³⁵ These factors can all be described as realist considerations and in the end they nearly trumped the impact of near unanimous public opinion. If the Turkish leaders had required “group decision” in the parliamentary vote to allow U.S. troops to enter Turkey, the institutional constraint mechanism would have been relegated to insignificant.

³³ Turkish Daily News (Ankara, Turkey) March 8, 2003 Democracy vs. Strategy

³⁴ Vermont Cynic, Turkey’s Role Still Unclear In Possible War With Iraq: March 11th, 2003: By Carly Baldwin.
<http://www.vermontcynic.com/news/2003/03/11/News/Turkeys.Role.Still.Unclear.In.Possible.War.With.Iraq-390113.shtml>

³⁵ Turkish Daily News (Ankara, Turkey) March 8, 2003 Democracy vs. Strategy

United States

The United States was the main actor in the “coalition of the willing” as they were the nation to assemble the coalition and provided most of the troops and resources for the military operation to remove Saddam Hussein. The evolution of the U.S. policy to remove Saddam Hussein is long and complex. In short, after the 1991 Gulf War many began to advocate for the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein from power. After years of formulating a policy of how to remove Saddam, the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks provided a window of opportunity for advocates of Saddam’s removal. Shortly after the terrorist attacks, President Bush declared, “We must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world...Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction.”³⁶ Essentially, this statement expanded the war on terror to include Saddam Hussein and Iraq. It is critical to consider the impact of including Iraq as a part of the war on terror if one is to understand why the American public supported using military force against. The terrorist attacks also had a major impact on public opinion favoring use of military force against Iraq. For example, a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted February 19-21 2001 indicated 52% favored sending American ground troops to remove Saddam Hussein from power and 42% opposed. Two months after the terrorist attacks the same survey reported that 74% favored sending American ground troops to remove Saddam Hussein from power and only 20% opposed.

³⁶The President's State of the Union Address The United States Capitol
Washington, D.C. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

The Bush administration was able to maintain support for removing Saddam Hussein from Iraq that the terrorist attacks provided. Opinion polls before the Iraq war started generally indicate that roughly 60% of the American public supported the operation. Although this indicates policy congruence, the Bush administration likely would have pursued the same policy if the public did not support it. President Bush claimed, “I am prepared to risk my presidency to do what I think is right” (Woodward 2004). In short, although a majority of American’s supported the war in Iraq, it is very much possible that the Bush Administration would not have been constrained by public opposition to the war. This is a counterfactual statement and cannot be proven, however based upon Bush’s rhetoric one can assume his actions would have been the same regardless of public opinion. In short, it does not seem likely that President Bush would have recognized the institutional constraint of public opinion being opposed to his policy towards Iraq. One can assume if the public did oppose his policy, he simply would have worked harder to get the public to change their views towards his preferred policy.

Explaining the Cases: Institutional Constraint Not Present

United Kingdom

In understanding Tony Blair’s decision to join the “coalition of the willing” one must look beyond the institutional constraint mechanism of the democratic peace theory. Most opinion polls showed that more people were against Britain joining the “coalition of the willing” than were for joining it. However, British public opinion was not decisively against the war (roughly 6% more people were against going to war depending upon when the poll was conducted) and the British public held several contesting beliefs. For example, the Guardian Newspaper asserted, “In such a nuanced mood, the truth is, first, that public opinion is very divided; second, that people can believe more than one thing at the same

time - for instance that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would be a good thing for Iraq and that George Bush is proving a bad thing for global stability; and, third, that some - but not all - views may be changing.”³⁷ Moreover, Blair did not face a strong opposition party in parliament that was against the war. Although, he had 139 members of his own party defect (which was the biggest anti-government rebellion in British parliamentary history) he still managed to secure a strong majority vote (412-149) in favor of the war in parliament. Marsha Singh, one of the Labour party defectors claimed that it is no longer accurate to claim Tony Blair is going to war against the wishes of the British people.³⁸

