

Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism

Reneta Kenolova

Drury University

rkenolov@drury.edu

Introduction

Terrorism has evolved over the course of history changing its aims, methods, and participants' character according to the context in which it occurs. The actual term "terrorism" is of relatively recent origin. It was first defined as an act of violence for political reasons in 1798, in a supplement to the Dictionnaire of the Academie Francaise (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 15). The study of terrorism can be divided in two time periods – before the 1970s and after the 1970s. In the beginning of the 20th century the field was dominated by psychologists trying to find individual-oriented explanations for the occurrence of violence and political scientists limiting terrorism only to conflicts between nations. The increase in terrorist actions in the 1960s spurred a more systematic study of the subject. Interpretations and theories developed by political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists contributed to the increasing amount of research in the field. The present state of the study of terrorism could be organized in four different categories – causes of terrorism, characteristics of the terrorist act, political and social effects of the occurrence of terrorism, and prevention strategies.

This particular research will focus on exploring the causes of terrorism. If we recognize the factors that impact the occurrence of violent acts, we will be more successful in containing or even eradicating them. The goal of this paper is to isolate three of the generally identified causes of terrorism – ethnic diversity, religious diversity and democracy – and provide empirical evidence for the relationship between these three factors and the presence of terrorism within a country. There are three hypotheses that will be explored in this paper. First, countries with more democratic governments will experience less violence. Second, countries with a more ethnically diverse population will experience more violence. Third, countries with more religiously diverse population will experience more violence.

The following review of literature will outline the definitions, theories, and typologies of terrorism that have been developed in the past four decades. It will be divided in eight sections - myths of contemporary political terrorism, definition, general characteristics, typologies of terrorism, theories on violence, effects of terrorism, terrorism and social pluralism, and terrorism and democracy. The main purpose of this general overview is to provide the reader with the necessary background and understanding of the processes involved in a terrorist act and to establish the foundation for the development of this particular research.

Literature Review

Myths of contemporary political terrorism

There is no uniformly accepted interpretation of the different aspects of terrorism – definition, origin, causes, significance, perpetrators, and prevention. As a result a number of misconceptions exist. In this section I will discuss the most common myths within each category as identified by the scholars Bell (1977), Laqueur (1977), Stohl (1988), and Bonanate (1979).

All four of the authors identify the lack of consensus on a single definition of terrorism as the main source of invalid assumptions. I will discuss this major drawback in the study of terrorism in the next section. Bell (1977) identifies the two main views of terrorists - perpetrators of violence on one hand and "freedom fighters" on the other. He regards these conflicting interpretations as the foundation of the widely accepted assumption that terrorists are psychotic fanatics and their actions cannot be rationalized. In their discussion of this myth, Laqueur (1976) and Stohl (1981) reject its validity based on existing evidence that terrorists actually apply the cost-benefit analysis to their actions and base their decisions on the guaranteed probability to attain the desired results.

Bell (1977) and Laqueur (1976) also discuss the general misconception that terrorism is a novel phenomenon that crystallized in the middle of the 20th century, when in reality terrorism was officially defined as early as the 18th century. Bell's analysis focuses on the foundation of the myth. He claims that it is a direct result of the lack of clarity in the definition of the phenomenon. Laqueur, on the other hand, explores the effects of this misconception. He considers it to be a major drawback for the development of the field as it diminishes the importance of exploring the history of terrorism and making comparisons between its past and present state.

There is a discrepancy among the scholars of terrorism with regard to the importance of the phenomenon. Bell (1977) and Stohl (1988), for example, consider terrorism as a threat to the normal operation of open societies. Laqueur (1976), on the other hand, views terrorism as a futile strategy to stir political change and thus unworthy of too much attention. In addition to that, some scholars disregard terrorism as a transient trend. Bell challenges this assumption providing evidence that terrorism is actually getting more organized and institutionalized and constantly growing in scope.

There are also a number of misconceptions about the causes of terrorism. Laqueur (1976) dedicates an extensive section of his research on this particular category of fallacies and its impact on the types of counter-measures developed. First, he points to the common assumption that terrorism is a result of injustice and, therefore, the conclusion that if political and social injustice is diminished then terrorism will gradually disappear. Second, he identifies the common misbelief that terrorism is triggered by individual frustration and if this harmful dissonance is reduced, the likelihood of terrorism will naturally diminish. Bonanate (1979) expands on the discussion by adding another common myth. He challenges the generally accepted notion that dysfunctional societies actually cause the formation of terrorist groups and points to the fact that terrorism is prevalent in a lot of stable democracies.

The last category of myths focuses on the different types of terrorist acts with regard to the nature of the perpetrators and the specific goals of the act. Stohl (1988) explores this category in great detail. The first myth he identifies is the notion that political terrorism is used only by insurgent forces to oppose the unjust actions of oppressive regimes. He points out that the very existence of state terrorism rejects this claim. The second myth classifies all insurgent violence as political violence. Stohl challenges this statement outlining the wide range of goals terrorist organizations are

trying to accomplish. The third myth as identified by Stohl is that governments oppose non-governmental terrorism. He states that in reality some of the terrorist actions are favored as they are targeting the opposition.

This extensive account of the misconceptions prevalent within the field of terrorism provides a framework for identification of a terrorist act. If we know what a terrorist act is not, then we can more thoroughly define what it is. The next section will focus on the definitions of terrorism.

Definition

There is no consensus on the definition of terrorism both as a doctrine and as a tactic. A number of problems have been identified in the constructive criticism of currently existing definitions. McCormick (2003) and Schmid and Jongman (1988) provide us with extensive discussion of a number of definitional problems. The first problem McCormick identifies is the controversy around the distinction between terrorism and other forms of violence and the evaluation of this distinction as qualitative or quantitative. Schmid and Jongman, for example, challenge the view of equating terrorism with a form of modern warfare through a detailed comparison between the two forms of violence. While war is usually a sequence of battles between two armed forces, in terrorism there is only one armed organization, and there is no perceptible battle. In addition to that, there are rules of war that consider certain actions on either side a war crime such as deliberately taking and killing hostages. In terrorism there are no such restrictions, and actions like hostage taking have become a common practice. In addition to that, terrorists do not target the desired audience of their message directly, but they use violence against civilians who then become just mediums for transmitting the message (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 13).

