

Counterinsurgency Lessons
for the Afghan Case

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Three historical cases, the British in Malaya, the Portuguese in Angola, and the French in Algeria, are reviewed in this paper in an effort to learn lessons for the United States' ongoing-campaign in Afghanistan. The United States in Afghanistan is acting like a colonial power; a weak but loyal government has been installed, one that is dependent for aid and military support from the West. The role of the United States as a colonial power is, however, a topic for another paper. The conflicts faced earlier by the imperial powers and currently by the United States share some similarities and many of the same goals. In each instance, the foreign power was obligated to remedy the situations that had caused the insurgents to take up arms while at the same time attempt to keep the guerrillas at bay. The most basic objective was to preserve a friendly government. In Afghanistan, the United States wishes to keep the pro-West government of President Hamid Karzai in power, much the same way that the British, Portuguese, and French sought to maintain control of their colonies.

Three commonly used words in the paper will be defined in the order that they are used. The first word is imperial, referring to a nation that directly controls people outside its native land by subjugating them through economic, political and military means. The land controlled by the imperialist nation is always exploited for the economic benefit of its owner. In some cases, imperialism is accompanied by a significant number of people taking up residence and creating a colony. Since the native inhabitants are usually not given the same rights, this can eventually lead to an insurgency (Rourke 1999, 197). In Algeria, France was a colonial power since there were over one million Frenchmen residing there. Malaya and Angola had far fewer imperial settlers. The second term is insurgency, a protracted campaign of political subversion with the goal of changing the existing political system using guerrilla war and terrorist attacks. The insurgents themselves can vary from large, well-organized, and well-equipped groups to

small, poorly trained and poorly equipped bands with little direction from higher headquarters. The military wing of the insurgents, referred to as guerrillas, carry out the attacks. The insurgents take up arms against the government because political problems are not being addressed, and there is no other realistic recourse (Jones 2001, 1-2). The last word is counterinsurgency, the action taken by the government to defeat the insurgents. This is normally a mixture of military and police action, along with political and social reforms, in an attempt to rectify the circumstances that caused the insurgency in the first place (Jones 2001, 1-4).

Afghanistan

It has been over eighteen months since the American-led military coalition forcibly removed the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, yet that nation is still not at peace. The Taliban began its resurgence in December 2002 with a series of raids on Afghan-manned border outposts along the Pakistani border and an ambush of an American patrol. The Taliban insurgents have apparently learned that they cannot stand up to the levels of firepower American forces can bring to bear if given the chance. In response, the Taliban has been operating in small bands conducting hit-and-run raids on outposts, killing or terrorizing foreign aid workers, and performing a few, carefully planned ambushes after which they retreat over the porous border into Pakistan. American-led sweeps have netted little in the way of results because they are normally unable to find the enemy fighters. In summary, a low-level insurgency is underway, and the American-led coalition has not had much success in combating it thus far. Looking at imperial counterinsurgencies carried out since World War II, this paper will attempt to take appropriate lessons and apply them to the Afghan case.

During the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979-1989, a number of Afghans fled to either Pakistan or Iran, where eventually their numbers would reach six million at their peak in the late 1980s. They lived in refugee camps that came to be used as staging grounds for the mujahedin in their efforts against the Soviets. It was this generation of young males, mainly Pashtun, who lived nearly their entire lives in these camps with little memory of their homeland and who were exposed to radical Islam during their camp life, which formed the core of the Taliban. It was also during the Soviet-Afghan War that smuggling equipment and weapons from Pakistan into Afghanistan really expanded by using secret paths to cross the border (Schmeidl 2002, 11-20).

After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, peace did not return to the already war-torn country as rival warlords soon began to battle each other for power. The Taliban entered the fray in 1994 and by 1998 controlled approximately 90 percent of the country (Rubin 2002, X-XII). In part because of the Taliban's horrific human rights and in part due to opium poppy production, United Nations' sanctions were imposed on Afghanistan; this mainly served to further radicalize the Taliban (Schmeidl 2002, 10-12). After the September 11 attacks were tied to al-Qaida, run by Osama bin Laden and based in Afghanistan, the United States briefly tried to talk the Taliban into turning over bin Laden but soon turned to military action. On October 19, 2001, the first Army Special Forces teams were inserted into Afghanistan, greeted by Central Intelligence Agency members, and soon set about aiding the faltering anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (Moore 2003, 51-66). What many predicted was going to be a long and grueling campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaida forces in the largely mountainous country the size of Texas proved to be anything but for the American coalition. By December 2001, an American-backed government was formed under the temporary leadership of Hamid Karzai, who in June of 2002 became president of Afghanistan. The only major ground engagement between American

and Taliban forces, which took place over a week in early March 2002 in the Shah-i-Kot Valley near the Pakistani border, resulted in a major defeat for the Taliban (Moore 2003, 271-295).

On May 1, 2003, the United States Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, declared an end to combat in Afghanistan and said the country was “secure.” However, since then a number of American servicemen have been wounded, several have been killed, rockets are still fired at United States' bases several times per week, and the number of Taliban attacks has been increasing. Additionally, four German peacekeepers were killed and thirty injured in a suicide bombing (Gezari 2003). On July 18 following the assassination of a Red Cross worker the previous month (Gall 26 April 2003), eighty international aid organizations in Afghanistan sent an open letter to the United Nations warning that the security situation outside the capital of Kabul was so poor that the workers cannot reach them, and some local Afghans were beginning to talk about the “better days” under the Taliban (BBC 2003). With the guerrilla-style attacks made by the Taliban forces based in Pakistan continuing, if not increasing, and the possibility of a wider movement occurring, the prospect of a prolonged insurgency in Afghanistan seems reasonable.

Choice of Cases

This paper will look at lessons of three previous imperial counterinsurgency campaigns and then apply what is learned to Afghanistan. The cases are the British action in Malaya, the Portuguese experience in Angola, and the French campaign in Algeria. Each of these examples involves an insurgent organization or organizations fighting a campaign against an imperial power. However, each counterinsurgency campaign is affected by unique circumstances. For instance, the jungles and mountains in Malaya and Algeria respectively made it easy for

insurgents to hide, while the rather flat terrain in Angola made hiding difficult. One large difference between the three cases and Afghanistan is the advanced technology the United States possesses and that the other nations mounting counterinsurgency campaigns did not have. Despite each case's differences from Afghanistan, they still are invaluable examples that can provide ideas for the United States to follow.

The British action in Malaya was unique in that it was one of the few successful counterinsurgencies mounted in the postwar era. The Portuguese in Angola successfully fought the conflict for an extended period without vastly superior strength over the insurgents. The French in Algeria used great force in an attempt to maintain their power but ultimately were never able to gain the support of most of the population. The three cases were chosen on several grounds. First, the major power in each of these cases was attempting to hold onto a piece of territory where the local population was not overwhelmingly supportive of its presence. Second, each of these insurgencies takes place after the Second World War because the technology present in the postwar period (such as airplanes and helicopters) plays a large role in modern counterinsurgencies. Third, in each conflict the foreign intervening power for various reasons, mostly political, could not deploy as many troops as the officers in charge would have liked and were forced to make do with the numbers they had. Fourth, the foreign power made immense use of the local population to add to military and police forces to fight the guerrillas. Finally, each case was not chosen on grounds of whether the foreign power was eventually victorious but on the potential of lessons applicable to Afghanistan, since one can learn as much from defeat as from victory.


Each of the reasons used in choosing the three cases relates directly to the American-led coalition in Afghanistan. First, the United States in this case is the foreign occupying power of

Afghanistan with the goal of keeping the friendly government of President Hamid Karzai in power, just as the other imperial powers sought to maintain their rule. Second, the coalition forces rely heavily on airpower as a means of supply, transportation, observation, and attack, much like the British and Portuguese forces did. Third, the coalition has only 15,000 troops deployed; the only sizeable combat unit is one brigade of three battalions, currently from the 82nd Airborne Division, which is a small number to control a population of about 25 million. Similarly, the British and French had numerous other locations where their forces were needed and could only spare a small number of soldiers. Fourth, the military and police forces of the current Afghan government are used a great deal, often to maintain checkpoints and border outposts as well as to patrol for Taliban forces, just as the British and Portuguese did. The three cases which will be studied are placed in order from least to most deadly per day (Cann 1997, 189). This is to highlight the reasons for increasing violence in each subsequent conflict.

The following is a brief overview of all the conflicts and their significant features. The Malayan Emergency began in 1948 and lasted until 1960. The British forces successfully defeated the communist guerrillas in what is widely considered the model of how to win against rebel forces. Noteworthy components included: heavy use of police, not soldiers, to make the population feel more secure, and very high levels of patrolling by small numbers of soldiers in the jungles (Beckett 2001, 143-145). The Portuguese fought to hold onto their territory of Angola from 1961 to 1974. Although the Portuguese were unable to maintain control in the end, how the war was fought is worthy of study. The imperialist power fought the war while successfully conducting social operations to win over the support of the Angolans and restructuring their military to a lighter force that could keep up with the insurgents better. (Beckett 2001, 13-15). In Algeria, the French tried to hold power from 1954 until 1962 when

they left. One particularly relevant lesson is the effectiveness of the Morice Line at cutting off the insurgents in Algeria from outside support. (Beckett 2001, 6-9). The discussion of each case will focus in particular on the means that yielded either particular success or important lessons.

