

**Chief Executive, Commander-in-Chief and Chief Legislator:
Clinton Supervention of Congressional Constitutional Authority
In Fast Tracking NAFTA.**

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The current political deliberations in the U.S. Congress regarding Presidential prerogative have elevated this historical discourse concerning powers of the Executive Branch of the American democratic experiment to a heretofore unprecedented level of criminal accusations. Since Lincoln ostensibly unilaterally declared war by ordering the blockade of Charleston harbor and issued a series of war promulgated Executive Orders, historians and political scientists alike have debated the validity of a President exercising expanded powers in times of national crisis. This thesis examines another aspect of the presidential powers discourse that has attracted minimal scholarly or political debate. It is however none the less corrosive in terms of obfuscating the constitutionally designated roles and responsibilities of the three branches of American federal government. In this case in point, former President William Jefferson Clinton exercised an expansion of presidential prerogative in a time of non crisis (or at least non-war crisis). His collaborative effort as unofficial "Chief Legislator" orchestrated the passage of NAFTA, a major domestic policy treaty from its conception. The treaty itself was contentious and still has its share of critics, however no challenge has been raised regarding Clinton's and his predecessor's control of the legislative process resulting in this trilateral agreement between Canada, Mexico and the U.S. which most certainly would have been stymied by special interest lobbying or obstructed by partisan and re-election cogitation.

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Introduction

Current discourse over the expansion of the powers of the Presidency of the United States is focused primarily around the President's prerogative during times of crisis – especially during war efforts. In the following thesis I identify an example of how presidential power expansion or congressional abdication of its constitutional duty has inflated the president's power in a time of non-crisis. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the exclusive authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. The 93rd Congress of the U.S. has promulgated I suggest a serious erosion of a major Congressional Constitutional authority. Agreement by Congress to "fast track" international trade agreements at the request of a president is a dangerous and perhaps unnecessary expansion of presidential power.

By approving the 1974 Trade Act, Congress decided to share its Constitutional responsibilities of control over international trade agreements. Language in the law required the president to consult with Congress prior to negotiating trade agreements. However in order to reassure trade partners and enhance the credibility of U.S. negotiators, Congress also established new procedures which critics say “allows the President to negotiate trade agreements with virtually no input from Congress and forces Congress to vote yes or no on an agreement with no opportunity for amendments.”¹ Thus the fast-track procedure was instituted as a presidential option. In the last 25 years fast-track has been invoked only five times.² During that period literally hundreds of trade agreements were approved by Congress with out the fast track option. This fact alone raises questions of whether fast track is a requisite government instrument. This paper analyses the use of the fast-track authorization by President Clinton in obtaining the passage of NAFTA into law by Congress in 1993. The depth of his leadership in assuming the lead legislative role in shepherding this legislation through Congress is inspiring. Nevertheless it also demonstrates I suggest how exercise of this technically narrow procedural measure can be a significant political challenge to the “check and balance” premise of the Constitution.

Background

In 1990 U.S., Canadian and Mexican political leaders met and committed to the creation of an agreement between the countries which would eliminate costly trade barriers that had existed for decades. By 1993, the U.S. Congress still had not approved the formal agreement which had already been approved by the governments

of Canada and Mexico. During those three years, dozens of conferences, working groups, advisory committees and academic studies had been consummated to clarify the ramifications of this proposed trade agreement.

Negotiations actually began in earnest in 1991. As William Orme Jr noted in his study, written during the two years NAFTA was being negotiated, “Two years later, as the actual vote approached, few members of Congress were willing to campaign for the accord, and more than a hundred were working actively against it – most of them Democrats, despite their President’s vigorous if belated support for the pact.”³

The Mexican and Canadian governments viewed this potential agreement as a groundbreaking trilateral trade treaty. However, in the U.S., the controversy and the spirited debate over aspects of the proposed agreement took on more of a flavor of domestic policy than the foreign economic treaty it actually was. Picking up the NAFTA banner, newly elected President Clinton exercised the fast-track⁴ authorization he supported for former President Bush.⁵ His contention was that this authority was necessary to obtain a Congressional approval of NAFTA as passed by Canada and Mexico, in time for the three countries self imposed start date of 1/1/94⁶. He proceeded to marshal all of his newly formed cabinet members and other top level administrative personnel to sell NAFTA around the country and generate support from every group that mattered.

