

Framing Iraq: How the Media Conveys a Presidential Speech

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Biographical Statement/Acknowledgements: Miguel P. Harvey is currently an undergraduate studying Government and History at the University of Texas at Austin. Upon graduation Mr. Harvey hopes to attend graduate school for a Master's degree in Political Communication, in preparation for a career in electoral politics. In his spare time, Mr. Harvey is an avid collector of vinyl records and from 1999-2004 achieved international success with Austin band The Stingers. Mr. Harvey wishes to express his sincere thanks to Dr. Nathalie Frensley for her advice, support, encouragement, coffee and tireless dedication to all of her students. Additional acknowledgement goes to Dr. Frensley and Nelson Michaud (Université du Québec) for their work concerning selective media conveyance, without which this study would not have been possible.

## Abstract

The intent of this study is to further the discussion of the media function of conveyance by addressing the way that the language of a specific presidential foreign policy speech affects news coverage. Do the media convey the message(s) of a speech as the administration intended, or do they independently employ other criteria for determining what elements of a speech to recount? To what extent do either or both of these practices occur in the media's reporting of a major speech by President George W. Bush? To answer these questions I will dissect the body of a major foreign policy speech by President Bush, separating the sentences of the speech and categorizing them into groups representing different lines of reasoning, initiatives, or issues (frame categories). I then examine the coverage of the speech and its intended message(s) by a major U.S. news wire service (The Associated Press). Included in the data set are the rates of occurrence of the different types of frames I identified in both the speech and in its subsequent AP coverage. My findings show a tendency by the media to selectively convey certain ideas discussed in the speech, regardless of their rate of occurrence in the speech itself. Heavy emphases (in the AP recounting) on decision statements and "catch phrases" indicate a general adherence to professional norms for American journalists, including the treatment of news stories as narrative "events" and the application of several nearly universal criteria for news story selection. Ultimately, I will discuss whether I believe the Bush administration intended for the frames of the speech to be deemed proportionally important and hence worthy of recall relative to their prominence within the speech itself, or if the press was meant to recall specific sentences and not general political frames.

American society's growing dependence on mass media (and its role as a go-between for officials and the public) over the past century has drastically changed the way a president handles foreign policy. Ball-Rokeach and Defleur (1976, 3-21) argue that there is an interdependent relationship between mass media and the general public. Just as the media needs the public as an audience, the individual depends upon media for information about society. Decisions made by an administration must not only be made and carried out, but carefully conveyed to a watchful nation through nationally broadcast speeches.

The general public's knowledge of current events hinges upon its absorption of mass media. Simon and Xenos (2000) further the concept of the media as an intermediary by noting that "the public relies on the mass media for its political information...the origins of public opinion lay in elite discourse." From this, we can infer that coverage of presidential policy-setting speeches by the nation's news outlets sets the tone for public discourse and debate over the policies themselves. Because coverage by the media acts as the administration's method of policy conveyance, the media's role as an interpreter is crucial. Hence, the key to establishing the ground for public debate is the way in which the media recounts a presidential speech.

In order to understand the media's interpretation of a speech, it is crucial to first examine the basis for its interpretation- the speech itself. For this study, I have chosen to look at the mechanics of a policy speech in the context of framing. Goffman's groundbreaking work (1974, 10) defines frames as "principals of organization which govern events and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify." A presidential foreign policy

speech consists of several political frames, disseminated throughout the speech either as stand-alone claims or reasoned arguments. Frensley and Michaud (2004, 7) cite Gadi Wolfsfeld in noting that “all speakers, including presidents, invoke frames to facilitate audience understanding of their ideas.” They “help audiences to distill the many words speakers use into a few meaningful categories of understandable ideas (7-8).” The key word in this definition is **categories**. For this study, the easiest way to conceptualize framing is to break the speech’s theme into several distinct idea subsets, or **frame categories**. Each of these categories consists of specific statements taken directly from the body of the speech. When a speech’s statements are ordered into a series of frame categories, what becomes clear is the message that the administration intends to convey, and how they intend to convey it. Intent is possibly the most important part of presentation, and analysis of a speech’s structure gives us, among other things such as phrasing mechanics, some insight on what an administration *means* to tell us with a particular piece of speechwriting.