The second problem is defining the nature of the terrorist act. In his discussion, McCormick (2003) identifies the distinction between terrorism “from above” and terrorism “from below” as a point of conflict. He also presents the lack of consensus on whether terrorism is a criminal or a political act as a major drawback in the development of a comprehensive definition of the phenomenon. Schmid and Jongman (1988), on the other hand, focus on another aspect of the act – symbolism. They view it as an area of ambiguity as the majority of the terrorists do not choose their victims by prominence, but rather randomly. Yet symbolic acts against property have been committed, such as the attack of the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001.

The third major definitional problem presented by Schmid and Jongman (1988) is the notion of terror. Some scholars consider non-state terrorism as incapable of producing constant fear of victimization due to the sporadic character of such acts. Others, however, claim that terrorism skillfully manipulates the emotional reaction of the audience, and thus manages to produce a lasting state of extreme fear (p. 19).

Schmid and Jongman (1988) tried to incorporate as many of the identified critiques as possible in the development of their definition of terrorism. In addition to that, they

compiled a list of twenty-two word categories that they consider necessary in the definition of terrorism. The most frequently used categories are violence, political, fear, and threat. They appear in more than 50% of all definitions. Although scholars usually incorporate only six to eight of the elements in order to make a definition manageable, Schmid and Jongman incorporated thirteen of them (p. 5). As a result, 81% of a sample of 200 members of the research community in the field of political science found the definition fully or partially acceptable (p. 2). Therefore, we will consider this particular definition as a reference point in the development of this study.

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (p. 28).

General characteristics

Terrorism has changed over the last century with respect to its goals, methods, organization, and the character of people involved to the point that some scholars distinguish between “old” and “new” terrorism. Crenshaw (2001), however, claims that the two are not fundamentally different, though terrorism has evolved in the changing historical context.

The first major difference between the “old” and the “new” terrorism as identified by Crenshaw is the shift in goals of terrorist organizations. While in the past the aims of terrorists were tangible and negotiable (IRA), today the ends are considered unlimited (Al Qaeda). The “new” terrorism is more expressive than instrumental and destruction is an end in itself. Another predominant characteristic of “new” terrorism is perceived to be its cultural and ideological conflict with the West and the United States in particular.

In addition to that, Crenshaw (2001) makes a clear distinction between the methods used. In the past terrorists were very specific in their targets and voiced their claims taking as few casualties as possible. Today terrorists have an unlimited access to a wider range of lethal weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and that has led to increased number of civilian deaths. She also points to the rise of suicidal terrorism as the new means to an end. It reflects the willingness of these organizations to sacrifice a large number of their own in order to achieve their goals.

Crenshaw (2001) further explores the apparatus of the terrorist groups focusing on their internal organization. In the past, they had very centralized leadership and a top-down structure. Today, they are decentralized and lack hierarchy. A number of sub-units

compose the web-like structure of the modern terrorist organization and each cell has its own autonomy in the decision-making process. There is also a change in the people operating within the cells of terrorist groups. And although it is almost impossible to generalize about the personality of terrorists, there are a growing number of young, educated, and middle class people.

Having identified the characteristics of the “new” terrorism, we can discuss the different typologies of terrorism within it.

Typologies

Typologies make a large amount of information manageable by placing it in different categories according to established criteria. The main benefits of typologies, as identified by Schmid and Jongman (1988), are the identification of new relationships between the variables, the generation of hypotheses, and the development of general theories (p. 39). However, Stohl (1988) cautions that typologies are idealized rather than true reflections of the world.

For the reference of the reader, Table 1 provides a general account of the typologies based on the categories identified by Schmid and Jongman (1988) and Stohl (1988). However, only a small portion of these classificatory schemes will be applied in this particular research and therefore discussed in more detail.

Stohl (1988) identifies four major categories of typologies – group-based classificatory schemes, motivational classificatory schemes, modus operandi classificatory schemes and origin-based classificatory schemes. Group-based typologies are actor-based and it distinguishes between state and non-state actors and for the purpose of this research only the former category will be applied to the data. Motivational typologies are purpose-based and categorize terrorist acts according to the motivation of the terrorist group and the goal they are trying to attain. Therefore, these classification schemes will be the starting point for the identification of potential causes of terrorism. Modus operandi typologies focus on the tactics employed and targets selected by the terrorist organization. Origin-based typologies explore the behavior of the terrorists in relation to the environment they operate in.

Table 1

Group-based Typologies	Motivational Typologies	Modus Operandi Typologies	Origin-based Typologies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actor-based 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cause-based • Political-orientation-based • Motivation-based • Demand-based • Purpose-based 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Victim-based • Means-based • Target-based 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environment-based

Now that we have identified the different types of terrorism, we can proceed with review of the theories that provide explanations on the causes of terrorism – the main focus of this research.

Theories

This section will be divided in two sub-sections that will review theories on violence in general and theories on causes of terrorism in particular.

Theories on Violence

Theories on violence are organized under the umbrella of two competing philosophies on terrorism presented by McCormick (2003) – rationalism and expressionism. The rationalist view considers violence as a means to an end, while the expressionist view states that violence is a means of individual expression that is usually spontaneous, uncontrolled, and irrational.

In this general framework, Muro-Ruiz (2002) further divides theories on violence distinguishing between violence as reaction and violence as action. Theories that view violence as reaction are the psychoanalytic instinctual theory by Sigmund Freud, the aggressive drive theories and theories of social discontent. Freud states that violence originates internally. He considers the relationship between our life instincts (Eros) and our death instincts (Thanatos). The imbalance between Eros and Thanatos results in destruction that is either directed at the self – self-destruction or directed externally – aggression. Aggressive drive theories (frustration-aggression theory) build upon Freud's theories and claim that people get frustrated when they are unable to attain their goals or do not receive the rewards they expect. This frustration results in aggression that is usually directed outward and affects people around us. Frustration-aggression theory states that the higher the level of frustration people are experiencing, the greater the amount of aggression they direct towards the perceived source of their frustration. Theories of social discontent apply the frustration-aggression theory at the societal level.