The following is an explanation of the different methods of counterinsurgency that will be studied later. While all the counterinsurgency campaigns mounted contained a social-operations part to win the hearts and minds of the native inhabitants, the Portuguese and the British conducted theirs with considerable success. Social operations included providing better services, such as medical care and education, to righting past wrongs with the goal of gaining loyalty. All imperial powers used police to combat the insurgents; however, the British and, to a lesser scale, the Portuguese deployed police to not only enforce laws but to show their presence as a good thing to the locals. The Portuguese significantly retrained and reequipped their military when the fighting in Angola began in an effort to make their soldiers less abrasive towards the local population. The French were the only power to build a defensive line, which cut off the insurgents inside Algeria from outside support. The British and, to a reduced degree, the Portuguese used a large number of small patrols in an effort to make contact with the insurgents in order to hunt them down. The following chart shows the five methods on a graph ranging from low coercion to high coercion.



Social operations rank as low coercion; there is little force involved since it concentrates on winning the support of the local population by improving their standard of living and granting more rights (Cann 1997, 145). Police are next on the continuum because, while they do employ force in some situations, in most circumstances it is much less overwhelming than that of the military. The police enforce the laws and normally try to arrest people, not kill them (Newsinger 2002, 41). Retrained military is in the middle of the continuum because the soldiers have been taught to interact in a friendly manner with the civilians and to try to avoid civilian casualties as much as possible (Cann 1997, 71). The defensive line ranks next on the scale because it is designed to stop insurgents from infiltrating the country at the border and cut off those insurgents inside the country from outside support. To accomplish this, what essentially is a wall is built and garrisoned by a number of soldiers (Horne 1987, 262). The most coercive is heavy patrolling, which has the goal of hunting down and killing all of the insurgents. Many small patrols are sent out to find the insurgents so a larger force can be sent in to destroy the base.

Britain in Malaya, 1948-1960

Historical Background

Beginning about 1400, a city in Malaya - Melaka - became increasingly important in controlling the spice trade due to its close proximity to the shipping routes. This success attracted traders from all over the world and the attention of the Europeans. The Portuguese, who were the first Europeans to arrive, seized Melaka in 1511. Their dominance was assured by a series of Papal Bulls that drew an imaginary line near the Cape Verde Island and gave all the land to the east to Portugal while the west went to Spain. In 1641, the Dutch took the land from

the Portuguese and soon after dominated all the trade in the area (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 57-74).

The Dutch in 1824 surrendered all of Malaya to the British, who before long had either direct or indirect control over the peninsula. To increase their revenues from Malaya, the British expanded tin mining and in the late 1800s brought in rubber trees from Brazil. A number of Chinese workers were imported to operate the plantations and mines (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 121-137). The Japanese seized Malaya in 1942 and held onto it until the end of the war. During the Japanese occupation, the main resistance came from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which was one of the few, well-structured organizations in prewar Malaya. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of the MCP members were not Malaysians but actually part of the sizeable Chinese population living in Malaya. A number of non-communist Malaysians were drawn to the MCP to fight during the Japanese occupation. These recruits were gladly taken in by the MCP, which converted many to its cause by war's end (Short 1975, 19-24). The MCP, which was supported by and had a number of leaders trained by the British during the war, received airdrops of weapons and supplies from the Allies. Practical considerations such as aircraft range, however, meant that little was delivered until the final year of the war. By the time the fighting ended, the MCP had built up a considerable arsenal of weapons, including a great many taken from the surrendering Japanese; some were turned over to the British when they returned, but many others were hidden away (Leary 1995, 9-12).

In September 1945, the British began to return to Malaya and were greeted with much enthusiasm by the Malaysians, who hoped for a return to the order and the prosperity that was present before the Japanese invasion. However, these unrealistic expectations that the war-torn land would soon be the way it had been before would not happen because of inept British

policies, a lack of personnel, and a shortage of funds (Stubbs 1989, 10-14). Overall, the immediate postwar years were not easy for Malaya with differences in wages and large-scale labor unrest throughout the territory, including countless strikes. While the British were in the process of giving up some of their other areas of control, including India and Palestine, Malaya was exceedingly important for economic reasons. Britain was all but bankrupt after World War II, and Malaya earned more money each year in rubber and tin sales than Britain did in exporting goods. The British realized that eventually they would have to give Malaya independence; however, many thought that this was perhaps twenty to twenty-five years down the line and, even then, it was assumed that Malaya would remain under strong British influence (Newsinger 2002, 40-42). The new government proved its ineptitude by managing to alienate nearly every segment of the population one time or another through police harassment, poor economic planning, a rice shortage, and a high cost of living. This, coupled with the poor economic situation, led to increasing civil discontentment in the years after World War II (Stubbs 1989, 36-38).

Malayan Insurgency

By early 1948, a number of local communist cells began a grass-roots terrorism campaign without approval from the Malayan Communist Party hierarchy. The MCP was not a well-organized insurgent movement; the local commanders often had infrequent contact with their superiors. The MCP was the political branch of the insurgency while the military wing was the Malayan Races Liberation Army, a misleading name since nearly all of its members were ethnic Chinese. In the first six months of 1948, over one hundred murders and abductions were attributed to the communist forces; its local commanders, many of whom felt they should have

never given the British a chance to return after the Japanese surrendered, essentially forced the MCP into a conflict. The MCP planned to target some British government employees and businessmen for assassination and use fear to drive out the others (Leary 1995, 9-12).

On July 19, 1948, the British declared a state of emergency following the killing of three estate (plantation) owners a few days earlier. However, the killings were merely the final excuse for declaring the Emergency, which gave the British significantly more latitude in arresting and detaining suspects; the British government had been under increasing pressure to take retaliatory action against the escalating violence. Both the British and the MCP realized war was coming, but the actual declaration of the Emergency caught the communists by surprise before a number of them could go underground, and some were subsequently arrested (Stubbs 1989, 60-62). While the MCP had experience in guerrilla operations previously, likewise the British had a good deal of background in combating guerrilla movements. Since World War I, they had fought numerous insurgencies: Ireland (1919-1921), Iraq Revolt (1920), Arab Revolt (1936-1939), and Palestine (1945-1948); they also were involved in the Greek Civil War (1945-1949) (Beckett 2001, 28-30).

To fight the communists initially in 1948, the British Colonial Government in Malaya could marshal a force of about 10,000 policemen, who were mostly Malay, and a total of ten infantry battalions, which were a mixture of British, Gurkha, and Malaysians totaling 7,000 men, although only 4,000 were riflemen. Facing the British, the MCP could initially call upon a force of somewhere between 3,000 and 23,000; although 5,000 is a common and reasonable number, it is believed that even the communists did not accurately know the size of their own forces (Leary 1995, 12-13).

The initial strategy implemented by the British proved to be clumsy and ineffective against the guerrillas and, in fact, drove a number of people into the arms of the MCP. There are several instances of the military burning down entire villages that were only briefly occupied by, or had aided, the guerrillas; additionally, the army had a propensity to shoot people who were acting suspiciously. Neither of these actions helped the British win friends. Furthermore, company-sized patrols in the jungle were both common and ineffective. However, in late 1948 the MCP withdrew deeper into the jungle to train and regroup, thereby giving the British some much-needed time to reform (Stubbs 1989, 66-93).

In March of 1950, a new British commander was assigned to Malaya. General Briggs soon implemented a different plan to defeat the MCP by recognizing the underlying problem of the insurrection as a political one. The new priority was to eliminate the massive political support the MCP drew, mainly from the Chinese population. Nearly five hundred new villages were created to separate the numerous Chinese squatters from the insurrectionists; at the same time, ethnic communities (including the Chinese) gained more rights, including citizenship. The new villages for squatters had hospitals as well as schools, and those who lived there were given the deeds to the land they farmed in 1951 (Beckett 2001, 27-28).

The changes introduced by General Briggs proved to be critical in defeating the MCP. By 1953, the guerrillas were clearly losing ground and on the defensive. The continued patrols, combined with political changes, created a situation where the MCP was unable to replace their losses. Malaya was given independence from Britain in 1957 with the multiracial Alliance Party coming to democratic power. Surviving MCP members were continually pushed further into the jungles while becoming even more removed from their support. In July 1960, the Emergency

was declared over while a small number of insurgents remained in remote jungle areas (Beckett 2001, 143-145).

When the British arrived in Malaya in 1824, they expanded tin mining and created rubber plantations using Chinese labor. However, when Malaya fell to the Japanese during World War II, the only real resistance came from a communist group that, at the time, the British supported. When the British returned to Malaya after the war ended, they were in desperate need of the revenue that could be produced; to the dismay of the population, the postwar years did not bring stability and wealth. In 1948, the communist insurgents began their campaign but soon withdrew into the dense jungle. By 1953, the British clearly had the upper hand, and in 1957 Malaya was given independence. The Emergency ended in 1960 with the hunting down of nearly all the insurgents. The British campaign against the MCP was helped in large part by the tactics employed. The two notable items that will be studied further are the British use of police and also the switch from a few large patrols to many smaller ones.

Counterinsurgency in Malaya

British Employment of Police

Background

It should be remembered that at the start of the Emergency it was the police force that was largely responsible for the failure to maintain law and order since 1945. The British quickly set about trying to dramatically increase the size of the police force, in part because additional military forces would not be as available as the British liked due to a downsized, postwar military and commitments elsewhere. In two years, the regular police force tripled in size from a little over 10,000 to nearly 30,000, a level where it stayed throughout the Emergency. Most of

the new police recruits were Malayan with the Chinese constantly being underrepresented because of a general unwillingness to serve. In early 1949, nearly five hundred new officers arrived from outside Malaya; most were former policemen in Palestine, although some came from India and Hong Kong. While their experience was helpful, they brought a number of problems with them, notably the lack of speaking either Malayan or Chinese that was compounded by little knowledge of the local customs and culture. There were always more police in Malaya than soldiers; especially after 1950 when the military spent much of its time in the jungle, the police became the public face of the British government to the local inhabitants.