The fact the Blair was able to rally members of parliament and public opinion behind his stance to join the “coalition of the willing” may be attributable to his ability to lead public opinion. On March 19 2003, President Bush spoke to Blair. “Not only did you win (the parliamentary vote for using military force against Iraq), but public opinion has shifted because you’re leading... That is why the vote happened the way it happened. It’s the willingness of someone to lead” (Woodward 2004). The ability of Blair to lead public opinion in his favor is evidenced by a 17% increase of British public opinion favoring military action against Iraq in the month before the war started.³⁹ The Guardian suggested this shift in public opinion could also be attributable to Blair’s attempt to secure a second UN resolution and/or a measure of the public rallying behind its leader in time of crisis. In understanding why Blair was not constrained by domestic public opinion it is also necessary to consider realist concerns of the U.S./British relations. It is quite possible that Tony Blair was more concerned with not damaging relations with the U.S. and George Bush than following British or European public opinion.

³⁷ The Guardian: London England. March 20th 2003

³⁸ The Guardian: London England. March 20th 2003

³⁹ The Guardian: London England. Alan Travis, March 18th 2003

Italy

The institutional constraint mechanism does not seem to have played a decisive role in Silvio Berlusconi's decision to join the "coalition of the willing". Public opinion was largely against joining the coalition. Unsurprisingly, question wording alters the results of Italians favoring use of force. If the question is couched in terms regarding an attack by the U.S. 85 % of Italians are against it. If the question is couched in terms referring to the UN opposition lowers to 71%.⁴⁰ The *Corriere della Sera* concludes, "Those hostile to the war diminish if the approval of an impartial institution like the UN is taken into consideration and, even more so, if the opinion asked concerns Italian support of a conflict already decided and put into action by others, still under the aegis of the United Nations."⁴¹ However, Berlusconi interpreted Italian opinion to be weakly against the war and joining the coalition. The *La Stampa* Newspaper characterized Italian public opinion as, "weak domestic opposition".⁴² However, this weak opposition gained strength when the Pope condemned war as "evil" and those waging it as "Satan" on Sunday March 9th 2003. According to the *La Stampa*, this is the reason why the Italian anti-war movement suddenly and unmistakably acquired a clear and overwhelming majority position among Italy's grass roots.⁴³ The Pope's comments mobilized the large catholic population within Italy to be against the war. In light of this public opposition one wonders why Berlusconi was not constrained by his domestic public opinion.

To adequately answer this, one must again look towards realist justifications. The *La Stampa* Newspaper suggested that Berlusconi felt it was critical to support allies Blair,

⁴⁰ *Corriere della Sera* (Milan, Italy) February 17, 2003

⁴¹ *Corriere della Sera* (Milan, Italy) February 17, 2003

⁴² *La Stampa*: Turin, Italy: Italian Daily sees Berlusconi's Iraq Wager Backfiring. March 11, 2003

⁴³ *La Stampa*: Turin, Italy: Politicians cannot ignore "ethical" pro-peace majority. February 22, 2003.

Anzar, and Bush who have helped him in previous situations. The La Stampa also offered realpolitik calculations of potential reciprocity from the United States for joining the coalition, such as an Italian being named the next secretary general of NATO and Berlusconi joining the elite among world leaders.

In light of Berlusconi neglecting to follow Italian public opposition to the war it is again apparent that the institutional constrain mechanism does not always work as democratic peace theorists would have us believe. One must again consider the affect of leaders manipulating and educating public opinion in their desired manner. As President Bush remarked to Berlusconi in a January 30 2003 meeting, “This is going to change. You watch, public opinion will change. We lead our publics. We cannot follow our publics” (Woodward 2004). This statement is antithetical to the institutional constraint mechanism and suggests that executive leaders take the role of a trustee rather than a delegate model of representation.