When the House of Representatives narrowly approved the NAFTA agreement after contentious debate, it was more a demonstration of the value of the expanded legislative power of the Executive Branch led by the President than it was the merits

of the pact, the ability of Congress to negotiate or the ability of the various special interest groups to compromise, that saved the day. As James Shoch notes in his illuminating book on U.S. trade policy, the dominating role of parties in influencing trade policy has weakened in this century and has often been replaced by other institutional factors such as “the administrative presidency”⁷. President Clinton took full advantage of the fragmentation of both the political parties and special interests over NAFTA. Formal side deals were cut to appease the major lobby groups in order to solidify the support of Congressional members for NAFTA. The administration, under direction of the oval office, made many informal promises in the final hours before the NAFTA vote, many of which were District specific in order to secure a majority vote count.

The efforts on all sides of the “Iron Triangle”⁸ were so intense, competitive and all encompassing that at times it was difficult to determine whether the Executive Branch, Congress or the special interest lobbyists were leading the charge on this trade initiative. In the end, the passage of NAFTA through Congress must be viewed as a crowning achievement of the Clinton Administration. The process of obtaining this Congressional victory is a classic case of what political scholar Ronald Shaiko calls “Reverse Lobbying”⁹. This inside-out lobby effort by the Clinton Administration was a textbook accomplishment of a strategy by the Executive Branch to influence and control the passage of legislation from inception.

It is truly amazing how the men formulating what would become the U.S. Constitution had the foresight to recognize the potential conflict and paralytic effect competing

interests could have on a republican form of democratic government. James Madison in Federalist Paper No. 10 pondered this issue:

“It is vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing of interests, and render them all subservient to the public good .Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor in many cases can such adjustment be made.....”¹⁰.

Alexander Hamilton advocated for a strong Presidential role in his Federalist Paper No.70 which predicts the particulars of the NAFTA struggle:

“Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attack; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws.....and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy”¹¹.

In the case of NAFTA, since the governments of Mexico and Canada had already passed the treaty, it was critically important that the U.S. Congress pass the pact intact with no major revisions. Subsequently, control of the Legislative process by the Executive Branch was critical. Without the invisible guiding hand, negotiated side agreements and informal understandings, it's anyone's guess as to whether the bill would have ever passed Congress. Additionally, if Clinton had left Congress up to its own stratagem, it most likely would have passed an aberration of the original NAFTA Treaty. Going back to Mexico and Canada with a new pact was absolutely out of the question.

The Participants and Participation

Organized interests according to scholar Anthony Nownes, can be categorized into three basic types of lobbying. He posits, “All lobbying techniques have something in common; they entail the provision of information through policy analysis, political analysis and /or legal analysis”¹². During the year long struggle to affirm NAFTA, all three forms of lobbying were offered by a variety of lobbying groups. On the policy analysis front, almost any industry that had a functioning association weighed into NAFTA trade policy issues with studies, statistics and articles published mainly through their organization’s association journals. No one wanted to be left out of the NAFTA debate, subsequently everyone had an opinion. Even within industries there was conflicting information and viewpoints on the effects of NAFTA and what needed to be accomplished through regulations to mitigate the effects. For example, *The American Banker-Bond Buyer*, a banking trade journal, published a report in its March, 1992 edition citing numerous statistics involving every industry from tele-electronics products to oil and forestry. Their conclusion was that NAFTA trade would complement rather than increase competition with each other. It even referenced a study by the Canadian government as proof.¹³

In order to bring the power of public opinion to the process Clinton exploited the use of trade advisory groups (TAGs). According to the Centre for Trade, Policy and Law

of Canada, “One of the main reasons for the enormous progress of the NAFTA negotiations in a variety of areas like market access, foreign investment services, intellectual property rights and dispute settlement among others is the close coordination that the three governments maintained throughout the negotiations with their private sectors through the TAGs”¹⁴. These TAGs offered the private and public sector interest groups another formal mechanism other than Congressional hearings to influence trade policy. From the Executive Branch’s perspective, TAGs consolidated or at least channeled numerous competing interests to a structured process which could be better managed in terms of influence and impact on the Administration’s policy direction. TAGs were first incorporated into trade law of the U.S. in the Trade Reform Act of 1974, which also recreated the International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent government agency. During the NAFTA negotiating years, the ITC, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative used the TAG process as a method of both receiving and controlling special interest information regarding NAFTA issues. Since all three of these Agencies are administered by commissioners and executive staff appointed by the President, this tactic has proven indispensable for managing the tremendous volume of special interest information and activity.