Upon the speech’s delivery, a context takes shape. The media then extracts its version of the frames established by the speech by recounting the address with emphases on specific statements or themes. The societal impact of the speech’s framing begins here, with the media’s decision process. With the speech, the foundation has been laid. It is now the media’s responsibility to interpret and then shape discussion of the source from which they are working (i.e. a presidential speech). With each occurrence of one of the speech’s established frame categories in the subsequent media coverage, the speech’s message permeates the national consciousness. Scheufele (1999, 105) argues that with frames, media construct social reality. This is reinforced by the work of McQuail (1994,

331) who contends that media create this construct by “framing images of reality in a predictable and patterned way.” Even if unconsciously, media reinforce a speech’s frames every time a word or phrase is recounted in a news article. Basing coverage of a speech on the central themes discussed in its body helps increase audience understanding of the speech and the policies or events upon which it is based. Scheufele continues by citing the work of W.A. Gamson and A. Modigliani, stating that media frames provide a “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events (106).” We now know that framing provides a way to dissect a speech and take from it specific themes. The media establish the frame categories invoked by the speech, and hence present the speech’s message through a “filter of categorization.” This creates a context in which discourse is carried out. The media’s filtering process and its subsequent interpretation of the issues set forth in a speech indeed set the tone for public discussion. For this examination of media conveyance, I have chosen to focus on the most visible of examples: the presidential policy speech. The question: How does the media utilize the rhetoric and structure of a presidential speech to shape news coverage? I aim to discover whether a speech’s emphasis on certain ideas or frames is proportional to media emphasis when recalling that speech’s components. In extracting frames, do media convey the message(s) of the speech as the administration intended, or do they use independent criteria to recount it? The research I conducted addresses the extent to which either or both of these practices occur in the Associated Press’s reporting of a major presidential foreign policy speech. In doing so, I aim to determine how one important news outlet conveys the administration’s message. My goal, then, is not to provide a representative sample of the entire news media, but rather to discuss the general

mechanics of media frame extraction and conveyance through examination of a specific instance.

### **Expectations**

Before conducting my research, I anticipated finding a heavy emphasis on specific frame categories, or even **specific sentences** in the AP's reporting of the speech I examined. I therefore expected that percentages of frame categories specifically recounted by the AP would not seem to be proportional to the rates of occurrence of those frames in the speech. Although they are the most obvious categorization subsets for policy discussion, specific **political** frames (e.g., "the Iraqi regime") were not the only source of attention in my analysis. Drawing on the work of Frensley and Michaud (2004, 12), I expected to find an emphasis on statements announcing decisions, using the operational definition discussed in their work: "a statement made in which Bush discloses actions or the purposes of actions taken or to be taken by the US government." Frensley and Michaud continue: "Reporters strive to write factually correct stories...reporters may be more attentive to, and therefore more likely to extensively recount, Bush's factual statements, given the stature of the president as a news source. (11)" I expected, then, to observe the extensive recounting of statements of fact in my findings. To prepare for these results I coded "special frame categories" for both decision statements and factual statements. Finally, upon observing the seemingly random inclusion of the words "terror," "terrorism," "terrorists," and "al-Qaeda" repeatedly in the speech, I expected to find a disproportionate linking of the Iraq story to those "catch phrases," and constructed an additional special frame category for "recall-inducing word inserts."

## **RESEARCH DESIGN**

### **Sources of Data**

This study uses President George W. Bush's March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2003 speech to the nation, delivered in the State Cross Hallway of The White House. The speech was given to announce the impending invasion of Iraq and deliver a last-minute ultimatum to the country's head of state, Saddam Hussein. To analyze news coverage of the speech, I use the thirty-seven (37) Associated Press wire reports concerning Bush's speech. Search dates range from 17 March 2003 (the day of the speech's airing) until 19 March 2003 (on the evening of which Bush's ultimatum expired and Iraq was invaded, starting a new cycle of news coverage). In addition to the date-specific requirement for the study, in order to qualify for inclusion in the data a story had to directly quote or paraphrase specific elements of President Bush's address. Data for the study was gathered using keyword searches on Lexis-Nexis Academic (AP reports) and the Federal News Service (speech transcript).

### **Why this speech?**

Foreign policy crises in the United States are arguably the most heavily covered news events in the world. The 2003 invasion of Iraq captured the attention of media the world over, and the Cross Hallway speech of 17 March marked the Bush administration's definitive announcement of pending military action.

### **Why the Associated Press?**

The AP is the most widely distributed news wire service in the country, serving 1,700 U.S. daily, weekly, non-English and college newspapers and 5,000 radio/TV outlets.






Figure 1: Comparison. A portion of the speech is shown in both frames, both before and after the numbering process. Note that the introductory statement has been removed from the modified version.