Ted Robert Gurr's (1971) work reviewing relative deprivation theory has received the most recognition across the field. Gurr defines political violence as "all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors – including political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies" (p. 35). His relative deprivation theory incorporates both psychological and societal variables. This model considers that there are three separate stages in the process of development of political violence. It starts with the development of discontent, which is then politicized and actualized in violence. The essence of Gurr's theory of relative deprivation lies in the discrepancy between people's value expectations and their value capabilities.

Gurr (1971) defines values are defined as objects and conditions that people strive for. He further categorizes them into welfare values, power values, and interpersonal

values. Welfare values are the most basic ones that guarantee our physical well-being such as food, shelter, health services, and physical comforts. Power values determine how much influence we have over the actions of the others and how much influence they have over us. These values are usually most evident in collective decision-making. Interpersonal values are usually psychological satisfactions we seek through our interaction with others such as our status in society and our belonging to strong support groups. Therefore, value expectations are what we believe we are entitled to. Value capabilities are what we perceive ourselves as being able to obtain.

There are certain societal variables that affect the process of focusing social discontent towards particular political objects. Some of these societal variables include the extent of tolerance for aggression present in a culture, the success of previously employed violence, and the legitimacy of the political system in power. Gurr (1971) states that the potential for collective violence increases with the increase in the intensity of relative deprivation and varies among the members of a collectivity (p. 35).

The widespread acceptance of relative deprivation theory is due more to its simplicity than to its strong psychological foundation. The theory has been criticized by a number of psychologists as research has shown that frustration does not always lead to aggression and aggression can form even without the presence of frustration. In addition, Gurr's theory fails to explain regime terrorism and the fact that a lot of the insurgents actually come from middle and upper class and have not experienced the effects of deprivation.

In the category of theories that view violence as action, Muro-Ruiz (2002) and Ross (1993) identify psychological theories, rational choice theory, and social learning theory. Muro-Ruiz identifies psychological theories as the ones that claim that people resort to violence due to psychological forces that affect them. The underlying concept of these theories is the view of terrorists as deranged personalities. He uses rational choice theory as a normative theory – it tells us what we ought to do in order to achieve our goals. According to Muro-Ruiz, the actors are the unit of analysis and the theory explains violence as a collective rational decision of a group. The social learning theory views violence as a result of external forces and, therefore, a learned behavior.

Schmid and Jongman (1988) add another theory to the psychology theories identified by Muro-Ruiz – the identification theory of insurgent terrorism. The basic concept of this theory is identification with the aggressor or with the victim. The level of identification is usually influenced by certain factors such as race, class, nationality, etc. This theory proves useful in the explanation of the high number of women and intellectuals in the apparatus of terrorist organizations. Women identify with people's suffering more strongly than men as they recognize it in their own experience as a marginalized group in society. Intellectuals, on the other hand, feel alienated from their own social group due to their education so they are looking for a new reference group (p. 93).

In addition to the general explanations of the occurrence of violence, psychology theories also attempt to create profiles of the terrorist personality. Although that has proven to be a futile effort as there is so much diversity in the members within and across terrorist organizations, Horowitz's (1976) propositions about the terrorist personality have gained relatively large recognition. Horowitz states that the "typical" terrorist is a young man from a middle class family who is economically marginalized. In his view, these men assume the cause of the organization as their individual vocation and, therefore, are ready to sacrifice their lives for it. They use acts of violence but distinguish themselves from regular homicides as their actions are much more systematic, planned, and symbolic. They use violence as a way to advertise wider discontent and thus encourage the public to withdraw their support for the regime.

Schmid and Jongman (1988) discuss two additional theories. The communication theory considers recognition and attention the two basic goals of terrorism. It applies the four basic components of traditional media to the elements of terrorism. Therefore, the terrorist (the transmitter) carries the message (the bomb) to the receiver (the target audience) who then gives feedback (reaction of the target) (p. 109). The sociological theories reject the assumption that terrorists are insane and look for the root causes of terrorism in the surrounding environment – international, national, and sub-cultural (p. 111).

Causes of Terrorism

The work of Martha Crenshaw (1981) provides us with a theoretical order of different types and levels of causes of terrorism. She identifies three levels of causation – situational, individual, and organizational. The situational level focuses on the environment in which terrorism occurs and evaluates the political, social, and economic conditions that account for the presence of terrorism. The individual level focuses on the actor and tries to explain why people placed under the same condition respond differently. The organizational level of causation explores the internal dynamic of the organization as a source of justification for the resort to violent means for attainment of goals.

Crenshaw (1981) distinguishes two types of factors – permissive and precipitant causes. Permissive causes are defined as the factors that set the stage for the occurrence of terrorism in the long run, but are not sufficient to actually cause the eruption of violence. Precipitant causes are the specific events that precede the violent act. They are viewed as direct causes of terrorism.

Ross (1993) builds on the theoretical framework that Crenshaw provides and actually identifies specific cases of both permissive and precipitant causes. He views geographic location as a permissive factor. There is historical evidence that cities are more likely to facilitate terrorism than rural areas due to their infrastructure. Ross also identifies the type of the political system as a permissive cause. Terrorism has been more prevalent in democracies, very rare in authoritarian regimes and totally absent in totalitarian states. He considers the level of modernization as defining for the success of

terrorism. More developed societies provide terrorists with access to more destructive weapons and advanced technology as well as networks of communication and more sophisticated, vulnerable targets.

In the category of precipitant causes, Ross (1983) identifies the social, cultural, and historical identification of a specific sub-group of the population. On the political level, he singles out splits of political organizations and the presence of additional political unrest as catalysts for the emergence of terrorism. On the social level, the presence of grievances such as poverty, ethnic, racial, and religious discrimination, suspension of civil liberties, etc., is the most significant precipitant cause. In addition, Ross considers the failure of counter-terrorist measures to have stimulating effect on the precipitation of violence.

In the next two sections we will review previous attempts to establish a relationship between the independent variables (ethnic diversity, religious diversity, and democracy) and the dependent variable (terrorism) of this particular study.