Police Action by the British

Within days of the Emergency being declared, the police swept into action detaining 600 communists and suspected-communist sympathizers; by the end of August, nearly 4,500 leftists were imprisoned. Because of the state of emergency, trials were not always necessary and many suspected MCP members were held without charges. The initial crackdown was successful in that several key leaders of the Communist movement were captured because they were surprised by the sudden declaration of the Emergency and did not have time to retreat into the jungle. By the time reality sank in, the MCP was then in a full-scale guerrilla war for which they were not entirely prepared. With many of their members and supporters arrested, the MCP was then forced into a number of piecemeal raids from their jungle bases, instead of a series of coordinated attacks all through Malaya that would have been preferable. Besides putting the MCP in a tactically poor situation, the initial police action also helped to seal the communists off from the urban areas. A quarter of the Malayan population lived in cities at the time, including a significant number of ethnic Chinese who were essentially the only members of the MCP. The

police helped to cut off the insurrectionists from a number of possible recruits (Newsinger 2002, 41-43).

For the first several months of the Emergency, the fighting consisted of a number of erratic firefights in which the police forces were often involved. Several police stations were raided, and patrols were ambushed while the police struggled to keep informants and civilian collaborators from meeting an early demise. By the end of 1948, the communists withdrew deeper into the jungles to regroup and retrain, which bought the British much-needed time to bring in reinforcements and create an intelligence network that they had been previously lacking (Newsinger 2002, 41-45).

Additionally, the large police force helped the military by taking over many of its guard duties, especially in the first several years of the insurrection. By replacing the military, who were manning various security posts by guarding bridges, road junctions, checkpoints and the like, the police freed up more soldiers to patrol the jungles for the MCP. However, the downside of this was that the police, who were not trained for heavy combat, often suffered noticeably higher casualties than the guerrillas in raids on these posts and in ambushes where the army suffered less in the same circumstances (Short 1975, 210-214).

The state of emergency that the British imposed on Malaya was very much akin to a police state, and the British did not waste the power. By 1950, 8,500 were being held in detention camps; most people never had a trial or were even formally accused of a crime. Additionally, the British did not hesitate to deport opponents, mostly ethnic Chinese - the group that the MCP drew its membership from; about ten thousand were deported in 1949. Additionally, the death penalty was made available for crimes such as possessing a firearm or explosives; by the end of the Emergency, 226 communists had been hung. While mass arrests

and deportations were not popular with the ethnic Chinese, the rest of the Malayan population remained largely unaffected by them, so they were not largely concerned with the arrests. To be sure, many of the powers given and used by the British were rather draconian and perhaps unnecessarily so, especially concerning the expanded crimes for which one could be executed. However, there is generally little doubt that these measures helped to play a major role in weakening the communists, first by imprisoning several leaders and a number of members and later by weakening the base of support for the MCP by literally removing them from the country (Newsinger 2002, 44-46).

The police also played a critical role beginning in 1952 with the so-called “hearts and minds” attempt to reduce support for the MCP by offering support and aid to those who helped the government. As part of this, police replaced soldiers in many local Chinese villages because it would be easier to build a dialog with the locals by having police who were stationed there permanently, instead of soldiers whose units would be rotated out of the villages. To make the police better at their new, more public roles, many were retrained from the paramilitary role they played earlier to that of a more typical police force. The police became less on edge; the fear of guerrilla attacks weakened in 1953 as the shooting war became much quieter, which in turn made the police not as ill-disposed to the public at large. The Malayan government mounted several public relations exercises with the police to show them as servants of the civic sector who were there to protect the civilians. These factors had a positive impact as far as the British were concerned; the Chinese civilians began to trust the police, and communication between the two groups increased (Stubbs 1989, 155-164).

Conclusion for Police Employment

Due to a lack of available soldiers when the Emergency was first declared, the police were forced into a paramilitary role to help fight the insurgents. In a similar manner in Afghanistan, the police are being forced to do more than mere law enforcement and are often exposed to considerable danger. Because there are not enough international soldiers present in Afghanistan to protect the entire country thoroughly and the Afghan National Army is currently pitifully small and still undergoing training, the Afghan police often help guard American bases and patrol roads (Rohde 2003).

The police in Malaya were successful in arresting a number of MCP members when the Emergency was first declared. After using the broad powers granted them by the Emergency, the police detained significant numbers of suspected communist sympathizers. The American forces made sweeps of Afghan villages looking for suspects but had a habit of arresting anyone who seemingly got in their way. Unfortunately, a lack of adequate translators tends to put many people in this category. These untargeted arrests of local Afghans are normally short-lived with the detainees often released later that day. However, these often-unwarranted arrests tend to upset the local Afghan villagers, thereby further straining relations with the international forces (Gall 26 April 2003).

Heavy Patrolling

Background

When the Emergency began in 1948, the ten battalions of British infantry were spread rather thinly throughout Malaya trying to put down a guerrilla movement the size of the MCP. The British Army initially began to conduct operations in line with the traditional method of

“Imperial Policing,” which called for large-scale infantry sweeps of suspected guerrilla camps. However, given that Malaya was about fifty thousand square miles and four-fifths was covered by dense, tropical rain forests, which were ideal hiding places, it should not come as much of a surprise that these sweeps met with little success. The MCP would receive word from local sympathizers that a large number of Malayan government soldiers were approaching the area and, as the soldiers were still moving into position, the guerrillas would be fleeing (Newsinger 2002, 44-47).

Additionally, these large patrols - normally company size (about 100 men) to battalion size (700 men) - won few friends from the civilian populace near the towns where they operated. There were numerous incidences where, after an unsuccessful search of the jungle, soldiers would take out their frustrations on some of the nearby, uncooperative Chinese villagers. The worst such incident occurred in December 1948 when British soldiers massacred twenty-four Chinese villagers who apparently had little, if any, loyalty to the MCP and were merely at the wrong place at the wrong time (Newsinger 2002, 47-49).

It was only a matter of months until the British Army realized that the tactics they were employing netted little in the way of results. In late 1948, the British began a campaign to drive the MCP out of the jungles and into the open where conventional forces could annihilate them. They timed several large-scale sweeping operations hoping to catch as many communists as possible. The first week ended with no discernible results; the British called for artillery and air strikes into the jungle to help dislocate the MCP. However, the shells and bombs struck only an empty jungle; the operation was soon called off and could be considered nothing but a dismal failure (Jones 2001, 81-89).

New Tactics

With the Greek Civil War winding down in early 1949, some of the British Special Air Service (SAS) commandos were withdrawn since they were no longer needed. The SAS was looking for a reason to justify their continued existence out of the very real fear that they would be shut down by conventional Army officers, who believed the SAS were glory hounds and unnecessary. As the British in Malaya were requesting more forces, a small number of SAS men arrived with hopes of proving themselves useful in addition to the six infantry battalions that were recently deployed. Soon after, the SAS men were given permission to set up the Jungle Guerrilla Force, which was commonly known as Ferret Force. This new force was essentially a duplicate of the raiding forces the SAS had organized in Greece with the goal of locating and destroying insurgents. The Ferret Force was composed of four groups with about eighty men each. Nearly a third of the men were Chinese, who were important for their language ability; there were also a number of local trackers. The Ferret Forces were deployed in the jungle for up to three weeks while small teams would search for the MCP (Jones 2001, 88-91).

The Ferret Forces soon began to prove that the small-unit patrolling tactics they employed had a great deal of value. The British, who still continued to perform company and battalion-sized sweeps in accordance to standing policy, searched for the MCP but had negligible results. Many local army commanders, however, began to conduct smaller patrols, often squad to platoon size. Instead of searching a wide area, it became common to conduct “saturation patrolling” where a number of small parties intensively patrolled a limited area for several days on end. While contacts with the MCP in the jungle were still limited due to poor intelligence on enemy locations, these new tactics did help the British take the fight to the MCP (Jones 2001, 96-99).

Through 1950, the British continued to mount battalion-sized operations into the jungle, although even the most stubborn officers began to conduct small-unit patrols as well. The effectiveness of these patrols was increased when the British set up a school for teaching jungle warfare (Jones 2001, 109). By 1951, it became commonplace for small detachments, often SAS troops, to spend up to six weeks in the jungle being re-supplied occasionally by aircraft and for small patrols from conventional infantry units to last there upwards of a month. Abandoning large-infantry sweeps, these patrols essentially became the only way the British deployed their forces. Since the local Malayans had little contact with these patrols, it caused them little duress while the MCP was seriously hampered. From the latter part of 1953, when the MCP was obviously being weakened, until the end of the Emergency in 1960, the general tactics employed by the military remained very much the same. Patrols were usually small by conventional British standards, ordinarily only about fifteen men, and they were generally in the jungle for two weeks. The SAS would be used in an area suspected of having large numbers of enemy units and were, in some cases, on patrol for three months at a stretch. Helicopters, which saw their first widespread use in Malaya in 1953, made resupplying and deploying patrols in remote parts of the country possible (Jones 2001, 125-137). As the MCP lost ground to the British, they also lost the ability to recruit new members and could not replace their casualties, thereby causing them to give up more ground. This cycle continued until the MCP was almost completely hunted down by 1960 (Newsinger 2002, 57-59).