### CODING

Upon separation of Bush’s speech into complete statements, I arrived at a total of 103 and numbered statements according to their position in the order of the speech (**Figure 1**). I excluded from the process nonspecific opening and closing statements which I judged to be irrelevant to the study. I then extracted the following three types of frames from the speech, with rates of occurrence in the speech for each frame category included:

#### Issue/Problem Frames (Figure 2)

Statements which conveyed a specific idea, line of reasoning, or issue were categorized into broader groups, or “frame categories.” There was not a particular method by which I arrived at a definition for each frame. I categorized each sentence to a group consisting of statements in the speech that shared a common theme (uniting issue/problem/justification; explained below) and devised a category definition for each of the groups (**App. Chart 1**). As a result, all 103 statements made in the speech are




Figure 2: Frame Establishment in Speech.

categorized into one of nine (9) issue-frame categories. The speech’s invoking of these frames is coded by sentence (1-103) in the data set with a “1” denoting that a sentence has invoked a certain frame and a “0” signifying that it has not (**App. Chart 3**).

The **Ultimatum** frame was established with the first sentence of President Bush’s speech, when the president declared that “events in Iraq have reached the final days of decision.” The frame included all statements which declared that the time to act had arrived, and Saddam Hussein had no choice but to surrender. Any statements declaring military action to be imminent were included in the category as well. Most notable within the category was Bush’s actual ultimatum to the Iraqi president, in which he said “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military action, commenced at a time of our choosing.” The speech invoked the **Ultimatum** frame 5 times in 103 sentences, at a rate of **4.854%**.

The next frame, **Regime**, was invoked **13** times, at a rate of **12.621%**. The category includes statements made about the Iraqi regime. Statements identifying the Iraq leadership's behavior as reckless, aggressive and defiant, or claims involving the regime's refusal to disarm, characterized this frame. Bush introduced the frame with the claim that "that regime pledged to reveal and destroy all its weapons of mass destruction...our good faith has not been returned."

The **Diplomacy** frame appeared **14** times in the speech at a rate of **13.592%**. Bush established the frame with the statement saying that "for more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraq regime without war." The category consists of all statements giving a general reminder that the disarming of Iraq has been pursued diplomatically, but that such pursuits have failed.

The fourth frame category, **Preemptive War** (invoked **18** times at a rate of **17.476%**) includes statements justifying military action to preempt an attack by Iraq or its allies. Bush remarked that "the danger is clear: using chemical, biological, or one day nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists...could kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other."

The **Clear Alternative** frame (invoked **14** times at a rate of **13.592%**) posits that decisive action in Iraq is preferable to the status quo. The frame weighed the benefits of action against the consequences of inaction. Bush: "Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety."

**World Support** was invoked **7** times at a rate of **6.796%**. The frame establishes that the United States has the support of the free world, and that the war (if necessary)

will be a unified global effort (“And a broad coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world”).

The **Call to Iraqis** (invoked **12** times at a rate of **11.65%**) frame was established by the president with the statement that “many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them.” The category includes any statements of reassurance to the Iraqi people at large, as well as instructions to help ensure their (Iraqis’) safety in the event of military conflict.

**American Values** (invoked **13** times at a rate of **12.621%**) includes any statements that recall values or qualities specific to Americans, such as **resolve** and **freedom**. (“And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence, and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace.”)

The final issue/problem frame categorized in this study is the **Threat to Homeland** frame, which was invoked **7** times at a rate of **6.796%**. The president introduced the frame by saying “in desperation, he (Saddam) and terrorist groups might try to conduct terrorist operations against the American people and our friends.” The category deals with any statement to the effect that the impending war against Iraq poses a threat to America itself.

### **Special Frame Categories (Figure 3)**

I employed special (non-issue specific) categories to denote two certain types of sentences that on the basis of Frensley and Michaud’s work (2004) I deemed would be extensively recounted by the media (**App. Chart 2**). Coding for the special frame categories was identical to coding done for the issue/problem frames, with a “1” denoting




Figure 3: Special Frame Categories.

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a special frame's appearance in a sentence (**App. Chart 3**). Statements categorized as falling under the domain of the special categories were also assigned issue-specific frames (i.e. "Events in Iraq have reached the final days of decision" was coded as both a **decision statement** and under the Ultimatum category). The **Decision Statement** frame is operationally defined by Frensley and Michaud (2004, 12) as "a statement made in which Bush discloses actions or the purposes of actions taken or to be taken by the US government." The frame was invoked in President Bush's speech **18** times at a rate of **17.476%**. Bush made perhaps his most memorable decision statement when he warned Saddam to "leave Iraq within 48 hours." The **Factual Statement** frame (invoked **20** times at a rate of **19.417%**) is defined simply as a pronouncement of indisputable, empirical fact. (Example: "We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq.")