Social Pluralism and Violence

Rummel (1997) defines social pluralism simply as the ethnic, racial and religious differences within a society. He conducted a multivariate cross-national analysis of 109 countries in the time period between 1932 and 1982. His independent variables were ethnic, racial and religious diversity or social pluralism as a collective variable and the dependent variable was collective violence. His research design was divided into four stages. He conducted separate factor analyses for all the variables – violence, pluralism, political, economic, and demographic differences. Then he ran a common factor analysis of all the indicators to determine whether there is a common factor for violence and social pluralism. He also carried out regression analyses of collective violence and a canonical analysis to determine how well the independent variables predict the dependent variable. Based on this outlined research design, Rummel identified two relationships between the variables. He concluded that the more ethnic groups there are in the state, the more likely is the presence of guerrilla and revolutionary warfare. He also found out that the more religious groups there are in a society, the more intense the general violence will be.

Democracy and Violence

Eubank and Weinberg (2001) investigate the relationship between terrorism and democracy in their research based on two sets of data. The first data set classifies the 159 governments around the world that they explored on the basis of their political system in the mid-1980s. Their classification identified five categories – stable democracies, insecure democracies, partial democracies, limited authoritarian regimes, and absolutist regimes. They provided an operational definition for each of these concepts and it is important to take these definitions into consideration in our own evaluation of their findings. In their view, stable democracies are regimes that conduct free and fair elections and their citizens have freedom of expression and civil rights protection.

Insecure democracies are defined as countries where all the above rights exist on paper but are broken occasionally and there is some threat of military intervention. Partial democracies incorporate both democratic and authoritarian elements. Limited authoritarian regimes are defined as dictatorships but the leaders are not seeking ultimate domination of society. Absolutist regimes are characterized by leaders that dominate every aspect of the lives of the citizens. The second set of data classifies the same countries according to the amount and intensity of violence present within their borders. Eubank and Weinberg based this classification on the International Terrorism: Attributes of terrorist events (ITERATE) that includes 2,989 accounts of terrorist events between 1980 and 1987.

The research provided some important correlations between democracy and collective violence. First, it showed that at least in the 1980s terrorism occurred more in democratic regimes than in autocratic ones. Second, the data identified stronger presence of terrorism in stable democracies than in insecure or partial ones. Third, the results demonstrated that terrorist acts are most likely committed by the citizens of stable democracies and affect those same citizens at the highest rate too.

This extensive literature review sets the foundation for the theoretical framework of this project. The next section will identify the hypothesis and its direction, the null hypothesis, the data collection method, the type of research design, and the type of statistical analysis that was conducted. I consider it important for the reader to comprehend how each element will support and enhance my efforts to identify the relationships between the three independent variables and the dependent variable identified in the beginning of this paper. In that way, the reader will have a better understanding and appreciation of the meaning and magnitude of the conclusions reached.

Theoretical Framework

The question this research is concerned with is “why does terrorism occur?” In order to understand the phenomenon of terrorism I propose an explanation that involves three phenomena considered relevant to the study of terrorism – ethnic diversity, religious diversity and democracy as type of government. These three phenomena constitute the independent variables and the presence of terrorism is the dependent variable. I have already outlined the proposed relationship between these variables in the three hypotheses:

- 1) Countries with more democratic governments will experience less political violence.
- 2) Countries with a more ethnically diverse population will experience more political violence.
- 3) Countries with a more religiously diverse population will experience more political violence.

The three corresponding null hypotheses are:

- 1) There is no relationship between democracy as a form of government and political violence.
- 2) There is no relationship between ethnic diversity and political violence.
- 3) There is no relationship between religious diversity and political violence.

The concepts democracy, ethnicity, religious diversity and political violence need to be conceptually defined within the context of terrorism. Dahl (1998) defines democracy as “a system of self-government where free, frequent, and fair elections are conducted to choose representatives that have control over government decisions about policy. This control is constitutionally vested in them. Citizens have civil liberties such as the freedom of expression, association and access to alternative sources of information” (p. 85).

Yinger (1985) defines ethnicity as “a segment of a larger society whose members are thought, by themselves and/or others, to have a common origin and to share important segments of a common culture and who, in addition, participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are significant ingredients” (p. 159).

The definition of terrorism remains one of the most controversial parts of the field. In this particular study “terrorism” will refer to violent action of insurgent groups operating within a state or at the international scene and seeking to accomplish political goals. The victims of the violence are chosen either randomly for convenience or selectively with a symbolic significance. These victims are selected from a larger target audience and they are used as a way to communicate a message. The threat of violence or the actual occurrence of violence is the method of communication used to manipulate the main target audience (Schmid & Jongman, 1988, p. 28).

Due to the nature of this study, the only appropriate data collection method is document analysis. I utilized only the running record in order to get a more complete understanding of the phenomenon. I used statistical indexes to get the raw data on the variables of interest and then I conducted a number of statistical analyses to discover correlations between these variables.

I proceeded with the construction of a research design that outlined the strategy for analyzing the data. I selected the longitudinal cross sectional non-experimental design as most appropriate for this study. This particular approach gave me the opportunity to observe the independent and dependent variables side by side over the period of time between 1998 and 2005. This design is simple enough to be practically executed and yet sophisticated enough to provide conclusions of significant importance to the field of political science. The study was based on information for 120 countries around the world. Correlations between ethnicity, religion, type of government (independent variables), and presence of violence (dependent variable) were induced.

The last step was to measure the relationships between the variables and to test the hypotheses. I conduct a multivariate analysis to determine the dependent’s variable

relationship with each independent variable separately and with all the independent variables together. The particular statistic I used is a multiple regression analysis.

Data Preparation

Three different sources of data were used in the development of the original dataset constructed for this research (Appendix C) – “Freedom in the World: 2004” annual survey of Freedom House, “The World Factbook 2004” of the Central Intelligence Agency, and “RAND®-MIPT Terrorism Incident database (1998-2005)” of Rand Corporation. The first two datasets were used to quantify the three independent variables, while the last dataset was applied to the dependent variable. I will identify each source in more detail in the following sections.