Conclusion for Heavy Patrolling

The large-scale-company to battalion-sized patrols the British initially preferred in Malaya met with little success. The MCP was largely able to avoid these slow and cumbersome

sweeps by the military, due in part to warnings provided by sympathetic villagers. Unfortunately, it seems that the United States Army is determined to use large sweeps in an effort to hunt down the Taliban remnants. In one instance, an American battalion conducted a three-week operation conducting a village-by-village search over a hundred-mile-long valley. In the end, this operation involving hundreds of American soldiers netted little; the Taliban leader, who was the main target, is thought to have slipped away along with his family, and only a handful of suspected militants were killed (Gall 5 March 2003).

The British used SAS teams and Ferret Forces on extended patrols to find the insurgents and then engage them. These missions in extreme cases could last up to three months but up to six weeks was more commonplace. American Army Special Forces are well-trained to carry out this kind of mission, but they are understrength as a unit and their skills of dealing with locals are needed elsewhere. When the Special Forces do mount a patrol, it is often by jeep with the goal of visiting a nearby village. However, these routes are predictable and, in at least one case, resulted in a Taliban ambush killing two American soldiers (Gall 15 April 2003).

The British Experience in Malaya: A Summary

The British victory against the Malayan Communist Party in Malaya was not due to any one tactic employed; rather, it was a result of a number of factors. Arrests made by the police, along with their active role in patrolling key areas in the first year of the Emergency, helped to buy time for the British to receive reinforcements and to develop more-effective plans. One of the most successful tactics was heavy patrolling in areas of suspected MCP presence. These patrols, especially ones conducted by the SAS, would last several weeks while searching for trails of the MCP in remote areas of the jungle. The police and patrols eventually began to deny

the MCP from various parts of the country; this kept the insurgents from gaining new recruits, which further weakened them until 1960 when the last remnants were hunted down.

Portugal in Angola, 1961-1974

Historical Background

Between 1961 and 1974, Portugal was forced to mount three simultaneous counterinsurgency campaigns in the African lands of Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. The Angolan guerrilla movement was the first and largest; therefore, in the following section it will be more discussed than the other two countries. However, the tactics and programs which occurred in one of the three regions were, in nearly every case, being used in the other two as well. Portuguese forces were routinely rotated between the three areas as the demands changed.

The Portuguese history in sub-Saharan Africa is a lengthy one and accurately described as the “first in and last out.” The Portuguese first reached the area in 1443 with the goal of obtaining slaves, gold, and other valuables for the European market and were the first Westerners to make any significant penetrations below the Sahara. The commerce was made into a crown monopoly where individuals could obtain contracts to run their enterprises. The crown strengthened the position of its monopoly by signing a number of treaties with African sovereigns and other European states. Eventually, a series of Papal Bulls drew an imaginary line near the Cape Verde Island and gave all the land to the east to Portugal while the west went to Spain. Spain and Portugal received the right to colonize as a reward for their efforts in spreading Christianity. For a time, no Catholic country would violate this for it had the force of law, and Protestant countries did not dare violate it out of fear. By the early seventeenth century, slave trading had become so profitable that few Portuguese traders concerned themselves with other

commodities. Nevertheless, over the course of the century the Portuguese slowly lost most of their slave-trading ports to the Dutch (Newitt 1981, 1-10).

The first three centuries of trade with Africa helped to play a role in leaving both Portugal and her territories underdeveloped. The relationship between Portugal and Africa was not equitable; Portugal would bring in goods while taking away resources and, oftentimes, people. However, unlike many other nations that traded with Africa, for the most part Portugal was not selling its own products. By the eighteenth century, the Portuguese had invested little in the future development of its lands; instead, it chose to transport other nations' goods to sell in its territories, which in turn meant it never developed industry as other European nations did (Newitt 1981, 11-15).

When the slave trade was finally abolished in 1836, the Portuguese were forced to find another “resource” which could be profitable in their lands. To do this, the Portuguese would have to penetrate the interior of the continent, a process that they had only halfheartedly tried before, each time ending in failure. However, by this point, the other European countries had cut up Africa in the Berlin Conference, and Portugal could do little to compete with the industrial powers when it was hardly developed (Humbaraci and Muchnik 1974, 87-93). This process was to prove to be a lengthy one, since nearly every time the Portuguese advanced, the local African tribes would mount a counteroffensive of their own; resistance was not fully put down in most cases until the 1930s. During the First World War, the Portuguese fought off several large-scale German offensives in Angola and Mozambique (Beckett 2001, 193-194).

The Portuguese claimed that Africans could obtain full citizenship, but this was a rare occurrence. Compounding this situation were the exploitative economic and social policies that kept the African in a poor position. If an African was somehow able to earn citizenship, it could

not be passed to his children, who would then have to go through the process themselves. These factors helped to contribute to the eventual insurgent movements in Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique (Humbaraci and Muchnik 1974, 109-112).

Insurgency in Angola

The guerrilla movements in all three countries have much in common, including the fact that they were formed and led by the tiny middle class of Africans who were educated enough to realize the unfairness of their situation and were all nationalists. While there had been some talk of fighting the Portuguese imperial system beginning in the 1930s, the first clandestine groups began to form in Angola in 1953, and in 1956 the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was formed (Humbaraci and Muchnik 1974, 109-120). The MPLA was strongly Marxist and eventually had some of its members trained in Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. The Portuguese put down the MPLA, which began its uprising in early 1961, with excessive brutality (Beckett 2001, 76-77). The Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA) drew much of its support from tribes located near the border with the recently freed Belgium Congo; this allowed the FNLA to use that land as a staging ground. The FNLA launched its first offensive in Angola in March of 1961 relying on sheer numbers. Its people were very poorly trained, even by guerrilla standards, and showed a great unwillingness to engage the Portuguese security forces under any condition, including a favorable one (Cann 1997, 21-23).

When the uprisings in 1961 began, Portugal had only eight thousand soldiers in Angola, a modest number for a country of about five million people. While the MPLA's initial effort was a dismal failure, beginning in March the FNLA had success in destroying a number of plantations while butchering the owners and overrunning a number of government outposts, relying on a

concentration of force to overcome any resistance. However, the FNLA could not maintain its momentum; by October 1961, the reinforced Portuguese Army had forced the FNLA to give up its land. This bloody series of events shocked the Portuguese public and helped to harden them for a protracted campaign to maintain law and order in the territories. Adding to the trauma of the Angola uprising was the loss of the Goa colony to Indian forces in December of that year (Cann 1997, 25-31).

With a lull in the fighting towards the end of 1961, the Portuguese wasted little time in formulating plans for fighting what they correctly believed would be a drawn-out conflict. They had been studying the lessons learned from previous counterinsurgency campaigns, especially the British in Malaya. The government immediately set about enlarging the size of the military, including locally recruited forces in the colonies. The army also began retraining its forces from a more conventionally trained infantry to a lighter force ready for extended patrols (Cann 1997, 49-51). While the military was gearing up for the expected campaign, the government also moved to reform the administration and fix some of the shortcomings of which it was accused. The Portuguese campaign for the “Hearts and Minds” was quite effective in the long run (Newitt 1981, 228-230).

While the war in Angola continued, it was never to become an extremely intense and bloody conflict after the atrocities committed by all parties in the beginning. The MPLA and FNLA drew the majority of their support from a few tribes that were mostly located on the border; as such, the war stayed almost exclusively on the frontier. By 1964, the Angolan insurgents were forced to operate out of neighboring countries because of intense, Portuguese pressure. Casualties remained relatively low, and the war rarely affected the daily lives of civilians, in either Portugal or the colonies. Both sides were noted for treating each other's

prisoners well. When fighting broke out in Guinea in 1963 and in Mozambique the following year, it followed the general pattern of Angola by not having heavy combat zones. Guinea was the most heavily contested, largely because the small size of the country made contacts between the army and guerrillas much more likely. One Portuguese officer commented that the war was one of “rockets and mines versus helicopters,” referring to the habit of the guerrilla groups to fire rockets occasionally at Portuguese bases and place mines on roads, while the Portuguese would often use helicopters to attack them (Newitt 1981, 229-232).

The Portuguese wars in Africa ended in 1974 but not due to a military victory by either the Portuguese government or the various guerrilla organizations. Instead, the dictatorship that had ruled Portugal for so long was overthrown by a military coup. During the campaign that lasted more than 13 years, Portugal had lost just over 4,000 killed by hostile fire in all 3 African nations and about another 4,000 killed in accidents (Cann 1997, 189). These losses, combined with a weakening economy due to the large defense budget, made the war increasingly unpopular in Portugal. Adding to the situation was a new Portuguese policy in which university graduates would be drafted as officers and promoted quicker than the career officers. This was merely the latest in a series of complaints by a number of officers who were growing increasingly disillusioned. On May 25, 1974, a group of officers seized power and, soon after, Portugal began to withdraw from the colonies, which were the last major holdouts of imperialism in Africa. In Guinea and Mozambique, where there was only one insurgent group, that group took power; in Angola, where there had been initially two then later three separate guerrilla groups, these factions immediately began to fight amongst themselves. The Marxist MPLA eventually won the civil war with the help of fifty thousand Cuban troops flown in by Soviet aircraft in 1976 (Beckett 2001, 14).