### **Recall-Inducing Word Inserts (RIWI)**

During the categorization process, language used in some sentences seemed to imply frames other than those that the sentences explicitly invoked. For example, the sentence "We will tear down the apparatus of terror, and we will help you to build a new

Iraq that is prosperous and free” fits quite nicely into the issue/problem frame **Clear Alternative**. However, inclusion of the word **terror** by the speechwriter implies the linking of the current Iraqi regime to terrorism- a “catch word” that makes us **specifically recall** terrorist attacks (a subject that in March 2003 was undeniably fresh in the national consciousness). In the post- September 11 world, Wiley (2001) notes that “our sense of place has been deeply altered.” Mention of or connection to the fight against terrorism gives new context to a statement about Iraq or any other subject. Mere mention of the word terror is likely not only to grab public attention, but shift public thought to the painful and deeply personal sense of loss over the 9/11 attacks felt by Americans. Therefore, I coded sentences which implied a link to terrorism with use of the words “terror, terrorists, terrorism, or al-Qaeda (the group deemed responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001)” into a special **Terror** category of RIWI (**11** total; **App. Chart 2**). Although other “catch words” (such as “weapons of mass destruction,” “hatred,” and “resolve”) appeared repeatedly in the language of the speech, I limited the test of RIWI in this study to the single **Terror** category. Most sentences’ uses of the aforementioned (weapons of mass destruction, etc.) fit the context of the frames in which they (the sentences) were categorized. Additionally, I expected the data set of AP coverage to show that stories including the speech’s allusion to terror or terrorism were significantly changed because of it. This was not my expectation for the other recurring “catch words” I identified- strong words themselves but not words whose mere mention **dominated** political discussion from the period between 11 September 2001 and the invasion of Iraq (terror). As with the political frames and special frame categories, RIWI are denoted in

the data set by a “1” appearing next to applicable sentences, and a “0” when not applicable (**App. Chart 3**).

## **RESULTS/DISCUSSION**

My main operational goal was to produce an empirical result for the question of how the speech affected media coverage (and the extent to which the Associated Press *selectively* conveyed the information given in the speech). A first step was to determine whether the AP’s coverage of the speech’s frames was proportional to the speech’s mention of them.

As noted, I computed the rates of occurrence of the frame categories in the speech. This provided the baseline for comparing the media recounting of the speech. To establish a comparison with the AP coverage of the speech, I exhaustively coded every reference to Bush’s speech (direct quotes and paraphrases) in each of the thirty-seven (37) articles used according to the speech sentence recalled in each reference. Using the same coding method that I employed for the speech, I noted a reference to a particular sentence in an article with a “1,” and a non-reference with “0” (**App. Chart 4**).

After coding each article by sentence, I was able to place the sentences back into their proper categories (**App. Chart 5**). I separated each reference (**158** total) into the frame categories I used in coding the speech, and calculated their rates in two ways. First, I determined the percentage of frames recounted **by reference (Reference model)**, dividing the number of occurrences of each frame by the total number of sentences recalled by the AP (Example: **13** recounts of the **Clear Alternative** frame out of **158** total references, or **8.228%**). For the sake of comparison, I then computed the results by the number of articles (out of **37**) that recounted each frame (**Frame/Article model**). Each

frame's prominence in the speech is measured by its occurrence **relative to the total number of sentences** in the speech. So, in determining a proportional relationship between the speech and its subsequent coverage by the Associated Press I utilized the **Reference** model. Because each sentence in the speech that was counted as a "factual" or "decision" statement was also coded as invoking one of the 9 issue-frames, I was able to use the same base number for references (158 and 37) for special frame categories that I used for issue-frame categories.


#### **Proportional Frame Representation (Figure 4)**

The data analysis shows the rates of issue-frames invoked (speech) to issue-frames recalled (AP) to be generally proportional, with one major exception (**Ultimatum**, which I will address momentarily). Of nine issue-frame categories, eight accounted for **81 of 156** total references in the AP coverage, none of the eight frames individually accounting for more than 17 references (or 10.759%). This would suggest a tendency by the AP to give equal weight to the importance of individual issues within the context of a speech. The presence of a disproportionately recounted frame disputes this postulation.

#### **Disproportionate Frame Representation (Figure 5)**

The **Ultimatum** frame was recounted **77** times out of a total of **158** references (**48.734%**). The recounting of this frame yields an enormously disproportionate comparison to its rate of invocation (**5, 4.854%**) in President Bush's speech. Even more remarkable is the discovery that of 77 appearances of the frame in the AP's coverage, **67** recounted a **single statement** made in the speech. The statement (#44; "Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours...their refusal to do so will result in military action at a time of our choosing.") declares explicitly President Bush's ultimatum to the





**Figure 4: Proportional Frame Representation.** Numbers indicate rate of occurrence (percent) in Bush's speech versus rate of occurrence in AP coverage. Note the absence of the Ultimatum frame and Special categories, to be shown in Figure 5.