Freedom House

This dataset was used for the first independent variable – democracy. The survey is based on a variety of information from domestic and foreign news reports, nongovernmental organizations, “think tanks”, and visits to the countries highlighted in the project. In order to ensure the validity of the data, the initial results are discussed in forums that include regional experts. Then cross-regional assessments are conducted to provide continuity among the results. Finally, the results for each country are compared with the results from the previous year and in the cases of large discrepancies further analysis is done. The survey for 2004 included 192 countries of which 120 were used in my research. Freedom House defines countries as “internationally recognized independent states whose governments reside within their officially claimed borders” (<http://www.freedomhouse.org>).

The survey incorporates analytical reports and numerical data and uses two broad categories, political rights and civil liberties, as indicators of the level of democracy in each country. In turn, these two concepts are further defined through a number of indicators. In the category of political rights, the authors of the survey include the right to vote, compete for public office, and elect representatives who can influence the creation of policy. Indicators of civil liberties are freedom of opinion, institutions, and certain level of individual autonomy within the state. Each country is assigned a rating for political rights and civil liberties and then based on these combined ratings it is categorized as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” These basic standards are not affected by the cultural, social, or economic differences between the countries as they are drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (<http://www.freedomhouse.org>).

The actual questionnaire for the survey contains three categories, consisting of ten questions each, in the political rights section and four categories, consisting of fifteen questions each, in the civil liberties section. The countries are assigned raw scores from 0 to 4 for each question in the different categories. The combined results of these raw points are converted into a rating of 1 to 7 for each of the two categories. Each rating has specific characteristics that are important for the final conclusions in this research. The political rights and civil liberties ratings and the questionnaire are provided in Appendix

A and Appendix B respectively for the reference of the reader (<http://www.freedomhouse.org>).

In my dataset I applied directly the Freedom House ratings for political rights and civil liberties. However, the designation of the countries as “free,” “partly free,” and “not free” represents a categorical variable that had to be quantified for the purposes of this research. Therefore, I coded the overall rating of the country on a scale of 1 to 3 with 1 denoting democratic states, 2 signifying developing democracies, and 3 representing non-democratic states.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The CIA database was used to gather information about the other two independent variables – ethnic and religious diversity. The National Intelligence Survey of the CIA is continuously updated intelligence information about all areas in the world. The *World Factbook* is an annual summary of the information gathered as part of the survey. It provides national-level information organized in eight distinct categories – geography, people, government, economy, communications, transportation, military and transnational issues. For the purposes of my research project I used the data on ethnic and religious groups. Both entries in the *World Factbook* are presented as listings of all recognized groups and the percentage of the total population each group represents. However, for this data to be statistically useful, it had to be coded in a manner that is uniform with the rest of the data used. I started out with a scale from 1 to 10. Each ethnic or religious group that constituted at least 5% of the total population of the country was counted as one group. For example, if a country was comprised of 95% Christians and 5% Muslims it was coded as 2 to indicate the presence of two distinct groups. Then I collapsed these two scales to even smaller scales ranging from 1 to 5 in order to be consistent with the 1 to 3 scale of the level of democracy in a country.

In an attempt to increase the accuracy of the dataset, I developed an additional variable to define ethnic and religious diversity. I established a point of reference at 75% for both ethnic and religious groups. Therefore, every country that had a single ethnic or religious group that consisted of 75% or more of the total population was coded as 1. The countries that did not have a single group with a clear majority were coded as 0. In this way I was able to distinguish between the level of homogeneity of a country with two ethnic groups of 80% and 20% and a country with two ethnic groups of 60% and 40%.

RAND Corporation

RAND Corporation is a non-profit organization that conducts research on issues of concern for the United States and the world as a whole. The RAND®-MIPT Terrorism Incident database monitors terrorism incidents around the world. The database accounts for both domestic and international events in the period between 1998 and 2005. It also distinguishes between “injuries” and “fatalities” and therefore accounts for the severity of the terrorist attacks.

It is important to understand how terrorism is defined within the national and international context to be able to interpret the data correctly. First, RAND Corporation presents one definition of terrorism as follows:

Terrorism is violence, or threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. . . This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity (<http://www.tkb.org>).

Second, the organization defines international terrorism as “incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel of equipment”. Third, they identify domestic terrorism as “incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic target” (<http://www.tkb.org>).

Based on the outlined definitions, the database provides the number of incidents in each country for the specific time period. I consider it important to present the number of incidents in the context of the size of the population of the country. Therefore, I created a new variable that normalizes the level of terrorism across the sample by indicating the number of incidents per 100,000 people.



Now that I have presented the methodology of the data preparation, I would outline the variety of statistical analyses conducted.

Statistical Analysis

A. Scatter plots

Scatter plots allow for the visualization of the relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable and the identification of outliers that might skew the results of the multivariate analysis.


1. Democracy and terrorism



The relationship between democracy and terrorism can be presented in two different ways – based just on the number of terrorism incidents without taking population size into consideration or based on the number of terrorism incidents per 100,000. The two relationships differ in the output they produce. In the first case the outliers identified are Colombia and Iraq. The former has experienced 1194 incidents in the period of five years and the latter 1063 incidents. However, when we factor the size of the population the results are different – Israel and Iraq appear to divert significantly from the overall pattern of distribution of the data. Although the size of population is not incorporated as an independent variable in my study, it is definitely a factor that needs to be taken into consideration in all further analysis.

In addition to that, some general patterns can be identified. It is interesting to observe that more acts of terrorism actually occur in democratic states than in autocratic regimes. This could be explained through the very oppressive nature of these regimes. Citizens of dictatorships have virtually no political rights and civil liberties and therefore limited access to the means necessary for the completion of a terrorist act. However, a more detailed observation of the graph identifies a concentration of terrorist activity in developing democracies. States in transition provide opportunities for radical factions to exploit the weaknesses of government and to mobilize greater support for their cause among the general public.

2. Ethnic diversity and terrorism




In my dataset ethnic diversity has two indicators – the number of ethnic groups and the presence of a single ethnic group that constitutes at least 75% of the total population of the country. Therefore, two different scatter plots are presented for more complete understanding of the relationship between ethnic diversity and terrorism. Both charts clearly identify Israel and Iraq as outliers. However, Nepal could also be considered an outlier based on the extreme diversity of the country and the corresponding low level of terrorism. If we disregard the outliers altogether, we can reach a number of significant conclusions.