While the Portuguese were the first European nation to exploit sub-Saharan Africa beginning in 1443, it was not until the slave trade was outlawed in 1836 that they began to penetrate the interior. However, this was a slow process due to incessant African counterattacks, and the remote areas were not brought under control until after World War I. Finally, after long frustrations because of unequal conditions, parts of the African population in Angola began an insurgency campaign in 1961. This first uprising was brutally crushed, but in the following years both Guinea and Mozambique faced insurgencies of their own. Aside from the initial uprising in Angola, the wars were never particularly bloody, and by 1974 the Portuguese had the insurgents largely on the run. The conflict was brought to an end by a coup in Portugal and the new government withdrawing from its territories. The Portuguese used several unique ideas that are worth studying. The first is the retraining of the military into a lighter force, while at the same time teaching the soldiers not to be hostile to the local population. The second is the effectiveness of Portugal's social operations, which undermined support for the insurgents.

Angolan Counterinsurgency

Retraining the Military

Background

When the guerrilla movements began their attacks in Angola in 1961, the Portuguese Army had seventy thousand soldiers, and by 1973 its army was twice that size. This is a small number of soldiers to hold territory as large as Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. Despite the fact that the last significant combat the Portuguese fought in was World War I, they had the benefit of studying previous counterinsurgency tactics. The Portuguese retrained their entire military for the sole purpose of defeating the guerrillas. To do this, the army drastically changed

the ways that its soldiers, especially the infantry who would do most of the fighting, were trained and organized. Additionally, the Portuguese continued to modify training during the war to match changes in guerrilla tactics (Cann 1997, 6-11).

Training and Organizational Changes

When the initial guerrilla attacks in Angola were suppressed by October 1961, the fighting had left many dead, as many as twenty thousand by some estimates, including a number of innocent bystanders. The Portuguese believed that this often-indiscriminate use of firepower in the end was counterproductive since it would create more enemies from the general public; therefore, they began to train the soldiers to put down disorders with a minimum level of force. The Portuguese soldiers knew that they were the key to winning over the population and convincing it that Portugal could look after them better than the various guerrilla groups could. While this emphasis is not uniquely Portuguese, there are few other instances where the soldiers' positive interaction with civilians is stressed so much. In short, the army was trained to avoid frightening the local population as much as possible, which is quite abnormal for armies (Cann 1997, 43-50).

The Portuguese Army began to reorganize its forces from conventional units to light infantry with the idea of making them better able to keep up with the guerrillas on the ground. As part of this change, the infantry battalions - which would bear nearly all of the fighting - were largely stripped of their heavy weapons (e.g. mortars and heavy machine guns). This sort of equipment was heavy and could not be redeployed quickly; additionally, when employed it could be rather indiscriminate in what it hits, which is what the Army was trying to avoid. In addition, the companies were enlarged from three platoons to four so that one platoon could be resting,

another in reserve, and two always ready to mount a patrol. A number of these changes in unit organization were not initially popular with many officers, who were unsure of their future in the new army. The changes became accepted over time, but countless officers were concerned with what would happen to their units when the insurgency ended (Cann 1997, 65-71).

New Units and Tactics

The Portuguese military had not maintained any commando-type units before the war but quickly realized the usefulness of elite, special-purpose units. The Navy formed several units of Special Marines, who were initially trained in Britain until the Portuguese set up its own school. These forces were used mainly for operations such as raids along the coastlines and rivers. The Air Force created several companies of paratroopers, but they were only used as a quick-reaction force and never employed in the manner intended. The Army formed two, special-mission units originally: commandos and special hunters. The special-hunter units were disbanded in 1962 when their skills had been incorporated into the training of standard, light-infantry units (Cann 1997, 71-73). The commandos, however, operated throughout the war and specialized in long-range patrols and surprise attacks when they found the guerrillas. In teams of about ten soldiers, the commandos would mount patrols for more than a week looking for the insurgents. However, they became noted for their attacks by rapidly dismounting helicopters, striking the enemy position, and hounding the surviving guerrillas for the remainder of the day (Cann 1997, 130-133).

While the campaigns in Africa continued, the Portuguese continually looked at what was proving to be successful and what needed to be changed. This is something many countries have problems doing effectively while in a conflict, including the United States which was terribly

slow in adapting new training measures during Vietnam. While most of the changes implemented by the Portuguese were relatively minor, in 1968 there was a notable change with much more authority given to company and platoon leaders. This was part of an effort to make the military more aggressive in combating the guerrillas, instead of merely responding to attacks as was often becoming the case. At the same time, another change was made; new recruits to the military would do much of their training in Africa to help make them accustomed to the African landscape (Cann 1997, 73-77). The drastic changes in the organization and training of the Portuguese Army helped lead to a situation where by 1970 the guerrillas could only operate out of bases in neighboring countries and launch sporadic attacks.

Conclusion for Military Retraining

After the initial guerrilla uprising was crushed in a bloodbath, the Portuguese military realized that such excessive use of force would only increase their opposition's strength if it continued. The Portuguese reorganized their infantry companies and took away many of the heavy weapons while training the soldiers to interact better with the local inhabitants. In addition to changes in the infantry, Portugal also created several commando units, which met much success during the war. Particularly during Vietnam, the United States had a reputation for using firepower rather indiscriminately, resulting in a number of civilian deaths. However, the advent of smart bombs and much-more-restrictive rules of engagement for American troops has changed this. While civilians are still killed by American forces, it is not nearly as common as it once was (Gall 5 March 2003).

When the Portuguese remade much of their Army into a light infantry force, it truly was a light force; there were no mortars or even medium machine guns, which are bulky and hard to

move. However, the American Army light infantry and airborne units can hardly be called light compared to Portugal. The American equivalents have a plethora of these cumbersome weapons and additionally carry antitank weapons; light and easily mobile they are not. The Portuguese used their commando units oftentimes to great effect. While the United States' military currently has several different commando-type units in its arsenal, each has reasons why they are not well-suited for Afghanistan. Army Special Forces is currently undermanned and has large obligations in Iraq, so not nearly as many can be deployed in Afghanistan as the military would like. Army Rangers are an elite, light infantry unit, but they have significant obligations in Iraq currently; also, since other elements must remain ready for immediate deployment to any world hotspot, there is little to spare for Afghanistan. Finally, the Navy special operations previously had some teams in Afghanistan; however, but they are at-home operating around water, of which there is little in Afghanistan.

Social Operations

Background

The Portuguese, who from the very beginning considered the military aspect of the war to be of secondary importance to preempting the insurgents' arguments of inequity, launched economic and social programs. While never actually admitting there was a problem to fix, the war forced the Portuguese to redress the grievances of the local population (Cann 1997, 11). In insurgencies, the operations to win the support of the local population are often much more important than defeating the guerrillas militarily. This is due to the fact that the insurgents are fighting because some aspect of their lives has a problem that the government has either caused or not addressed. The native African inhabitants of Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique had a

large number of wholly legitimate complaints about their treatment under Portuguese imperialism, including limited educational opportunities, abusive labor practices, and extremely difficult citizenship laws. Many years before the 1961 insurrection began, Portugal had started ever so slowly to change its imperial economic and political policies (Newitt 1981, 219-221).

Reforms

Economic changes were one part of the Portuguese effort to win the hearts and minds of the local population in Africa. As Portugal was becoming more industrialized in the 1950s, mining in the colonies also increased, and in the latter part of the decade, the first successful oil wells were drilled in Angola. By 1960, more factories were being built in the territories to produce a variety of goods from cement to consumer goods. However, many of these projects were just getting underway when the insurrection in Angola began (Newitt 1981, 219-221). Once the war started, the Portuguese government began investing in industrial development, which helped the regions' economies greatly expand, particularly in Angola. Angola's iron ore production in 1957 was 100,000 tons, and by 1971 it reached 15 million tons. A sizeable amount of the money that helped finance this boom was from foreign investors, something that earlier had been heavily discouraged by Portugal (Newitt 1981, 237-238).

A second part of the Portuguese effort to win over the native inhabitants was with a vastly expanded program of social services. Previously, accessibility to a European-style education had been limited, but from 1961 to 1969, the number of students in primary schools in Angola saw a fourfold increase from 100,000 to 400,000. The Portuguese Army played a role in this increase by building a number of schools and having military who were university graduates teach part of the day in remote locations where there were no civilian teachers (Cann 1997, 145-

148). The number of hospitals and clinics, which had been greatly lacking before, saw a large increase. By 1970, the Portuguese were able to meet the World Health Organization standards for proper health care with the needed number of doctors, nurses, and hospital beds. As in the case of education, the Army played an important role by establishing mobile clinics of medics and doctors to visit remote villages. Despite the attempts of the Portuguese government and army, however, a number of the remote villages still never received much medical or educational support (Newitt 1981, 238-239).

Finally, in 1961 there was the first major reform dealing with the status of the African population in nearly sixty years. Previously, the African population was subject to compulsory labor, a much-hated policy that was finally abolished. At the same time, another very unpopular policy was also done away with - making farmers plant cash crops, such as cotton,. The whole population was supposed to have equal rights before the law then. While this became true to a certain extent, the extremely stringent conditions for becoming a citizen remained unchanged (Newitt 1981, 240). A final part of the Portuguese campaign to win and maintain the support of locals came from the military itself. The Army encouraged its soldiers to have as much contact as possible with the local population to show them who was in charge and convince them that the military would protect them. It became standard practice for patrols to go through contested villages, often on a daily basis, not looking for a confrontation but to talk to the locals and earn their trust (Cann 1997, 163). These programs helped to directly challenge the claims of the guerrillas that Portugal was only looking after the interests of white Europeans. In Angola where these programs were employed the most effectively, by 1972 the guerrillas could barely operate inside the country and were all based in neighboring nations. The few insurgent strongpoints in Angola remained isolated villages with infrequent contact and aid from the Portuguese.