Of course, the academic community in all three countries formed a non-unified interest group with a myriad of conferences and studies concerning NAFTA.¹⁵ A majority of these studies found that the U.S. economy would more than likely benefit

from NAFTA in terms of increase of exports, production and employment. These studies gave the Clinton Administration intellectual ammunition to counter claims by labor interests that manufacturers would move south along with their jobs. This was a theory promoted by third party presidential candidate Ross Perot. Several of these studies independently agreed that the expansion of low wage imports would only marginally affect the U.S. manufacturing climate. The Clinton Administration as part of its reverse lobby effort contributed to the negotiations concerning the agricultural provisions of NAFTA with its own academic study (one of several generated by other departments) completed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture¹⁶. This research report completed in 1992 offered among other things compelling evidence for quotas on corn exports by Mexico and tomato exports by the U.S. The countries agreed to long term tariff eliminations for different agricultural products in sensitive areas of each country. Since some of the agricultural interests in the U.S. remained unconvinced, the “sell” to Congress would come later in the form of informal side agreements.

The academic community’s impact on the NAFTA policy negotiation efforts was significant but indeterminate due to the rich variety of discourse on the subject. Market economists thought it made sense for the three bordering countries to negotiate a treaty to formally integrate their economies. Some free traders thought to the contrary. Historians recalled lingering trust issues revolving around the wars which led to the U.S. obtaining much of the southwest of the country from Mexico and establishing the geographical Canadian border. They debated whether such an agreement could be sustained. Political scientists were equally diverse with their opinions concerning free trading versus protectionism, worker relationships and the

lobbying campaigns over the proposed pact. In the final analysis no one was completely convinced and political maneuvering was all that mattered.

From the political analysis perspective, the efforts of special interest groups providing information to members of Congress and the Clinton Administration regarding the political effect of the public policy issues raised by NAFTA were numerous and multifarious. Supposedly the primary motivation was to make sure that NAFTA was good public policy. This was interpreted by politicians to mean that NAFTA provisions kept them in good graces with their particular constituencies - at least those that counted most in keeping them elected to office. Re-election is of paramount concern for legislators considering the high visibility of major legislation such as NAFTA. For President Clinton and his Cabinet, realistic political analysis which provided information as to the feasibility of gaining Congressional approval of the various NAFTA provisions was critical. To secure the majority vote of Congress for NAFTA, matching legislative needs with the appropriate NAFTA provision was essential. Side agreements, were subsequently required to secure the vote and keep the main agreement in tact.

The automotive industry was thought to have a major impact on the economies of the NAFTA countries. Export revenue is of primary concern for the industry, with employment retention and generation of concern to their labor interests. In all three countries the automobile industry was the largest manufacturing sector. By 1990 exporting auto parts between the three countries reached over a billion dollars

annually for each country. It was the ferocious competitiveness of the Japanese automotive industry that drove the U.S. automotive corporations to Mexico in search of cheap labor. As the Mexican scholars Canovas and del Castillo noted, “the NAFTA negotiations concerning the automotive industry, therefore, took place in a very political and difficult environment and made them one of the most complicated aspects of the over all negotiation”¹⁷. There were tariffs, quotas and regulations that had to be negotiated, such as different gasoline mileage declarations for domestic and imported automobiles. Elimination of these tariffs and restrictions became a major balancing act for NAFTA negotiators. Key to passage of the final agreement was a gradual phase out time frame between 5-15 years per provision. From a political standpoint, the extended time frames addressed the concerns of the labor union interest groups that large lay offs would occur if NAFTA was approved. The labor interests as a whole remained unconvinced. However, the time frame provisions and side agreements did influence Congressional support.

Of all the competing interests, the financial interest group sector of all three countries seemed to be the most agreeable to the passage of NAFTA. Financial interests of the three countries consolidated their goals and political approach to open investment activity in each of their neighboring countries. Mexico felt vulnerable however, to big U.S. banking institutional domination of their fledgling financial services industry and for good reason. As early as 1991, the American Banking Association and the Security Industry Association (SIA) demanded in a communication directly to the Bush administration these five requirements:¹⁸

- Branch opportunities in Canada and Mexico
- Full access to ATM installations in both countries
- Access to credit card business
- Unrestricted investment banking opportunities
- Fair regulation of cross border activity

The economic and political clout of this major interest group was not lost on the Clinton Administration or Congress. Securing the advocacy for NAFTA from this group was a major priority for the Executive Branch and was reflected in the NAFTA negotiations and the Administration's coordination with the various financial interest groups. During the House Banking Committee hearings on NAFTA, in September of 1993, financial industry officials were questioned as to the financial industry participation in the NAFTA negotiations. According to a CITI bank representative:

“financial institutions were frequently updated and consulted on their position by NAFTA U.S. negotiators – members of the U.S. Treasury, with the Federal Reserve Bank staff and Security Exchange Commission as technical advisors.”¹⁹

In a meeting with Mexican officials, a group of Republican and Democratic Congressional NAFTA supporters visited Mexico and demanded liberalization of cross border investment in Mexican financial institutions²⁰. Mexican NAFTA negotiators eventually agreed to the requirements of the U.S. financial institutions coalition by shortening transition periods for investment percentage increases in

Mexican Banks. The 5% limit on market share was also eliminated. The U.S., in turn, agreed to accept safeguard provisions for Mexican financial institutions if American insurance and securities industries threatened the Mexican industry survival.²¹ The strongest business proponents of NAFTA were not the financial business community, but the multinational corporations who also sought liberalization of Mexico's investment rules²². This business interest group formed a substantial support team for the Clinton NAFTA effort.

Environmental interest groups and labor groups teamed up on occasion to lobby their concerns. In an effort to keep the main agreement intact, side agreements were incorporated by the Clinton Administration to deal specifically with the social concerns raised by environmental and labor groups. Despite the fact that this was the first time environmental concerns were addressed in a trade agreement, the debate over environmental issues with Mexico were contentious. Three of the 15 objectives noted in the NAFTA preamble related to environmental issues. A side deal committed Mexico and the U.S. to spend \$700 million to clean up the border waterways with the U.S. picking up the lions share of the cost.²³ In an effort to further appease the environmental interests, President Clinton proposed a strong Environmental Commission to monitor the environmental aspects of the trade pact. He sent U.S. Office of Trade representative Mickey Kantor to testify before congress in May of 1993 to describe his expectations of the new commission. Kantor generated letters of support from several environmental groups with the promise that dispute settlement and enforcement responsibilities would fall under the proposed commission's purview. Of course, not all of the environmental lobby was as trusting or convinced.

Agricultural interests were as varied and pessimistic as labor and some manufacturing interests as to the benefits of NAFTA. To meet agricultural interest concerns, a provision for a Trilateral Commission on Agricultural Trade was incorporated into NAFTA. A portion of the Commission's responsibilities centered on:

- Monitoring and promoting implementation of NAFTA
- Authorizing the tariff free designation of bulk commodities of 100% NAFTA country origin
- Monitor the sanitary measures adopted by each country to protect human, animal and plant life in their territories.
- Improving land transportation, investment and property rights to encourage U.S. firms to establish new agricultural concerns in the Americas²⁴

The agricultural sections of NAFTA allowed each country to negotiate some separate agreements among themselves since other trade agreements were already in affect with Canada. Subsequently in addition to the existing trade agreements with Canada, these additional provisions were added to NAFTA:

- The gradual removal of import controls
- Weakening of health and safety regulations
- Settling rules for grading or rating of commodities
- Allowing continuation of some U.S. subsidies

These provisions, while key to agricultural interests support in the U.S., caused major concerns in Canada which the political leaders there were able to address.²⁵

Labor interests turned out to be a difficult group to convince regarding NAFTA. Ross Perot had convinced them, as well as a lot of congressional members, that NAFTA would create a great “sucking sound” of American industry moving to Mexico with its jobs. In mid-March Clinton sent Kantor, Secretary of Labor Robert Reich and other labor officials out to meet with and generate labor support, to no avail. Eventually “..., the ten- member (Democratic Party) majority leadership was split down the middle (on labor and NAFTA), unable even to discuss the pact among themselves.”²⁶ Rather than continuing to try to win over labor interests, President Clinton took the advice of his advisors and directed his personal lobbying efforts towards the business and corporate interest groups and middle of the road Congressional voter support to gain NAFTA approval.²⁷

Last but not least were the legal analysis interests, which included law school scholars, legal aid groups and the national lawyer groups, whose voices were largely marginalized by the tremendous struggle between labor and business. The Executive Branch, through the Federal Trade Commission and The International Trade Commission, issued reports regarding the legal regulations and enforcement issues of NAFTA. Since the commissioners and executive staff of both commissions are appointed by the President, it’s not difficult to understand how both commissions were in “lock step” with the administration in support of the Pact.