The second chart organizes the data in two distinct groups – ethnically diverse versus ethnically homogeneous countries without accounting for level of diversity in the sample. Grouped in that way, the data does not provide us with any conclusions on the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable. However, if we factor in the actual level of diversity based on the number of ethnic groups in the country, then we can see a clear inverse relationship which contradicts the second hypothesis of this research – countries with more ethnically diverse population will experience more political violence. It is also important to note that there is a very slight difference between countries with one or two ethnic groups, but then the variation radically increases reaching very limited level of terrorism in countries with at least four clearly defined ethnicities.

2. Religious diversity and terrorism

The analysis of the relationship between religious diversity and terrorism is in many similar to the ethnic diversity analysis due to the fact that both independent

variables have the same set of indicators. Both religious diversity charts identify Israel and Iraq as outliers. If we remove these two countries from the analysis, we can observe the same inverse relationship as in the case of ethnic diversity.



B. Correlation

In the second stage of my statistical analysis, I explored the correlation between each independent variable and the dependent variable. The results of the conducted bivariate analysis are presented in Table 2. The values for R² range from 0.001 to 0.01 and show that very little to none of the variation in the level of terrorism is explained by democracy, ethnic diversity and religious diversity. In addition to that, the individual correlations between each independent variable selected and the dependent variable are insignificant at the 0.05 level.

Table 2

	Terrorism Incidents per 100k		
	Correlation	Signif. Prob	RSquare
P Rights	-0.08416	0.3608	0.007083
C Liberties	-0.06701	0.4671	0.004491
F Rating	-0.05197	0.5729	0.002701
EthDivers	-0.05848	0.5258	0.00342
75%+ One Race	0.034116	0.7114	0.001164
RelDivers	-0.10003	0.277	0.010006
75%+ One Rel	0.102381	0.2658	0.010482

C. Multiple Regression

The third stage of the statistical analysis incorporates multiple regression analysis as a way to explore the relationship between all independent variables and the dependent variable at the same time. The results of the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 3. The multiple R^2 of 0.02 is a little bit larger than the corresponding value in the bivariate analysis, but it is still considerably smaller than the value expected. This demonstrates that collectively this is a bad model for exploring the relationship between the two set of variables. Moreover, the individual values for the estimates, the t ratio and probability show that separately there is no relationship between democracy, ethnicity, religion and terrorism.

Table 3

	Terrorism Incidents per 100k				
	Estimate	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t	R Square
P Rights	-0.10786	0.154366	-0.7	0.4862	0.022679
C Liberties	0.017456	0.144459	0.12	0.904	0.022679
F Rating	0.18388	0.275678	0.67	0.5061	0.022679
EthDivers	-0.04942	0.132692	-0.37	0.7103	0.022679
75%+ One Race	-0.04048	0.200799	-0.2	0.8406	0.022679
RelDivers	-0.02604	0.118921	-0.22	0.8271	0.022679
75%+ One Rel	0.098474	0.250215	0.39	0.6947	0.022679

Conclusion

The goal of this study was to explore the causes of oppositional political terrorism. Initially, I hypothesized that there is a relationship between the level of democracy, ethnic diversity, and religious diversity and terrorism experienced by a given country. I conducted an extensive literature review that identified the definitions, theories, and typologies of terrorism developed by scholars in the last forty years. On the basis of that solid foundation, I proceeded to test my hypotheses through a quantitative analysis.

I completed scatter plots to identify the general relationships between the variables as well as the outliers in the data. The results identified Israel and Iraq as outliers and showed that the size of the population is a significant factor in the comparison of terrorism incidents between countries. Next, I proceeded with a correlation analysis with the two outliers removed from the data. The individual correlations between each independent variable and the dependent variable were statistically insignificant at the 0.05 level. Finally, a multiple regression analysis was conducted to analyze the collective effect of democracy, ethnicity and religion on terrorism. However, the value of R^2 was too small to identify any relationship between the variables.

In conclusion, the initially stated hypotheses cannot be supported or rejected based on the statistical analysis conducted. In spite of common belief, neither democracy nor ethnicity and religion sufficiently explain the phenomenon of terrorism.

Appendix A: Freedom House – “Freedom in the World: 2004”**I. Characteristics of political rights and civil liberties ratings****A. Political rights**

- a. Rating of 1 – Free and fair elections, competitive parties or other political groups, powerful and influential opposition, integration of minority groups in government
- b. Rating of 2 – Political corruption, violence, discrimination against minorities, foreign or military influence on politics
- c. Rating of 3, 4, 5 – civil war, heavy military involvement in politics, lingering royal power, unfair elections, one-party dominance
- d. Rating of 6 – rule by military juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, autocrats
- e. Rating of 7 – extreme regime oppression, virtually no political rights

B. Civil liberties

- a. Rating of 1 – freedom of expression, assembly, association, education and religion, rule of law
- b. Rating of 2 – deficiency in some aspects of civil liberties but relatively free
- c. Rating of 3, 4, 5 – censorship, political terror, prevention of free association
- d. Rating of 6 – severely restricted rights of association and expression, high level of political terror
- e. Rating of 7 – no freedom

Appendix B: Freedom House – “Freedom in the World: 2004”

I. Freedom House Questionnaire

A. Political Rights

- a. Electoral process
 - i. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections?
 - ii. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
 - iii. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots?
- b. Political Pluralism and participation
 - i. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
 - ii. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
 - iii. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
 - iv. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?
- c. Functioning of government
 - i. Do freely elected representatives determine the policies of the government?
 - ii. Is the government free from pervasive corruption?
 - iii. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?
- d. Additional discretionary political rights questions
 - i. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler?

- ii. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?