Conclusion for Social Operations

At the moment in Afghanistan, jobs are often scarce as a result of the destruction from the nearly continuous warfare since 1979. In Angola, the Portuguese made a conscious effort to make the village locals see the soldiers often and in nonthreatening conditions, such as teaching school, giving medical aid, or simply passing through. However, the American forces in Afghanistan are making their presence evermore unpopular with the Afghans. In a great many cases, those who live outside of Kabul rarely see the foreign troops of the American-led coalition other than in searches for suspects and weapons that turn whole villages upside down (Gall 26 April 2003). The troops who are best suited to deal with the Afghan villagers in a respectful, unobtrusive manner are Army Special Forces. Unfortunately, the Special Forces units are understrength by 20 percent, and many are currently deployed to Iraq, leaving too few Middle East specialists available for Afghanistan. Therefore, instead of a handful of soldiers who would talk to the villagers, a company of infantry who do not speak the local language or understand the customs conduct the searches and arrest a number of innocent civilians creating more dislike for the Americans.

To put an end to the Taliban, the coalition must convince the Afghan people that they are better under President Karzai than the Taliban. While in Afghanistan equal voting and citizenship rights are not the issue, the poor economy, medical service, and educational systems are. However, one of the major arteries in the country, the road that runs between Kabul and Kandahar, is still littered with burnt-out trucks and shell holes from October 2001 (Gall 26 April 2003). International aid workers are too afraid to venture far outside Kabul, especially since the assassination of a Red Cross worker earlier in the year. As long as the aid workers cannot do

their jobs of rebuilding the shattered economy, the Taliban will remain (Gall 5 April 2003). This is in many ways a Catch-22, but the country must be rebuilt.

The Portuguese Experience in Angola: A Summary

The Portuguese left its African territories, not after a military defeat, but following an internal political coup. In Angola, the insurgent movements were forced to base their operations out of neighboring states beginning in 1964 because of Portuguese pressure. The retrained and reequipped Portuguese Army had given up its heavy weapons in an effort to keep civilian losses to a minimum and to allow its infantry to keep pace with the insurgents. Additionally, several commando units were formed which specialized in assaults and long-range patrols. The Portuguese also successfully conducted social operations in an effort to win the support of the Angolan people. To accomplish this, the Portuguese set about righting past wrongs, such as poor employment opportunities and conscripted labor, while improving services, such as education and medical care. The Army helped reach rural villages in order to provide aid, and it peacefully visited settlements to show the inhabitants that it meant no harm.

France in Algeria, 1954-1962

Historical Background

Prior to 1830, Algeria was ruled by the Turkish-dominated Ottoman Empire. The French had little difficulty defeating the few Turkish defenders in 1830 and quickly took the northern city of Algiers, but they failed to advance further south. The Arab and Berber peoples of the interior had never really accepted the Turkish rule over them for 200 years and were less friendly towards the French. The French fought the Algerian resistance in a vicious campaign for

control. The French finally won in 1847 after seventeen years of fighting; soon after, Algeria was annexed and became an integral part of France. French colonizers quickly settled in Algeria taking the best land with little concern for who had owned it previously. This process was helped enormously by the French administrators whom did all they could to help the colonizers gain land. Settlers and their children were given full citizenship rights. However, while it was theoretically possible for Algerians to gain French citizenship, this almost never occurred, and they would essentially have to give up their religion. After World War I, a bill to grant citizenship to Algerians who had served in the military was met with strong opposition from the settlers in the National Assembly and quickly rejected (Horne 1987, 28-33).

When the Germans handed the French a crushing defeat in 1940, Algeria fell under the control of the Vichy collaborator government. However, a number of Algerians fought with the Free French forces with great valor and paid a heavy price. When the Second World War ended in 1945, France was in poor shape; it had been plundered by conquerors, bombed by liberators, and was short of every raw material needed, partly because of a crippled railroad. When WWII ended in Europe - May 8, 1945 - a large Algerian nationalist demonstration was held in Algiers. A fight broke out between some of the demonstrators and local police, with several on both sides being killed. This set off the mob, which went on a rampage eventually killing one hundred white Frenchmen. The French settlers retaliated with massive force and killed as many as five thousand Algerians (Horne 1987, 23-27).

The small-scale uprising in 1945 was caused by over one hundred years of unfair French treatment of Algerians in nearly every way possible. For instance, in 1946 the one million Europeans in Algeria had voting rights over the eight million Algerians in the country. Another example of the unjustness of the French was the educational system. All the European settlers'

children went to school, yet as late as 1954 only one out of five Algerian boys attended school and only one out of sixteen girls. Also, as in many other imperial systems, the Algerian population was exploited economically; they received very low wages for work and had little chance to improve their station in life. While the Algerian nationalist movement began demanding more from the French government in the postwar years, it was ignored. To a certain point, the lack of response to Algerian demands is understandable; the French government had too many crises to handle already. Among these problems were a brutal and taxing war in Vietnam, continual changes in heads of government (twenty between 1945 and 1954), numerous strikes, and skyrocketing prices (Horne 1987, 60-69).

Algerian Insurgency

The National Liberation Front (FLN) came into existence in July 1954. Many of the first leaders of the FLN had served with the Free French forces in World War II but turned against the French following the war largely because of the horrific reprisals after the 1945 insurrection. Additionally, all of the leadership had been the lucky few who were educated by the French. The FLN was an Algerian nationalist movement that studied the tactics used by the Vietnamese against the French for ideas on how to operate (Beckett 2001, 77-78).

The Algerian War began on November 1, 1954, which was All Saints Day. This was a religious holy day for the Catholic French who would attend Mass in honor of all the saints. The FLN picked this day for the start of their offensive, further adding to the shock the French would suffer. In the week before the insurrection led by the FLN, French intelligence suspected that an attack of some sort was being planned but was not sure how large or even when it would begin. Nearly 70 targets were attacked by 800 guerrillas. When the day was over, the FLN did

not earn a reputation as one of the most effective guerrilla organizations ever; many of the planned attacks failed, not because of French resistance, but due to incompetence on the rebels' part. However, the attacks made it clear to all concerned parties that the war had begun. The French police in Algeria swept down on any and all people with possible involvement in the attacks. As would become the pattern, a wide net was cast, and many innocent were arrested (Horne 1987, 83-97).

After its initial attacks, the FLN was largely forced underground after the first strikes in November. By January 1955, nearly eighty thousand French soldiers had been deployed to Algeria and soon began sweeping the Aures Mountains where most of the FLN was spending the winter. The insurgents always seemed to be one step ahead of the large French Army patrols, and Algerians who were loyal to the government had a tendency to show up in front of Army posts in the mornings with their throats cut. The FLN was growing in number and, as much as possible, refused to engage the French Army in order to conserve its strength (Horne 1987, 97-104).

In 1955, the FLN began targeting army barracks and police stations less in order to target pro-government personnel more. Small-scale atrocities committed by FLN were returned on a large scale by French forces on the Algerian population (Horne 1987, 119-122). In 1956, Morocco and Tunisia were both granted independence; soon after, this allowed the FLN to base its operations in these territories, which helped the guerrillas to form more-effective combat units. In 1957, the Battle of Algiers began in January and lasted until September when the FLN suffered a defeat. The city of Algiers had eighty thousand Algerians, among whom guerrillas could easily hide. The FLN began the battle with a general strike, which effectively shut down the city for two days, until French paratroopers ended the strike at gunpoint. The French set up a

large number of checkpoints in the city and often used house-to-house searches. By September, the FLN had been rooted out of the city, and several high-ranking members were arrested. The French, however, used considerable brutality to achieve these results, and in the end, nearly three thousand Algerian suspects “disappeared” (Beckett 2001, 6-9).

With much of the FLN based out of Tunisia, the French erected the Morice Line in 1957 on the Algerian and Tunisian border. The Morice Line was a physical barrier designed to keep the FLN from crossing over into Algeria and to isolate those guerrillas already in the area (Beckett 2001, 158). Continually forced to give ground and fall back, the FLN units that remained in Algeria were largely hunted down. In December 1958, Charles de Gaulle again rose to power in France. In the following September, he offered self-determination to the Algerians much to the dismay of many elements inside the French military. Many of these disgruntled soldiers attempted a coup and several assassination attempts against de Gaulle failed. The French began negotiations with the FLN in 1961, and on July 3, 1962 Algeria became independent (Beckett 2001, 6-7).

The Algerian population had resisted the French, who first arrived in 1830. Continual mistreatment by the European colonists towards the Algerians, including extremely stringent citizenship requirements and few financial opportunities, drained Algerian patience. After World War II, the French were not quick to reform the inequities and were harsh in their retribution to Algerian acts of violence. This helped lead to the formation of the National Liberation Front (FLN), which began its guerrilla attacks against the French in 1954. While the initial strikes by the FLN were not particularly effective, the insurgents grew in number, and the war became increasingly bloody. When the FLN began using Morocco and Tunisia as staging grounds for their operations, the French built the Morice Line to keep the insurgents inside

Algeria away from their support. Algeria gained independence in 1962 after the French lost the political will to continue fighting the FLN, which was only just holding on inside Algeria. One very unique idea that the French employed was a large defensive line along the borders of Algeria with the goal of stopping insurgents from infiltrating the country.