Poland

Aleksander Kwasniewski’s decision not to heed domestic public opinion can also be partially explained by realist justifications. Kwasniewski’s rhetoric is couched in geopolitical strategies. He stated that Poland should assist the US in avoiding a situation where, “France and Germany could...do whatever they wished behind our backs.”⁴⁴ He also stated that the Polish should play a role in the reconstruction of Iraq. These statements indicate the Polish had geopolitical and economic interests in mind in deciding whether to join the “coalition of the willing.” It is also possible that Kwasniewski believed joining the coalition would bolster the Polish nation’s chances of joining the European Union.

⁴⁴ Gazeta Wyborcza: Warsaw Poland April 15th, 2003.

The Polish decision can also be partially explained by the lack of opposition from rival political parties. The PAP news agency indicated that the major political parties in the Polish parliament supported joining the “coalition of the willing” citing similar realpolitik justifications.⁴⁵ However, it should be noted that not all Polish political parties supported the decision to join the coalition of the willing. The Self-Defence Farmers’ Party and the Polish Peasant Party each criticized the legal grounds for Polish troops being sent to Iraq without parliamentary approval. In the end, the Polish Parliament did not vote on whether to send troops to Iraq. In reading through the various Polish newspapers it is evident that there was elite consensus to join the coalition and little concern for public opinion. Kwasniewski’s unpopular decision would influence his public support in Poland. Aleksander Kwasniewski confided in George Bush that, “The level of anti-Americanism is extremely high,” and Bob Woodward concluded that Kwasniewski had a serious political problem because of his support for Bush. Bush responded, “Success helps change public opinion,” Bush said. “Should we commit troops, we’ll feed the people of Iraq.” He said it as if that humanitarian gesture might have an impact on public opinion in Poland (Woodward 2004). This passage suggests that rather than being constrained by public opinion, Kwasniewski was intent on moving public opinion to favor his own stance on the Iraq war issue.

Spain

In sifting through Spanish newspapers it is apparent that Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar was aware of the mass public opposition to the war in Iraq and

⁴⁵ PAP news agency (Warsaw, Poland): March 26, 2003 Polish political parties have mixed views on participation in Iraq war

Spain joining the “coalition of the willing.” However, Aznar believed the actions of his government were correct and pursued his foreign policy despite the institutional constraint mechanism. Aznar believed the best path to peace was making sure Saddam Hussein was aware of the threat of war if the necessary steps were not taken. Aznar pursued a path that he believed would achieve peace while maintaining a strong allegiance to his U.S. and British allies. Of all the members of the “coalition of the willing” leaders, the Spanish prime minister faced the most hostile opposition parties in his government. Aznar viewed the leftist parties as attempting to bring down the government in an undemocratic manner.⁴⁶ Spanish academic Pedro Schwartz argued that Aznar was acting as a skilled statesman in his handling of the Iraq war situation. He argues that Aznar stood behind the most powerful country in the world and offered moral and political support in spite of domestic opposition. He applauds Aznar for neglecting electioneering strategies and acquiescing to political pressures. Others point out that Spanish parliament is the institution where decisions of war are made, not public opinion polls. People in this camp argue that the 1991 Gulf War and Kosovo war were not initially supported either, but the Spanish public later supported the decisions after their success. Aznar’s realist calculations again discredit the democratic peace’s institutional constraint mechanism.

Conclusion

In analyzing nine nations that were a part of the “coalition of the willing and non-willing”, the institutional constraint mechanism failed to play the critical role that many scholars have suggested it should. In light of this, it is necessary to reevaluate the premises of the democratic peace theory, specifically the institutional constraint mechanism. The leaders of the four nations that made up the “coalition of the non-willing” all pursued the