B. Civil liberties

- a. Freedom of Expression and Belief
 - i. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)
 - ii. Are there free religious institutions, and is there free private and public religious expression?
 - iii. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?
 - iv. Is there open and free private discussion?
- b. Associational and organizational rights
 - i. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
 - ii. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.)
 - iii. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?
- c. Rule of law
 - i. Is there an independent judiciary?
 - ii. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?
 - iii. Is there protection from police terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?
 - iv. Is the population treated equally under the law?
- d. Personal autonomy and individual rights
 - i. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?
 - ii. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?
 - iii. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?
 - iv. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?

Appendix C – Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism Dataset

Country	PR	CL	FR	EthD	75%+ One Race	RelD	75% + OneRelig	Pop Size	Terror Freq	Terror per 100k
Afghanistan	6	6	3	2	0	2	1	28,513,677	364	1.27658
Albania	3	3	2	1	1	3	0	3,544,808	38	1.07199
Algeria	6	5	3	1	1	1	1	32,129,324	131	0.407727
Angola	6	5	3	2	0	3	0	10,978,552	18	0.163956
Argentina	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	39,144,753	7	0.017882
Armenia	4	4	2	1	1	1	1	2,991,360	8	0.267437
Australia	1	1	1	1	1	4	0	19,913,144	1	0.005022
Austria	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8,174,762	4	0.048931
Azerbaijan	6	5	3	1	1	1	1	7,868,385	5	0.063545
Bahrain	5	5	2	2	0	2	0	677,886	1	0.147517
Bangladesh	4	4	2	1	1	2	1	141,340,476	70	0.049526
Belarus	6	6	3	1	1	1	1	10,310,520	2	0.019398
Belgium	1	1	1	1	0	2	1	10,348,276	18	0.173942
Bolivia	3	3	2	2	0	1	1	8,724,156	11	0.126087
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	4	2	2	0	3	0	4,007,608	84	2.096013
Brazil	2	3	1	2	0	1	1	184,101,109	13	0.007061
Bulgaria	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	7,517,973	5	0.066507
Burma	7	7	3	2	0	1	1	42,720,196	14	0.032771
Burundi	5	5	2	1	1	2	0	6,231,221	2	0.032096
Cambodia	6	5	3	1	1	1	1	13,363,421	17	0.127213
Chad	6	5	1	1	0	3	0	9,538,544	1	0.010484
Chile	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	15,823,957	16	0.101113
China	7	6	3	1	1	2	0	1,298,847,624	9	0.000693
Colombia	4	4	2	2	0	1	1	42,310,775	1194	2.821976
Congo, The Democratic Republic	5	4	2	3	0	5	0	58,317,930	2	0.003429
Costa Rica	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	3,956,507	1	0.025275
Cote d'Ivoire	6	5	3	3	0	3	0	17,327,724	1	0.005771
Croatia	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	4,496,869	15	0.333565
Cyprus	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	775,927	13	1.675415
Czech Republic	1	2	1	1	1	2	0	10,246,178	4	0.039039
Denmark	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5,413,392	4	0.073891
Djibouti	5	5	2	2	0	2	1	466,900	1	0.214179
East Timor	3	3	2	1	0	1	1	1,019,252	9	0.883
Ecuador	3	3	2	1	0	1	1	13,212,742	38	0.287601
Egypt	6	6	3	1	1	1	1	76,117,421	6	0.007883
El Salvador	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	6,587,541	2	0.03036
Eritrea	7	6	3	1	0	4	0	4,447,307	3	0.067457
Ethiopia	5	5	2	3	0	3	0	67,851,281	14	0.020633
France	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	60,424,213	523	0.865547

Georgia	4	4	2	2	0	4	0	4,693,892	60	1.278257
Germany	1	1	1	1	1	3	0	82,424,609	17	0.020625
Greece	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	10,647,529	292	2.74242
Guatemala	4	4	2	1	0	2	0	14,280,596	7	0.049018
Guinea	6	5	3	2	0	3	1	9,246,462	1	0.010815
Guyana	2	2	1	2	0	3	0	705,803	4	0.56673
Haiti	6	6	3	1	1	2	1	7,656,166	12	0.156736
Honduras	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	6,823,568	5	0.073275
Hungary	1	2	1	1	1	3	0	10,032,375	4	0.039871
India	2	3	1	1	0	2	1	1,065,070,607	334	0.031359
Indonesia	3	4	2	3	0	2	1	238,452,952	194	0.081358
Israel	1	3	1	1	1	2	1	6,199,008	348	5.613801
Iran	6	6	3	2	0	2	1	69,018,924	14	0.020284
Iraq	7	5	3	1	1	1	1	25,374,691	1063	4.189214
Ireland	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	3,969,558	8	0.201534
Italy	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	58,057,477	146	0.251475
Japan	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	127,333,002	27	0.021204
Jordan	5	5	2	1	1	2	1	5,611,202	13	0.231679
Kazakhstan	6	5	3	1	0	2	0	15,143,704	3	0.01981
Kenya	3	3	2	4	0	4	0	32,021,856	6	0.018737
Korea, South	2	2	1	1	1	3	0	48,598,175	1	0.002058
Kuwait	4	5	2	2	0	1	1	2,257,549	6	0.265775
Kyrgyzstan	6	5	3	2	0	2	1	5,081,429	11	0.216475
Laos	7	6	3	2	0	2	0	6,068,117	8	0.131837
Latvia	1	2	1	1	0	3	0	2,306,306	8	0.346875
Lebanon	6	5	3	1	1	2	0	3,777,218	58	1.535522
Liberia	6	6	3	1	1	3	0	3,390,635	1	0.029493
Libya	7	7	3	1	1	1	1	5,631,585	1	0.017757
Lithuania	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	3,607,899	4	0.110868
Macedonia	3	3	2	1	0	2	0	2,071,210	63	3.0417
Madagascar	3	3	2	2	0	3	0	17,501,871	5	0.028568
Malaysia	5	4	2	2	0	5	0	23,522,482	3	0.012754
Mauritania	6	5	3	2	0	1	1	2,998,563	1	0.033349
Mexico	2	2	1	2	0	2	1	104,959,594	10	0.009527
Moldova	3	4	2	2	0	1	1	4,446,455	4	0.089959
Morocco	5	5	2	1	1	1	1	32,209,101	7	0.021733
Nepal	5	4	2	5	0	2	1	27,070,666	256	0.945673
Netherlands	1	1	1	1	1	3	0	16,318,199	9	0.055153
New Zealand	1	1	1	1	0	5	0	3,993,817	2	0.050077
Nicaragua	3	3	2	3	0	2	1	5,359,759	2	0.037315
Nigeria	4	4	2	3	0	3	0	11,360,538	11	0.096826
Norway	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	4,574,560	2	0.04372
Pakistan	6	5	3	3	0	1	1	159,196,336	375	0.235558
Paraguay	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	6,191,368	4	0.064606
Peru	2	3	1	2	0	1	1	27,544,305	32	0.116176
Philippines	2	3	1	1	1	3	1	86,241,697	188	0.217992
Poland	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	38,626,349	4	0.010356
Portugal	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	10,524,145	1	0.009502
Qatar	6	6	3	2	0	1	1	840,290	1	0.119007
Russia	5	5	2	1	1	1	1	143,782,338	310	0.215604