The Deals

Below are some of the informal side deals promised by the Clinton Administration to secure the NAFTA Congressional victory.²⁸ Contrary to critics’ charges of “pork

barreling for NAFTA”, these informal promises provided political cover for representatives that ideologically supported the controversial measure, but needed justification for their District constituents, in case the issue turned sour. This is a regular tactic used by Congressional leaders to encourage reluctant party members on close vote legislation as well as the Executive Branch to build bipartisan support for the budget bills each year which require two thirds of the Congress to approve. President Clinton’s team employed this strategy masterfully to garner NAFTA votes across party lines:

- Two additional C-17 Military cargo planes from the District of Representative Bernice Johnson , D-Texas to be built in that south Dallas district.
- \$16 Million for completion of an Agricultural Research Center in Fort Pierce, FL.
- Four Republican representatives were co-opted when the Administration agreed to delay restrictions of methyl bromide pesticides for 7 years.
- Agreement to authorize the construction of a Center for the Study of Trade to be built in the Austin District of J. Rickle D-Texas to the tune of \$10 million.
- Gained 10 House Republican votes by agreeing to delay federal land reforms, by reopening public comment period.
- \$10 million dollars for the construction of a bridge over the East Houston rail yard in the District of Representative Gene Green, D-Texas.
- Three representatives who lobbied intensely for air route authorization to London that the Department of Transportation announced plans to award, voted for NAFTA.

- Representative Lewis Payne R-Virginia, whose district was named as the site for the construction of the National Institute of Standards, voted for NAFTA.
- Promised to press Canadian government to limit subsidies for a chemical plant in the province of Quebec which happened to be in competition with a plant located in Representative Cardin's Maryland District.
- Shortly before Senator Pelosi announced support for NAFTA, President Clinton sent a letter to her promising that the Administration would issue an Executive order adding labor rights violations as a cause of action that could trigger sanctions. (nothing ever came of the promise).

Conclusion

Political theorists and citizen participants tacitly understand that the President of the United States is the party's chief political leader as well as the chief executive officer for the implementation and enforcement institutions of this form of democratic government. Historically, appointing department heads and committee commissioners with a supporting vision of government is also a major activity of the chief of the Executive Branch. The complexity of social and political issues of today, coupled with the increased political impact of the media and the Internet, has necessitated that the role of the Chief of the Executive Branch of government be expanded in a defacto informal manner not readily admitted or recognized by many of the "players" in the formal process of passing legislation.

While more interest groups have formed and become active in the national legislative process, the sheer magnitude of the money they spend and other resources they have at

their disposal often thwarts the passage of good public policy. Partisan politics has also intensified, “ because in the American separation of powers.....members of the Presidents party may oppose him on some issues” (such as NAFTA where 60% of the House Democrats voted against the bill)²⁹ This is the point where the newly invigorated role of the Presidency achieves prominence. Traditionally the President sets the party agenda and national policy priorities during the start of each term. Interest group competition, with the mounting threat of legislative grid lock, requires a strong Executive Branch legislative role in advocating and ushering those policy priorities through the Congress to insure that they reach the President’s desk in a form which meets his vision and constituent expectations.

This expanded legislative role was deftly demonstrated by President Clinton and his Executive Branch staff in order to secure passage of NAFTA in the U.S. Congress. Inside-out lobbying to shop and sell this trade pact made the difference between victory and defeat. NAFTA was perceived to have such a major impact on so many areas of the American political and economic spheres that all of the competing interests and Congress could never have come to an agreement. If left to their own devices, the Trade Pact already approved by Canada and Mexico would never have survived in tact. President Clinton guided the negotiation process, aggressively lobbied not only the competing interest groups but also the competing philosophical factions within both political parties. Judging from the continued criticism on anti-NAFTA WEB sites and trade journals, had not the President exercised this unwritten Executive Branch power, NAFTA would still be on the negotiation table.

This strategy by the Presidency has only been exercised in the later half of the 20th Century, which coincides with the enormous growth of special interest groups lobbying Congress.³⁰ While this effort in the case of NAFTA was especially successful and will impact the economic and political relationship of the three countries for years to come, it is not always the best approach in working the legislative process. For example, the effort by the Clintons to sell their healthcare agenda failed miserably. President Bush has still not managed to generate legislation to formalize his vision of privatizing Social Security. This should remind the Executive Branch of the potential pitfalls of using the “Reverse Lobby” strategy on a regular basis to formalize a political agenda. These examples should also suggest that expansion of these presidential powers pose no real threat to the sanctity of balance, the Founding Fathers intended. Perhaps this might be a lesson that constitutional flexibility is advisable for the successful implementation of the American democratic experiment.