Iraqi regime. This announcement of action constitutes a **decision statement** as operationally defined by Frensley and Michaud (2004, 12) and coded in the data set as a special frame category. The hypothesis is proven true: AP coverage **extensively** recounted the key decision statement of the speech. With the statement President Bush established the timeframe for military action in Iraq, and the AP deemed this (as shown in the data set) the most important element of the speech to recount. The preceding explanation makes evident the fact that decision statements were also recounted at a disproportionately high rate to their appearance in the speech. **18** decision statements in the speech (**17.476%**) appeared in the AP's coverage **87** times (**67** of which being accounted for by statement number **44**, the "explicit ultimatum") at a rate of **55.063%**.

A third deviation from proportional representation patterns disproves one of my previous expectations. In the AP coverage of the president's speech, **factual statements**




Figure 5: Disproportionate Frame Representation.

(20 in the speech at a rate of 19.417%) were recounted only **eight** times (of 158 total references at a rate of 5.063%). This startling lack of attention given to empirical statements, coupled with the knowledge of what frames the AP **did** invoke in their coverage leads to two questions. Why did the AP report the speech in this way, and what implications does this have?

### Selective Media Conveyance as an Explanation for Deviation

There are multiple possible explanations for the press’s motivation. Fishman (1980) argues that the duration of a news event is determined by reporters’ understanding of the event as a **narrative**, an unfolding story with a defined beginning, middle and end. Stories that are considered newsworthy consist of elements that fit the **trajectory of the event**. In this case, the decision to declare a 48-hour ultimatum for Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq marks the **beginning** of the “story arc” for the event in question (the impending invasion of Iraq). Because the timeframe for the event is set, the trajectory is easy to map out. Bush’s ultimatum (with the announcement) singles not only the beginning of an event, but the middle (the ensuing 48 hours) and end (expiration of the 48-hour period). This **frames the issue** concisely and powerfully for the media, and

gives reporters a context for **selective conveyance**. Frensley and Michaud (2004, 8) cite Frensley's notion that the concept of selective media conveyance "regards reporters both as political consumers of leaders' frames and as news workers who follow their profession's norms, objectives, and procedures for determining the newsworthiness of leaders' statements." This follows the "news as a demarcated event" hypothesis- the Associated Press consumed the frames laid out by the speech, and selectively applied a **decision statement** that signaled the start of a story.

Additional journalistic professional norms exist that allow selective media conveyance to explain the disproportionate recounting of a single decision statement. Graber (2001, ch. 5-6) explains that journalists use several nearly universal criteria to determine news coverage. Since the success of a media outlet depends upon whether a significant number of people obtain their news from it, all criteria are strongly influenced by the need for audience appeal. Stories that are reported by the news media should have an impact on the audience, and hence are organized around components that are likely to "grab the attention" of a consumer. Journalists, then, gravitate toward "big stories" that report lurid events of violence, war, sex, etc. The invasion of Iraq was a "big story" of war which dominated the climate of reporting. If we here apply Fishman's (1980) notion, a definitive story cycle within the life of the "big story" would constitute the ideal news item. 36 of 37 stories (and 50% of overall recounted frames) are structured around the administration's decision to issue an ultimatum to Saddam. This frame/decision statement's domination of the coverage of the president's speech gives further empirical proof (and multi-tiered explanation) of the existence of selective media conveyance in foreign policy reporting. . Selective media conveyance can also possibly explain the

relative absence of factual statements by the president in the AP's recounting of the speech. Because factual statements are defined as arguments/claims presented as empirical truths, they are generally presented as statements including some kind of historical context. The news cycles surrounding policy decisions are set by defined courses of action. Because of this (and the professional norms employed by American journalists when deciding which items are newsworthy), it is conceivable (if a bit cynical) that deadline reporting of news in a media system such as America's has no real need of (or much use for) an empirical factual basis in real-time reporting (like wire reporting).

### **Recall-Inducing Word Inserts: Setting a New Context**

I used the same method employed to code frame references to count the recall-inducing word inserts recounted in the AP coverage (**App. Chart 3**). The word terror (or terrorism, terrorists or al-Qaeda) was mentioned **11** times in the Bush speech, and recounted by the Associated Press **29** times (Table 6). I was not concerned with percentage comparison for the RIWI to determine representation. The fact that the RIWI were inserted into speech sentences **regardless of whether they were representative of the frame(s) into which the sentences were categorized** provides a remarkable discovery in the data set. In its coverage, the AP establishes a new frame (terror) in the press coverage that changes the context for discussion of the speech. Did the government mean to implant a link to terror in the media's frame of the event by slyly inserting the word, or are the media applying Graber's (2001, chp.5) criteria for coverage to set a specific agenda? Scheufele (1999, 117) contends that journalists are "equally susceptible to the very frames that they use to describe events and issues." Therefore, this concept could just as easily apply to the gathering of stories by news workers (i.e.

journalists selectively extracting specific elements or **words** from Bush's speech).