Counterinsurgency in Algeria

Defensive Lines

Description

After Tunisia and Morocco began allowing the FLN to stage attacks from their soil, French military engineers set about constructing a pair of solid defensive lines along the borders. The French previously tried conducting cross-border raids against the insurgents, but these often met with minimal success because on numerous occasions the French forces were ambushed. The Morice Line was built on the Algerian-Tunisian border; the less-famous and less-extensive Pedron Line was constructed on the frontier between Algeria and Morocco. The two lines had the twin goals of stopping the FLN infiltration of guerrillas and supplies into Algeria and keeping the FLN units currently in Algeria from withdrawing before being annihilated by the French units that were searching for them. The French believed that as long as the FLN could withdraw to the safety of Tunisia and Morocco to replace losses and rest, they could not realistically be defeated (Alexander and Keiger 2002, 10-11).

The Morice Line was completed in September 1957 and ran for two hundred miles from the Mediterranean coast to deep into the Sahara. The line's centerpiece was an eight-foot-high electric fence with five thousand volts of electricity running through it. If the fence were somehow cut, the French would be alerted to the exact location of the breach so that they could

then send forces. The fence was surrounded for forty-five meters on each side by a liberally equipped antipersonnel minefield with some barbed wire thrown in for good measure. On the Algerian side of the Morice Line, the frequent patrols could travel on a road running parallel to the fence. Behind the road lay batteries of artillery that were already sited on the line in case of a break. Finally, a number of helicopters were used to spot the breaches and then follow anyone who made it through (Horne 1987, 262-263).

Effectiveness of the Morice Line

In early 1958, the ten thousand FLN troops on the Tunisian side of the border began a series of probes on the Morice Line and constantly attempted new tactics to breach it. The FLN tried cutting through the wire, going over the wire, going under the wire, and blasting through the wire, all with little effect. The minefields, electric fence, and barbed wire served to slow the insurgents down enough for the French patrols to arrive and engage the already-weakened FLN. A number of times the guerrillas tried to go around the Morice Line through the Sahara by posing as nomads, only to be shot to pieces by helicopters and, sometimes, legitimate nomads as well. By April 1958, it was believed that 80 percent of the attempts to infiltrate the Morice Line were unsuccessful; most attackers were either forced back into Tunisia, killed, or captured (Horne 1987, 263-267).

With the FLN unable to breach the Morice Line in any sizable scale, the insurgents still inside Algeria were cut off from any significant amount of replacements for their losses in both men and equipment and fresh supplies. The French army took advantage of the situation and began a series of offensives starting in early 1958. These offensives were successful in costing the FLN both lives inside Algeria, which could not be replaced, and supplies. The guerrillas

were soon suffering from a serious lack of weapons and ammunition. Whereas in 1956 the monthly number of FLN defectors to the French could be counted on one hand, by mid 1958 there were over three hundred per month. By the end of 1958, the FLN was forced to operate in groups of about thirty men instead of the much larger units they had been able to maintain a year prior; this was due to increased French pressure and their own diminishing strength. By 1959, the FLN's strength had been reduced to a point where they could only undertake relatively safe operations, such as derailing trains, where the risk of engaging the French army was minimal. While these small-scale raids and assassinations continued until the end of the war, large-scale attacks were a thing of the past (Horne 1987, 317-329).

Conclusion for Defensive Lines

The Taliban remnants are currently using Pakistan as a staging ground to launch attacks into Afghanistan in much the same manner that the FLN was based out of Tunisia and Morocco. Despite repeated pledges from the Pakistani government that it will do more to stop the Taliban from using its lands as a base of operations, little action has been taken; this is partly because local leaders are openly sympathetic to the Taliban (Schmitt 2003). While the French military launched the occasional cross-border raid into Tunisia, it is unlikely that any significant American force would cross into Pakistan because the political ramifications would be great. An operation conducted into Pakistan without the consent of their government would likely upset the American ally. Additionally, such a move would probably infuriate many Pakistanis, further increasing support for the Taliban. An exact copy of the Morice Line along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is not feasible because it would have to be nearly 2,500 km long. The resources

to construct that scale of fortification would be enormous, and there would not be enough soldiers to garrison it.

The French Experience in Algeria: A Summary

In a manner similar to the Portuguese, the French lost the war in Algeria, not through military defeat at the hands of the FLN, but rather by making the political decision to withdraw since the war proved to be too costly in both men and material. The defensive line the French constructed along the Tunisian border stretched for two hundred miles well into the desert. The Morice Line achieved an estimated 80 percent success rate at stopping FLN reinforcements and supplies from reaching their brethren trapped inside Algeria. Although the FLN was never fully destroyed, it was severely weakened after 1959.

Conclusion

A Summary of the Lessons

The victorious British campaign in Malaya from 1948-1960 had two unique factors which were studied. The first of these was the extensive use of police. Because of a lack of available soldiers when the Emergency was first declared, the police were forced into a paramilitary role to help fight the insurgents. Later, when more soldiers were available, the police were returned to their normal roles of enforcing the laws. The police were also deployed to areas with large Chinese populations to show the local population that the government was concerned about the civilians. The other lesson the British experience in Malaya provided was the use of heavy patrolling to first find the insurgents and then kill them. The large-scale-company to battalion-sized patrols the British initially preferred in Malaya met with little

success. The insurgents were largely successful in avoiding these slow and cumbersome sweeps by the military, due in part to warnings provided by sympathetic villagers. However, the use of SAS teams on extended patrols in the jungles to find the insurgents met with success and helped to inflict losses that the insurgents could not replace.

The Portuguese experience in Angola lasted from 1961 to 1974 and was ended by a coup in Portugal. The Portuguese campaign produced several interesting aspects, two of which were studied. The first was the reorganization and retraining of the Portuguese Army, especially the infantry, after the initial guerrilla uprising was crushed in a bloodbath. The Portuguese reorganized their infantry companies and took away many of the heavy weapons while training the soldiers to interact better with the local inhabitants. These actions were taken out of the fear that continued use of excessive force, which killed a number of civilians, would only increase the insurgents' strength if it continued. The other point of interest learned from the Portuguese campaign is their conduct of social operations. After the insurgency began, Portugal began its effort to repair the social problems that had caused the insurgency to begin in the first place. This included building more factories and mines in Angola to help reduce unemployment and erecting a number of new hospitals and schools. In addition, the Portuguese made a conscious effort to make the locals see the soldiers often and in nonthreatening conditions, such as teaching school, giving medical aid, or simply passing through villages.

The French fought a counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 before withdrawing because of political reasons. The French constructed defensive lines along the borders with Morocco and Tunisia to keep the insurgents in those countries from entering Algeria and also to keep the insurgents already in Algeria from receiving replacements and

supplies. Despite continual efforts by the insurgents to breach the lines, over 80 percent of these attempts failed.

The Lessons Applied to Afghanistan

The lessons that have been learned from the three cases studied will now be applied to the United States and the campaign in Afghanistan. The first lesson is that the United States must become much more effective in its hearts and minds campaign to gain the support of the local population. Afghanistan is a country that has been thoroughly destroyed by over twenty years of war and, as a result, has little left in the way of infrastructure and faces high unemployment. The second topic is that the United States needs to expand the Afghan police rapidly. This is necessary to help restore order to many of the remote areas of the country and to aid American forces while searching villages. The third item calls for the United States creating a defensive line along the border with Pakistan. The line could be established by using perimeter-surveillance radar systems to alert allied units when Taliban forces are crossing the border and an ambush could then be planned. The final lesson deals with retraining the American Army and increasing small-unit patrolling in Afghanistan. New units that specialize in long-range patrolling should be created to help find and destroy Taliban forces.

Hearts and Minds

Both the Portuguese and British thought that the idea of winning the support of local inhabitants through social operations was vital to victory against the insurgents. It was necessary to provide some kind of proof to the population that the government was indeed concerned with fixing the social, economic, and political troubles that led to the insurgency taking place. The

British forcibly relocated Chinese squatters to new villages in an effort to separate them from the MCP. While initially unpopular with the Chinese, the new villages had hospitals and schools, and this, along with full citizenship, helped win the support of many ethnic Chinese. The Portuguese set about undermining the insurgents' claims of inequality through economic and social programs. By increasing employment opportunities, wages, education, and healthcare, among other things, the Portuguese made many of the Angolan people content with the status quo, thus weakening support for the insurgents.

For the United States in Afghanistan, work on rebuilding the country, which has been destroyed by over twenty years of war, should be an urgent priority. Much of what had survived the Soviet invasion and the Afghan civil war that followed was destroyed by bombs belonging to the United States in its campaign from late 2001. For instance, the main road between Kabul and Kandahar is still littered with bombed-out trucks (Gall 26 April 2003). Unfortunately, because of security concerns after several attacks, international aid workers (the ones who would be doing most of the rebuilding) do not dare venture far outside the capital of Kabul, which is guarded by international forces. While the United States Army had helped to rebuild some buildings, it is rarely more than a small school, simply because there are not enough available forces to both fight and build. While aid workers normally do not like to be escorted by military patrols, out of fear it makes them look loyal to the soldiers and therefore even-greater targets, this is perhaps the best temporary solution.

However, with so much of Afghanistan destroyed, simply replacing destroyed buildings will not be enough. The economy is poor, and there is a massive unemployment rate. While Afghanistan is receiving about \$1 billion in aid a year, it is not enough to restart the economy since most of the money is going to much-needed, emergency relief programs. A large-scale

civil works program, which would give some of the unemployed jobs as well as improving the infrastructure of Afghanistan, is one solution, if the necessary funds could be allocated.