Notes

¹ Excerpt from Congressional testimony by Congressman Pete DeFazio, Oregon regarding pending fast track legislation, www.defazio.house.gov/120601/TRStatement.shtml

² See FIG. 1 in article, www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pd91.htm

³ Orme, William A. Jr, *Understanding NAFTA*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press,1996), p. XIV

⁴ See Heritage Foundation article and opinion of “fast track” authority request by Clinton to push NAFTA accessed at www.heritage.org/Research/trade-foreign

⁵ Shoch, James, *Trading Blows*, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,2001) p. 147

⁶ IBID, pg 159

⁷ IBID, paraphrased, p. 23

⁸ Herrnson, Paul S., *The Interest Group Connection*, 2005, pg 276 (detailed description of Iron Triangle model of influencing policymaking), Washington, DC, CQ Press

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- ⁹ Shaiko, Ronald G., *Reverse Lobbying: Interest Group Mobilization from the White House and the Hill*, 8, In Interest Group Politics, 5th ed., edited by Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A Loomis, - (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1998), pp.259-267
- ¹⁰ Lodge, Henry Cabot. *The Federalist*, In Number X, The Same Subject Continued, (New York, NY. G.P. Putman's Sons, 1888), p.55
- ¹¹ Boone, Edward Gaylord, *The Federalists*, (New York, NY, Walter Dunne Publishing 1901). P 49
- ¹² Nownes, Anthony J. Organized Interests in American Politics, Chapter 5 , *Pressure and Power* (Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001), p. 90
- ¹³ This is paraphrased from the American Banker-Bond Buyer, March 23,1992, *NAFTA Brings no Conflicts for Canada-Mexico in U.S.* pg 5, accessed at <http://infotrac.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.csus.edu> – article A12099587
- ¹⁴ Del Castillo, Gustavo V, *The Politics of Free Trade in North America*, (Ottawa, Canada, The Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1995), p. 4
- ¹⁵ Canovas, Gustavo Vega et all, *The Politics of Free Trade in North America*, (Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1995), pp 145-146 See a list of studies compiled by authors
- ¹⁶ IBID pp 133 and footnote 139 for details on the report
- ¹⁷ IBID detailed discussion on specific automotive issues, p. 160
- ¹⁸ The American Banker, (August 14,1992) p. 1, *U.S. Banks Eager to Enter Mexico*, accessed at www.americanbanker.com/media/digitalriver
- ¹⁹ U.S. House of Representatives Banking, Financial and Urban Affairs Committee; *Hearings on Aspects of NAFTA Affecting the Financial Services Industry*,(Federal News Service September 28,1993)
- ²⁰ U.S. – Mexico Free Trade Reporter , February24, 1992 issue. P. 3
- ²¹ IBD June 15 1992 edition p. 2
- ²² Paraphrased detailed discussion, Shoch, James, IBID *Trading Blows* pp 145-147
- ²³ Ambler, H. Moss Jr., *Assessments of the North American Free Trade Agreement*, Environmental Concerns pg 12 and NAFTA's Green Opportunity; (Coral Gables, FL, University of Miami Press 1993), pp. 19-31
- ²⁴ Paraphrased from CBO Papers, *Agriculture in the North America Free Trade Agreement*, (Washington, DC, Congressional Budget Office, May 1993), pp 24-27
- ²⁵ Canadian Centre for Policy Alternative, *Which Way for the Americas – Analysis of NAFTA Proposals and the Impact on Canada*; (Ottawa ,Ontario, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1992), pp. 57-61
- ²⁶ IBID Shoch, *Trading Blows*, pp175-177
- ²⁷ For more info see *Labor Side Agreements to Save NAFTA*, Employment Housing and Aviation Subcommittee Report for the House Committee on Government Operations (Washington, DC, CBO Papers 9/9/1993) accessed at www.thenewamerican.com , regarding labors opposition to 32 new boards and committees set up by NAFTA
- ²⁸ For more details and several reports see the Public Citizen WEB site of the Ralph Nader non-profit PAC ,*Public Citizen Global Trade Watch*, accessed at (www.citizen.org)
- ²⁹ IBID Shoch, *Trading Blows*, pp. 27 and 30 see supporting discussion
- ³⁰ Cigler, Allan J., *Interest Group Politics*, In Congress Organized Interests in the Twentieth Century, (Washington, DC, CQ Press, 2002), pp. 189-198