Reporters function as a kind of "proto-audience," disseminating government information based upon their interpretation of it (as implied in Simon and Xenos (2000)). It could follow then that elements of a speech that invoke powerful feelings in reporters are in turn reported with increased weight. It cannot be disputed that government officials (particularly presidential speechwriters) are acutely aware of the post- 9/11 rhetorical importance of the word "terror." It is not entirely out of the question, then (an idea to explore in future studies) that the administration consciously exploited the impact of the word "terror" on journalists (and subsequently audiences). By linking the Iraq situation to the general war on terror (intent which has since been empirically proven **over and over again**), the government could have sought to "drum up" support for the invasion of Iraq. This could be achieved by triggering the automatic emotional empathy felt by Americans when reminded of the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Government manipulation of reporting (though an attractively sinister theory) is not the only possible explanation of the AP's extensive recounting of the RIWI. Dye (2001, chp.6) writes that "media do play key roles in setting the American political agenda by determining what news is to be covered, how much, and in what context." Cohen (1963, 232-33) takes the argument a step further when he affirms that the press is "stunningly successful in telling readers what to think of." This idea of agenda-setting can be carried out by journalists' practice of professional norms, as discussed earlier and defined by Graber (2001). By extracting the word "terror" from the speech and invoking the concept (and its relation to the situation in Iraq) in coverage of the speech, the media would immediately make a "big story" a huge one. Journalists would also be employing

additional reporting criteria that appeal to audiences- terrorism is a timely story, appeals strongly to the emotions of the consumer, and is certainly familiar in the context of foreign events.

It is up to future studies to reveal the real reason for the relatively high proportion of references to terror in AP coverage (for example, the word was cited in reports on the speech **29** times compared to **9** references to Bush's mention of the Iraqi regime). We **can** infer that the presence of RIWI in the data (regardless of which entity was responsible for it) changes the idea of independent professionalism in journalism as applied to the American media system (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 38-52). In any case, the "War in Iraq" becomes "The War in Iraq in Relation to Terrorism" with the introduction of the RIWI "terror." This shift in context has many potential implications on both the specific policy debate concerning Iraq, and on the idea of selective media conveyance.

### **CONCLUSION**

Overall, the research I've done has reinforced my belief that media conveyance is a two-way street: that journalists (in this case the Associated Press) selectively convey ideas that the Bush administration has already marked for media analysis. The study's focus on the Iraq crisis provided an excellent proving ground for both the mechanics of framing and the theory of selective media conveyance. This sort of symbiotic relationship between the government and the press can have both positive and negative consequences. A degree of selectivity in foreign policy discussion is important for both the administration and the media (for security reasons and to provide a check to widespread elite manipulation, respectively). It is of even greater importance, though, that the

operators of the top tiers of public discourse (government and media) maintain focus on the entity that each of them exists to serve- the public at large.

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## APPENDIX

**Chart 1: Category Definitions**

Frame and Description	Example
<p><b>Ultimatum:</b> The time to act is now- Saddam Hussein must surrender Power or face war.</p>	<p>Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.</p> <hr/> <p>It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power.</p> <hr/> <p>Events in Iraq have now reached the final days of decision.</p>
<p><b>Iraqi Regime:</b> The behavior of the Regime in Iraq is reckless, aggressive, And defiant, and it is clear that the Regime has not disarmed.</p>	<p>The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage.</p> <hr/> <p>The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East.</p> <hr/> <p>Today no nation can claim that Saddam Hussein has disarmed.</p>
<p><b>Preemptive War:</b> The United States And her allies are justified in conducting Preemptive war against the Iraqi regime, And possess the authority to act.</p>	<p>The danger is clear: using chemical, biological, or one day nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other.</p> <hr/> <p>The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security.</p> <hr/> <p>And responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide.</p>
<p><b>Clear Alternative:</b> Decisive action in this Matter is preferable to the status quo, and The benefits of action will be far greater than The possible consequences of inaction.</p>	<p>Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety.</p> <hr/> <p>We will tear down the apparatus of terror, and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.</p> <hr/> <p>The terrorist threat to America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed.</p>
<p><b>Diplomacy:</b> The United States and other Nations have tried to persuade Iraq to Disarm through diplomatic measures.</p>	<p>For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war.</p> <hr/> <p>America tried to work with the United Nations to address this threat, because we wanted to resolve the issue peacefully.</p> <hr/> <p>We have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq.</p>