Saudi Arabia	7	7	3	1	1	1	1	25,795,938	40	0.155063
Serbia and Montenegro	3	2	1	2	0	2	0	10,825,900	35	0.323299
Sierra Leone	4	3	2	2	0	3	0	5,883,889	7	0.118969
Slovakia	1	2	1	1	1	3	0	5,423,567	8	0.147504
Slovenia	1	1	1	1	1	2	0	2,011,473	1	0.049715
Somalia	6	7	3	1	1	1	1	8,304,601	6	0.072249
South Africa	1	2	1	2	1	2	0	42,718,530	33	0.07725
Spain	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	40,280,780	939	2.331137
Sri Lanka	3	3	2	2	0	4	0	19,905,165	77	0.386834
Sudan	7	7	3	2	0	3	0	39,148,162	7	0.017881
Swaziland	7	5	3	1	1	4	0	1,169,241	2	0.171051
Switzerland	1	1	1	2	0	3	0	7,450,867	9	0.120791
Syria	7	7	3	1	1	2	0	18,016,874	1	0.00555
Taiwan	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	22,749,838	1	0.004396
Tajikistan	6	5	3	1	0	2	1	7,011,556	21	0.299506
Tanzania	4	3	2	1	1	3	0	36,588,225	5	0.013666
Thailand	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	64,865,523	166	0.255914
Togo	6	5	3	1	1	3	0	5,556,812	2	0.035992
Tunisia	6	5	3	1	1	1	1	9,974,722	1	0.010025
Turkey	3	4	2	1	1	1	1	68,893,918	780	1.132175
Turkmenistan	7	7	3	1	1	2	1	4,863,169	1	0.020563
Uganda	5	4	2	4	0	4	0	26,404,543	32	0.121191
Ukraine	4	4	2	1	1	4	0	47,732,079	21	0.043996
United Arab Emirates	6	6	3	2	0	1	1	2,523,915	1	0.039621
United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	60,270,708	19	0.031524
United States	1	1	1	1	1	3	0	293,027,571	102	0.034809
Uzbekistan	7	6	3	2	1	2	1	26,410,416	9	0.034077
Venezuela	3	4	2	3	0	1	1	25,017,387	90	0.35975
Vietnam	7	6	3	1	1	4	0	82,689,518	1	0.001209
Yemen	5	5	2	1	0	1	1	20,024,867	73	0.364547
Zambia	4	4	2	1	1	2	0	10,462,436	1	0.009558

Legend:

PR – political rights

CL – civil liberties

FR – freedom rating

EthD – ethnic diversity

RelD – religious diversity

Pop Size – population size

Terror Freq – number of terrorism incidents (1998-2005)

Terror per 100k – terrorism incidents per 100,000

References

- Bar, S. (2004). The religious sources of Islamic terrorism. *Policy Review*, 125, 27-38.
- Bell, J. B. (1977). Trends on terror: The analysis of political violence. *World Politics*, 29, 476-488.
- Burton, J. (1997). *Violence explained: the sources of conflict, violence and crime and their prevention*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- The World Factbook. (2005, February 10). Retrieved February 19, 2005 from the World Wide Web:
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html>.
- Corbett, M. & Le Roy, M. K. (2003). *Research Methods in Political Science* (5th ed.). Canada: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Crenshaw, M. (2001). "New" versus "old" terrorism. *Palestine-Israel Journal*, 10, 48-53.
- Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13, 379-399.
- Crenshaw, M. (Ed.). (1995). *Terrorism in context*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Crenshaw, M. (Ed.). (1983). *Terrorism, legitimacy, and power: the consequences of political violence*. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.
- Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O. , & Aall, P. (Eds.). (2001). *Turbulent peace: the challenges of managing international conflict*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Dahl, R. (1998). *On democracy*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
- Eubank, W. & Weinberg, L. (2001). Terrorism and democracy: perpetrators and victims. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 13, 155-164.
- Freedom in the World 2004. (2005, February 12). Retrieved February 23, 2005 from the World Wide Web:
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/methodology.htm>.
- Gurr, T. R. (1971). *Why men rebel?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Laqueur, W. (1977). *Terrorism*. Boston-Toronto: Little, Brown and Company.
- McCormick, G. H. (2003). Terrorist decision making. *Annual Review of Political*

- Science*, 6, 473-507.
- Muro-Ruiz, D. (2002). The logic of violence. *Politics*, 22, 109-117.
- Ross, J. I. (1993). Structural causes of oppositional political terrorism: towards a causal model. *Journal of Peace Research*, 30, 317-329.
- Schmid, A. & Jongman, A. (1988). *Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and literature*. New York: North-Holland Publishing Company.
- Staub, E. (2002). Notes on terrorism: origins and prevention. *Journal of Peace Psychology*, 8, 207-214.
- Stohl, M. (Ed.). (1988). *The Politics of Terrorism* (3rd ed.). New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.
- MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base*. (2005, January 18). Retrieved February 19, 2005 from World Wide Web: <http://www.tkb.org/RandSummary.jsp>
- Rummel, R. (1997). Is collective violence correlated with social pluralism? *Journal of Peace Research*, 34, 163-175.
- Yinger, J.M. (1985). Ethnicity. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 11, 151-180.