⁴⁶ ABC web site (Madrid, Spain. Spanish premier stands firm on Iraq policy, criticizes opposition conduct

policy preferences of their constituents who were largely opposed to supporting the war in Iraq. These cases would support the institutional constraint mechanism of the democratic peace theory, in which the public constrains their leader's ability to wage war. However, it is also possible that the leaders of these nations led public opinion towards their own anti-war policy preferences. It seems the democratic peace theory is a misnomer. The word democratic implies that the authority, resides in the people. The institutional constraint mechanism suggests that it is the people who decide whether a nation goes to war. Public opinion polls and elections give citizens the power to ensure leaders follow their foreign policy preferences. Instead, perhaps the theory should be called the republican peace theory, as it is the representatives of the citizens that make the decisions of war and peace. Executive leaders are more insulated from public opinion than the institutional constraint mechanism suggests. This paper finds that executive leaders assume the role of a trustee representative rather than a delegate representative in matters of foreign policy. Leaders view public opinion as a moldable object, not as a constraining mechanism on their power to wage war.

Many of the cases examined indicate the presence of realist principles. Some have speculated that the loss of Iraqi oil contracts factored into the French decision not to join the coalition of the willing. The Turkish parliament seemed immune from the institutional constraint mechanism as it supported the proposal allowing U.S. troops to invade Iraq from Turkey. Many have suggested that this was due to potential economic and strategic benefits from siding with the United States. Similarly, Britain, Italy, Poland, and Spain considered the alliance with the United States as more important than domestic public opinion. It is also likely that the United States applied coercive tactics to get members to

join the “coalition of the willing”. It is impossible to know what the United States dangled in front of nations in order to get them to join the “coalition of the willing.” It is possible that reconstruction contracts, foreign aid, and entry into NATO or to the UN were used as leverage by the United States to get nations to join the coalition. It is also possible that the lone superpower of the world bullied nations into the coalition. For example, after Yemen cast a no vote in the UN, which authorized use of force against Iraq in 1991, a U.S. diplomat told the Yemeni ambassador, “that will be the most expensive ‘no’ vote you ever cast.” Within days the United States cut all of its aid budget to Yemen.⁴⁷ These bribes and coercive tactics may explain why nations failed to be constrained by their domestic population’s preferences.

The findings also indicate that opposition parties do not keep governments from pursuing war. In some of the cases, such as Spain, the opposition party strongly opposed the executive leader’s stance, yet this did not keep them from joining the “coalition of the willing”. In the German case, the opposition party supported joining the “coalition of the willing” but this did not alter the executive’s final decision. In some cases, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, one can assume that the lack of opposition from rival parties contributed to the executive’s ability to use force against Iraq. In short, the affects of opposition parties are mixed and one can not conclude that they determine whether the institutional constraint mechanism will be present or not.

There is evidence contrary to what the principles of the democratic peace theory would suggest. First, in the cases where the institutional constraint mechanism was present, two of the nations had the lowest polity scores of all nations examined (Turkey and Russia

⁴⁷ Anderson, Sarah, Bennis, Phyllis, & Cavanagh, John. (2003). Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced? How the Bush Administration Influences Allies in its War on Iraq. Institute for Policy Studies: 2/26/2003.

each scored 7 on the polity index). Of the four nations that were not constrained by the institutional constraint mechanism, their policy index average was 9.75. Of the 4 nations where the institutional constraint mechanism was present, their policy index average was 8.6. Ironically, in the group of nations with the lower policy index average the institutional constraint mechanism was present, while the group of nations with the higher policy index average the institutional constraint was not present.⁴⁸ This is contrary to the notion that the more democratic a nation is (as measured by the polity index) the more likely they would be restrained by the institutional constraint. Secondly, the institutional constraint mechanism is not evident in four of the cases. An effort was made to explain why each nation pursued their respective policy. However, it would be necessary to examine each nation in more depth, in order to tease out exactly why leaders decided to follow or not to follow their constituents' preferences. Each case may have individual nuances that have been glossed over by this general examination. It is possible that the "coalition of the non-willing" leaders engaged in educating and manipulating public opinion towards their own policy goals. This would require interviews of the leaders and examinations of their speeches. It is also possible that the "coalition of the willing leaders" that ignored their constituents' preferences believed that following the dictates of the world's only superpower was more important than domestic considerations.