Finally, in addition to the massive destruction and unemployment that Afghanistan faces, the Taliban continues to exist and launches the occasional attack or fires a few rockets. With their bases in Pakistan unreachable by the United States military, fully hunting them down is not realistically possible, meaning these small attacks could continue for many years to come. One solution, that could have the potential to weaken the Taliban greatly, is rather simple. Offer the Taliban members amnesty and allow them to return to their villages in Afghanistan. While such a move would not likely wipe the Taliban out, it could cause a fair number of members to leave the cause.

Police

The British used a large number of police in Malaya to enforce laws as well as in paramilitary roles. The police were pressed into guarding road junctions and protecting key facilities early in the Emergency when there were not enough soldiers to protect these areas and engage the insurgents. However, as police officers, they were not trained for these duties and often suffered losses accordingly. As soon as there were enough soldiers available, the police were put to use dealing with the local population. Police officers are normally better equipped to deal with the local population than soldiers are because the police usually do not use the excessive force the military does. In Afghanistan, the police often help guard American bases and patrol roads, but as soon as there are enough soldiers in the Afghan Army to take over these tasks, the police should be returned to the police work for which they are suited.

Once enough Afghan police officers are available, there is plenty of work for them. One role, which could definitely use the attention of the police, is the continued bickering between, and increasing power of, various warlords. The United States literally bought the support of many of these warlords during the campaign to take Afghanistan from the control of the Taliban. However, many of these warlords reside far from the power of Kabul and show little regard for the national government since they see little of it. A series of clashes between warlords has left a number dead (Reuters 2003). Police detachments stationed in the warlords' land would have a double impact. First, it would make the national government's presence felt in the rural areas. Second, the police might be more able to implement the numerous cease-fire agreements that are signed and broken.

The United States Army conducts a number of searches of Afghan villages looking for signs of the Taliban and arrests anyone who seemingly resists them. Unfortunately, it appears many of these arrests are of villagers upset over being searched; the arrests happen because few of the soldiers speak the language well enough to understand the villagers' complaints. Those detained are often released within a day, but these arrests make the Americans increasingly unpopular. With a police force not tied down to garrison duties as it is now, the Afghan police could conduct many of these village visits; hopefully, since they speak the language, fewer people will be arrested for protesting their homes being searched as happens now.

Defensive Line

An exact copy of the Morice Line along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border would not be feasible due to the massive amount of material that would be needed to construct it, and there are not enough soldiers available to garrison it. Additionally, Afghanistan already has too many land

mines in it without more being added. Even if enough resources were present, they would be better used rebuilding Afghanistan.

However, a line of electronic surveillance along the boundary could help detect Taliban infiltration routes. The United States military currently has a number of portable, short-range, perimeter-surveillance radar systems, such as the General-Dynamics-produced PPS-15. These radars can detect people a kilometer and a half away, or farther, with great reliability (Laur and Llanso 1995, 320). If deployed along the border, they could help detect some of the Taliban infiltration routes.

When the radars identify what appears to be a Taliban infiltration route, American or Afghan soldiers could then lie in wait for the next Taliban unit to appear. Another option would be to maintain a force of soldiers in reserve behind the electronic line to act as a reaction force when the frontier is crossed. An infantry battalion could be split up into its companies to cover a wider area, and the soldiers could be deployed quickly via helicopters. While it is likely marauding Taliban forces would destroy a number of these systems, no lives would be lost since these radar systems are operated remotely. If necessary, they can be built faster than they can be destroyed. To be sure, these radars will not be able to detect all the Taliban infiltrators crossing the borders; the frontier is too long and rugged for that to occur. However, these radars could make crossing into Afghanistan a riskier endeavor than it currently is.

Patrolling and Retraining

The British use of the SAS and Ferret Forces in Malaya and the Portuguese successes with commandos in Angola show just how effective small units of elite soldiers can be. Additionally, the Portuguese retrained and reequipped its army once the insurgency in Angola

began to be a lighter unit. These forces, normally deployed in small groups of about fifteen to twenty soldiers, performed long-range patrols ambushes; the commandos often spearheaded assaults when an insurgent's position was found. In Afghanistan, additional forces well-trained in extended patrolling would be useful to watch over areas with suspected Taliban presence and to monitor the border with Pakistan better.

Additional American Army Special Forces would be a nice addition to the forces already present because of their training to deal peacefully with local populations, language skills, and combat abilities. However, their commitment in Iraq is not likely to decrease very much in the near future, and they have additional commitments abroad keeping more of these soldiers from entering Afghanistan soon. Since it takes nearly two years to train a new Special Forces soldier, and only about one-quarter of the candidates pass the course, increasing the size of the unit is not something that can be done quickly. It should also be considered that the Special Forces soldiers would be overqualified with all of their language and technical skills if their main mission were to be patrolling (Clancy and Gresham 2001, 66-90). Essentially, these soldiers could be put to better use.

The American Navy special operations Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams had been used in Afghanistan in small numbers during the initial campaign to seize the country from Taliban control in late 2001 and early 2002. While SEALs normally operate in and around water, they have proven themselves able soldiers in all conditions (Moore 2003, 281-289). One possible suggestion is to use the SEALs as a stopgap measure to conduct patrolling while a unit better equipped and trained for the task is readied.

Army Rangers are well-suited for the task of conducting long patrols and spearheading assaults. Unlike Special Forces who receive a broad range of training in both combat and

noncombat fields, Rangers are only trained for combat. Their training period is two months, compared to two years for Special Forces, meaning that their ranks can be expanded quicker if necessary. Currently, there are three Ranger battalions, one of which is stationed in Iraq. There has been talk in the Army for a number of years about the possibility of expanding the Rangers to have a fourth or even a fifth battalion. During Vietnam, the Rangers trained all of the Army's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol teams (LRRP). The LRRP teams, six-man patrols that stayed out for a week or more, had considerable success in finding the elusive enemy and reporting that position for larger units to find (Neillands 1998, 177-182).

The LRRP teams were dissolved after Vietnam, but perhaps these teams should be resurrected in the form of new Ranger battalions. Each company in the battalion could operate with considerable independence and be deployed separately to whatever theater they were needed in. The current problem in Afghanistan for the United States is not killing the Taliban but to find the Taliban to kill them. These units would prove a large boost to the recon capacity wherever they are sent, although they would be particularly useful in Afghanistan where the border with Pakistan is long and can be easily infiltrated.

What Can be Learned for Afghanistan?

For the United States in its role in Afghanistan, there are several lessons that will help defeat the Taliban quicker. Afghanistan must be rebuilt from its current condition despite the dangers to international aid workers, who might have to be escorted by the military in some locations. Also, a large civil works program would help not only rebuild the country but also provide much-needed jobs. Granting amnesty to the Taliban might convince a number to give up arms and return to their villages. As soon as possible, the Afghan police should be removed

from garrison duties and return to police work. As police officers, they may be able to help stop the violence of the warlords and conduct searches of villages instead of American forces, which tend to arrest innocent people. An electronic surveillance line could be constructed on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to harass and ambush Taliban forces crossing back and forth. Finally, expanding the United States Army Rangers from three battalions to five battalions, with the new additions trained for Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, would give a significant boost in finding the Taliban. As long as the United States maintains the will to spend money and lose soldiers in Afghanistan, the Taliban can be defeated, but it will take a number of years.

Counterpoint: Responding to Paper's Weaknesses

This paper, like all papers, has weaknesses. This section will attempt to identify some of the limitations and provide a counterpoint to them. First, the paper has spent a great deal of attention on the military side of the counterinsurgencies while less attention has been paid to the equally important, if not more significant, part of a counterinsurgency - the social operations element. In response, the author does agree that winning the hearts and minds of the population is the key to defeating an insurgency. However, in the three historical cases that were studied, it was the imperialist country that took actions causing the insurgency in the first place. The United States in Afghanistan does not have to undo social injustices as in the historical cases; instead, the United States must rebuild the country, which is a different task.

A second weakness is the lack of consideration concerning the costs of implementing many of the suggestions put forth. The large-scale civil works program would cost an extraordinary amount of money, which Afghanistan does not currently have despite international aid. Also, expanding the United States' Army Ranger Regiment by creating several new

battalions, at a time when half of the Army is deployed overseas, is asking a lot. In response, it is true that obtaining enough money for a civil works project in Afghanistan would be very difficult. However, if more Afghans do not obtain jobs, the situation in Afghanistan may very well slowly decline as the unemployed become more discontent. At the same time, building a country that has a road network still in shambles is not plausible. Regarding the expansion of the Army Ranger Regiment, it is the author's opinion that the Army itself will soon have to be enlarged if the United States wishes to maintain a significant presence in Iraq for years to come. In short, both sending more aid money to Afghanistan and expanding the United States military are necessary; unfortunately, the resources for such actions are not presently available.

A third weakness in the paper is that the reasons for both the Portuguese and the French withdrawals from their territories were only briefly explained. Nothing was mentioned about what could be done to help ensure that the United States will not leave Afghanistan. In response, both Portugal and France withdrew because there were internal political conditions in their countries that stopped supporting the war. France withdrew from Algeria after the cost in lives became too high; Portugal withdrew after a coup, which occurred partly due to popular dislike of the ongoing war and the casualties that came with it. The United States can remain in Afghanistan as long as the political will to spend money and to lose soldiers remains.

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