<p><b>World Support:</b> The United States has the Support of the free world, and the war will Be a unified global effort.</p>	<p>The United States with other countries will work to advance liberty and peace in that region.</p>
<p><b>Call to Iraqis:</b> The United States is reaching Out to the people of Iraq, and provides assistance Along with instructions to help ensure safety.</p>	<p>And a broad coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world.</p> <p>If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you.</p> <p>I urge every member of the Iraqi military and intelligence services, if war comes, do not fight for a dying regime that is not worth your own life.</p> <p>Do not destroy oil wells, a source of wealth that belongs to the Iraqi people.</p>
<p><b>American Values:</b> American values cannot and Will not be compromised, and we will fight For them.</p>	<p>America understands the costs of conflict because we have paid them in the past.</p> <p>No act of theirs can alter the course or shake the resolve of this country.</p> <p>And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and violence, and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace.</p>
<p><b>Threat to Homeland:</b> The impending war against The Iraqi regime poses the threat of Retaliatory attacks against America.</p>	<p>In desperation, he and terrorist groups might try to conduct terrorist operations against the American people and our friends.</p> <p>Our government is on heightened watch against these dangers.</p> <p>The Department of Homeland Security is working closely with the nation's governors to increase the armed security at critical facilities across America.</p>

## Chart 2: Special Frame Category Definitions

Special Frame Category	Example
<p><b>Decision Statement:</b> “a statement made in which Bush discloses actions or the purposes Of actions taken or to be taken by the US Government.” (Frensley and Michaud, 2004: 12)</p>	<p>Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Failure to do so will Result in military action, commenced at a time of our choosing.</p>
	<p>War crimes will be prosecuted.</p>
	<p>And yet the only way to reduce the harm and duration of war is to apply the full force and might of our military, and we are prepared to do so.</p>
<p><b>Factual Statement:</b> A statement of fact by Bush with the means to be proven statistically, empirically, or otherwise.</p>	<p>We have passed more than a dozen resolutions in the United Nations Security Council.</p>
	<p>This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq's neighbors and against Iraq's people.</p>
	<p>Yet some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq.</p>
<p><b>Recall-Inducing Word Insert:</b> "Catch" words Inserted into a sentence for the purpose of recalling/invoking a frame not explicitly invoked by the sentence in which it is contained.</p>	<p>We will tear down the apparatus of <b>terror</b>, and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.</p>



Sentence	Decision	Fact	Word Insert		Ultimatum	Iraqi Regime	Diplomacy	Preemptive War	Clear Alternative
62	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
63	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
64	1	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
65	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
66	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
67	1	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
68	0	0	0		0	1	0	0	0
69	0	0	2		0	0	0	0	0
70	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
71	1	0	0		0	0	0	1	0
72	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	1
73	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
74	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
75	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
76	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
77	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
78	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
79	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
80	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
81	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
82	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
83	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
84	1	0	0		0	0	0	1	0
85	0	0	0		0	0	0	1	0
86	0	0	1		0	0	0	1	0
87	1	0	0		0	0	0	0	1
88	0	0	0		0	0	0	1	0
89	0	1	0		0	0	0	1	0
90	0	0	2		0	0	0	1	0
91	0	0	2		0	0	0	1	0
92	0	0	0		0	0	0	1	0
93	1	0	0		0	0	0	1	0
94	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
95	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	1
96	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	1
97	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
98	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	1
99	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
100	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
101	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	1
102	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
103	1	0	0		0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTALS</b>	18	20	18		5	13	14	18	14

Sentence	World Support	Call to Iraqis	American Values	Threat to Homeland
1	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	0
7	0	0	0	0
8	0	0	0	0
9	0	0	0	0
10	0	0	0	0
11	0	0	0	0
12	0	0	0	0
13	0	0	0	0
14	0	0	0	0
15	0	0	0	0
16	0	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	0
20	0	0	0	0
21	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0
23	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	0
26	0	0	0	0
27	0	0	0	0
28	0	0	0	0
29	0	0	0	0
30	0	0	0	0
31	0	0	0	0
32	0	0	0	0
33	0	0	0	0
34	0	0	0	0
35	0	0	0	0
36	0	0	0	0
37	1	0	0	0
38	1	0	0	0
39	0	0	0	0
40	1	0	0	0
41	1	0	0	0
42	0	0	0	0
43	0	0	0	0
44	0	0	0	0
45	0	0	0	0
46	0	1	0	0
47	0	1	0	0
48	0	0	0	0
49	0	0	0	0
50	0	0	0	0
51	0	0	0	0
52	0	0	0	0
53	0	0	0	0
54	0	1	0	0
55	0	1	0	0
56	0	1	0	0
57	0	1	0	0
58	0	1	0	0
59	0	1	0	0
60	0	1	0	0
61	0	1	0	0
62	0	1	0	0
63	0	1	0	0
64	0	0	1	0
65	0	0	1	0
66	0	0	1	0