Limitations and Other Considerations

There are also limitations of using surveys to assess public opinion. In eight of the nine cases public opinion did not support joining the coalition to use military force against Iraq. However, the question used for this paper is not capable of measuring the strength of

⁴⁸ The United States was excluded, as it was the nation that assembled the coalition of the willing and the institutional constraint mechanism was not present. One can describe the United States situation as one where there was policy congruence with the preferences of the public.

these opinions. It is possible that citizens preferred their leaders not to join the coalition and use force against Iraq, while still supporting their leader's decision to do just that. An October 3-6th, 2002 CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll supports this phenomenon. When respondents were asked "If President Bush decided to invade Iraq with US ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power, which of the following would best describe your reaction? Twenty-seven percent of the participants responded that they would support the president, even though they don't think U.S. should invade Iraq."⁴⁹

Secondly, attitudes are complex, and the survey question used for this project may not be capable of distinguishing citizen's conflicting attitudes. For example, citizens may not support war, yet believe the Iraqi people will be better off if Saddam Hussein was removed from power. The March 2003 Pew poll indicated a majority of respondents in both the "coalition of the willing and non-willing nations" felt the Iraqi people would be better off by disarming Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein. A majority of those polled in the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Poland believed the war would make the Iraqi people better off. A plurality of people in Spain believed the same. Only in Russia and Turkey did more respondents believe the Iraqi people would be worse off.⁵⁰ This may indicate that many people oppose the use of force weakly and may later support the military endeavor if it goes successfully.

Appendix A

World Military Spending

⁴⁹ 47% responded they support Bush's decision and they think the U.S. should invade Iraq and 22% responded they do not support Bush's decision and U.S. shouldn't invade Iraq.

⁵⁰ Pew Research Center for the People & the Press: March 18, 2003 report. America's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties.

<http://www.cdi.org/budget/2004/world-military-spending.cfm> Figures are for latest year available, usually 2002. Expenditures are used in a few cases where official budgets are significantly lower than actual spending. The figure for the United States is from the annual budget request for Fiscal Year 2004.

* 2001 Funding

Table prepared by Center for Defense Information.

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Department of Defense

- 1) United States: 399.1 billion
- 2) Russia: 65 billion
- 5) United Kingdom: 38.4 billion
- 6) France: 29.5 billion
- 7) Germany: 24.9 billion
- 8) Italy: 19.4 billion
- 15) Spain: 8.4 billion
- 19) Turkey: 5.8 billion
- 29) Poland: 3.9 billion

World GDP

World Fact Book 2004

<http://www.studentsoftheworld.info/infopays/wfb/def/2001rank.php>

- 1) United States: \$ 10,980,000,000,000
- 5) Germany: \$ 2,271,000,000,000
- 6) United Kingdom: \$ 1,664,000,000,000
- 7) France: \$ 1,654,000,000,000
- 8) Italy: \$ 1,552,000,000,000
- 10) Russia: \$ 1,287,000,000,000
- 13) Spain: \$ 885,500,000,000
- 22) Turkey: \$ 455,300,000,000
- 24) Poland: \$ 426,700,000,000

Appendix C

CNN/USA TODAY/GALLUP

Would you favor or oppose sending American ground troops to the Persian Gulf in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq?

	Favor %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
2002 Sep 13-16	57	39	4
2002 Sep 2-4	58	36	6
2002 Aug 19-21	53	41	6
2002 Jun 17-19	61	31	8
2001 Nov 26-27 *	74	20	6

2001 Feb 19-21 *	52	42	6
1993 Jun 29-30 *	70	27	3
1992 Mar30-Apr5 *	55	40	5

* Wording: Would you favor or oppose sending American troops back to the Persian Gulf in order to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq?

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