Sentence	World Support	Call to Iraqis	American Values	Threat to Homeland
67	0	0	1	0
68	0	0	0	0
69	0	0	0	1
70	0	0	0	1
71	0	0	0	0
72	0	0	0	0
73	0	0	0	1
74	0	0	0	1
75	0	0	0	1
76	0	0	0	1
77	0	0	0	1
78	0	0	1	0
79	0	0	1	0
80	0	0	1	0
81	0	0	1	0
82	0	0	1	0
83	0	0	1	0
84	0	0	0	0
85	0	0	0	0
86	0	0	0	0
87	0	0	0	0
88	0	0	0	0
89	0	0	0	0
90	0	0	0	0
91	0	0	0	0
92	0	0	0	0
93	0	0	0	0
94	0	0	1	0
95	0	0	0	0
96	0	0	0	0
97	1	0	0	0
98	0	0	0	0
99	0	0	1	0
100	0	0	1	0
101	0	0	0	0
102	1	0	0	0
103	1	0	0	0
<b>TOTALS</b>	7	12	13	7









Sentence	Article	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	
72		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
73		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
74		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
75		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
76		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
77		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
78		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
79		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
80		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
81		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
82		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
83		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
84		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
85		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
86		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
87		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
88		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
89		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
90		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
91		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
92		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
93		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
94		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
95		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
96		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
97		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
98		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
99		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
100		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
101		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
102		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
103		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

**TOTALS**

Sentence	TOTAL
1	1
2	0
3	0
4	0
5	0
6	0
7	1
8	1
9	0
10	0
11	0
12	1
13	0
14	1
15	1
16	3
17	4
18	1
19	1
20	2
21	0
22	0
23	0
24	0
25	0
26	0
27	0
28	0
29	0
30	0
31	0
32	1
33	1
34	0

Sentence	TOTAL
35	1
36	1
37	0
38	2
39	3
40	0
41	0
42	0
43	3
44	67
45	4
46	0
47	1
48	1
49	0
50	0
51	7
52	0
53	2
54	0
55	1
56	4
57	0
58	0
59	2
60	2
61	1
62	1
63	1
64	0
65	0
66	2
67	3
68	0
69	11
70	1
71	1
72	1
73	1
74	1
75	1
76	0
77	0
78	2
79	0
80	0
81	0
82	0
83	0
84	0
85	0
86	0
87	0
88	0
89	2
90	3
91	0
92	3
93	3
94	0
95	0
96	0
97	0
98	0
99	0
100	0
101	0
102	0
103	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>158</b>

### **Chart 5: Comparisons of Frame Representation**

<b>Table 5- Bush Frames and AP Recounts by Frequency and Percent</b>			
<b>Frame</b>	<b>Bush</b>	<b>AP (by total number of references)</b>	<b>AP (by number of articles recounting frame)</b>
Ultimatum	5 of 103 (4.854%)	77 of 158 (48.734%)	36 of 37 (97.297%)
Regime	13 of 103 (12.621%)	9 of 158 (5.696%)	5 of 37 (13.514%)
Diplomacy	14 of 103 (13.592%)	5 of 158 (3.165%)	5 of 37 (13.514%)
Preemptive War	18 of 103 (17.476%)	17 of 158 (10.759%)	6 of 37 (16.216%)
Clear Alternative	14 of 103 (13.592%)	13 of 158 (8.228%)	8 of 37 (21.622%)
World Support	7 of 103 (6.796%)	2 of 158 (1.266%)	2 of 37 (5.405%)
Call to Iraqis	12 of 103 (11.65%)	13 of 158 (8.228%)	4 of 37 (10.811%)
American Values	13 of 103 (12.621%)	7 of 158 (4.43%)	5 of 37 (13.514%)
Threat to Homeland	7 of 103 (6.796%)	15 of 158 (9.494%)	10 of 37 (27.0279%)
<b>Special Frame Category</b>			
Decision Statement	18 of 103 (17.476%)	87 of 158 (55.063%)	37 of 37 (100.0%)
Factual Statement	20 of 103 (19.417%)	8 of 158 (5.063%)	6 of 37 (16.216%)
<b>Word Insert</b>			
Terror/Terrorism/Terrorists/al-Qaeda	11	29	10 of 37 (27.027%)